# Round 2

## 1nc

### 1NC – DA

#### Obama pushing immigration reform first even with fiscal issues and it will pass – GOP electoral incentives

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D.C. She previously worked at The Washington Independent., “Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html>)

WASHINGTON -- Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said. Advocates have vowed to keep pushing for reform. As part of their efforts, they plan to remind Republican members of Congress about their presidential nominee's defeat among Latino and Asian voters, a majority of whom support a fix to the immigration system. "They can procrastinate as long as they want, but they're going to have a serious day of reckoning next election cycle," said Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy and advocacy at the Center for American Progress. "We're going to have a lot of near-death experiences with this issue, but I'm pretty confident it's never going to go completely to a flatline." Good news for immigration advocates may have come Tuesday night, when Boehner broke the so-called "Hastert Rule" and allowed the fiscal cliff bill to come for a vote without support from a majority of his Republican conference. Given opposition to immigration reform by many Tea Party Republicans, the proof that Boehner is willing to bypass them on major legislation is a good sign, the Democratic aide said. "If something is of such importance that the GOP establishment [is] telling Boehner, 'You must do this. You need to get this off the table soon,'" the Democratic aide said, the speaker could break the Hastert Rule again. "He already did it with this fiscal issue, so I would not be surprised if when it came down to it he puts up a bill that he just allows to go through with a combination of Democratic and Republican votes, without worrying about a majority of the majority," the aide continued. Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-immigration reform group America's Voice, also said he thinks the House could pass an immigration bill in the same way it did last night, relying on support from both parties. He's hopeful that the fiscal cliff fight could even make them happy to work out legislation in a more standard way. "I never thought I'd say this, but after bruising battles over the future of the American and world economy, the chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya,'" Sharry said.

#### Nuclear power is a political deadweight---drains capital

Levine 12 (Greg, “Obama Drops Nuclear Energy from Convention Speech” http://my.firedoglake.com/gregglevine/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-energy-from-convention-speech/)

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever. That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means): We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles. Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.” But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina. That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.” But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term. Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this): [W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build. That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important. In the wake of Fukushima, where hundreds of thousands of Japanese have been displaced, where tens of thousands are showing elevated radiation exposure, and where thousands of children have thyroid abnormalities, no one can be cavalier about promising a safe harnessing of the atom. And in a world where radioisotopes from the breached reactors continue to turn up in fish and farm products, not only across Japan, but across the northern hemisphere, no one can pretend this is someone else’s problem. Obama and his campaign advisors know all this and more. They know that most industrialized democracies have chosen to shift away from nuclear since the start of the Japanese crisis. They know that populations that have been polled on the matter want to see nuclear power phased out. And they know that in a time of deficit hysteria, nuclear power plants are an economic sinkhole. And so, on a night when the president was promised one of the largest audiences of his entire campaign, he and his team decided that 2012 was not a year to throw a bone to Obama’s nuclear backers. Obama, a consummate politician, made the decision that for his second shot at casting for the future, nuclear power is political deadweight.

#### Obama’s political capital is key to reform passage

Dade 12/7/12 (Corey, staffwriter for NPR, “Black, Latino Groups: It's Our Turn, Mr. President” <http://www.npr.org/2012/12/05/166573082/black-latino-groups-its-our-turn-mr-president>)

Spending 'Political Capital' For Latinos, the November election has sparked momentum for their top issue, immigration. Congressional Republicans have since embraced immigration reform as a priority. Bipartisan talks are under way in the House on legislation that could be introduced early next year. Obama has said Congress should "seize the moment," yet Latino leaders insist that voters have given the president a mandate to lead the effort. Some Latino leaders believe Obama should have fought more aggressively to push the DREAM Act through Congress in 2010. (The bill would have established a path to citizenship for young people brought to the United States as children who attend college or serve in the military.) Latinos also criticized the Obama administration, before it changed its policy, for deporting a record 1.1 million people in three years. "Not only the president but others have said in the past, 'How much political capital do we need to spend on this issue?' Everybody understands now that you need to spend all of it," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill. "With the same vigor and energy that Latino people voted for this president, he should do this."

#### Immigration reform key to solve clean tech U.S.-China co-operation – fosters business relationships

Herman, “why immigrants can drive the green economy” 2010

Raymond Spencer, an Australian-born entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future--and a gusto for investing after founding a high-technology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. "I have investments in maybe 10 start-ups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a 'green' theme," he said. "And it's interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants." It should come as no surprise that immigrants will help drive the green revolution. America's young scientists and engineers, especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, the leading expert on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that much of the clean-technology talent lies overseas, in nations that began pursuing alternative energy sources decades ago. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Expanding our own clean-tech industry will require working closely with foreign nations and foreign-born scientists, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His lab's efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab, for example, were stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers. "We can't get researchers over here," Arvizu, the son of a once-undocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his voice tinged with dismay. "It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach." Dr. Zhao Gang, the Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. "The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy development," he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what's the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fast-paced world of green-tech development. "We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork," he said.

#### Key to solve reactionary Chinese oil policy – destabilizes Asia.

Herberg 2010

Mikkal E, Senior Research Fellow for International Energy Pacific Council on International Policy, China’s “Energy Rise”, the U.S., and the New Geopolitics of Energy http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=159

Beijing’s sense of weakness and vulnerability has fueled this “go-out” policy and has been very much about ownership and physical control of barrels rather than just access. Mistrust of global energy markets remains deeply ingrained amid a concern that the market alone cannot be counted on to provide reliable oil supplies at reasonable prices. This is reinforced by the belief that these markets are dominated by the U.S., which is out to exploit China’s energy weakness in its efforts to ‘contain’ China. U.S. strategic power in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy’s control over critical energy transport sea lanes, and what is perceived to be the power of the U.S. in the global oil industry and institutions, foster a perception in Beijing that the U.S. exerts a dominating influence on global oil prices and flows. Strident rhetoric in the U.S. during the 2005 CNOOC-Unocal episode reinforced the perception that the U.S. seeks to undermine China’s access to secure supplies and that it sees energy as an arena of strategic competition. All these factors have combined to give a strongly mercantilist impulse to China’s energy security drive and rhetoric and a decidedly strategic approach that has fueled a sharpening image of China Energy Inc. among other major oil importing countries and the oil industry. Regional or multilateral approaches to energy security based on collaboration to ensure open access to oil supplies, boosting investment in new oil supplies, and regional or multilateral cooperation on sharing emergency oil stocks, for example, have been low on Beijing’s agenda. All these attributes have contributed to a more politicized, competitive, and zerosum environment towards control over energy supplies, particularly in Asia where the atmosphere of competition over control of oil supplies is reinforcing strategic rivalries among China, Japan, India, and South Korea. In fairness, other Asian oil importers, as well as the U.S., have strongly fueled and fed this atmosphere of energy nationalism. The U.S. has contributed to this atmosphere with the constant drumbeat of nationalistic rhetoric coming from Congress, the Pentagon, and conservative think tanks about China’s energy strategy. Japan, India, and South Korea have all stepped up their energy diplomacy, rhetoric, and support for the national oil companies and have sharply raised their targets for acquiring “equity” oil.

#### Most likely scenario for nuclear escalation

Nye et al., Professor @ Harvard, 2K

[Joseph S. Nye, Professor Emeritus @ The John F. Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard University, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Michael J. Green, Advisor & Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Associate Professor @ The Walsh School of Foreign Service, Kurt M. Campbell, Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Edward J. Lincoln, Fellow @ The Brookings Institution, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” The Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 11th 2000, http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibei-anpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf]

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.

### 1NC – Counterplan

**Text**

**The United States federal government should**

**-reform existing domestic subsidies for non-nuclear renewable energy to be conditional on price reductions and improved performance**

**-substantially increase funding for non-nuclear renewable energy research and development**

**-substantially increase global climate financing for non-nuclear carbon reduction strategies**

**-support non-nuclear carbon reduction strategies in future climate negotiations**

**-ratify and implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.**

#### Observation One: CP solves the case

#### Conditioning renewable energy subsidies on performance and increasing funding for R&D spurs domestic transition.

Jenkins et al-Breakthrough Institute-4/12

Beyond Boom and Bust <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Beyond_Boom_and_Bust.pdf>

In light of these budgetary findings, this report concludes that policy makers and business leaders need to unite behind timely energy policy reform that supports US innovation, rewards continual improvements in clean tech price and performance, and secures subsidy independence for clean tech markets as rapidly as possible. The key implications of this report’s analysis are: The maintenance of perpetual subsidies is not a sustainable solution to the new challenges facing the US clean tech industry. Clean tech markets in America have lurched from boom to bust for decades, and the root cause remains the same: the higher costs and risks of emerging US clean tech products relative to either incumbent fossil energy technologies or lower-cost international competitors, which make US clean tech sectors dependent on subsidy and policy support. Cost competitiveness is achievable, but until technological innovation and cost declines can secure independence from ongoing subsidy, clean tech segments will remain continually imperiled by the threat of policy expiration and political uncertainty. Continual improvement in price and performance is thus the only real pathway beyond the cycle of clean tech boom and bust. Maintaining a viable US clean tech industry will require policy makers to reform the nation’s myriad energy subsidies, which should be optimized to drive improvements in technology price and performance and ensure clean tech segments achieve subsidy independence as rapidly as possible. Federal clean energy policies should reward firms for continually improving the performance and reducing the cost of their technologies, or for inventing and commercializing next-generation, advanced energy technologies, not simply for deploying current-generation technologies without advancing them towards subsidy independence Energy subsidies should be temporary and targeted to drive the maturation and improvement of emerging technologies. Just as subsidies for clean tech sectors should phase out as these sectors mature, it is long-past time to end subsidies for well-established fossil energy production methods and technologies as well. The United States can leverage its strengths as an innovation leader and accelerate the pathway to clean tech subsidy independence by increasing funding for energy RD&D, accelerating advanced energy technology commercialization, and harnessing the advanced manufacturing capabilities, regional industry clusters, and high-skilled energy workforce that are crucial to a robust innovation system. Establishing subsidy independent, highly innovative US clean tech markets will also position US firms to compete effectively in growing international markets for clean energy products. With the right reforms, the United States has the opportunity to be a leader in the invention and production of next-generation technologies for sale to an energy-hungry global market.

#### Climate Financing gets developing nations on board – makes sustainability affordable.

Purvis and Stevenson 2010

Nigel Purvis is president of Climate Advisers and senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He previously served as a senior climate negotiator at the U.S. Department of State. Andrew Stevenson is a researcher at Climate Advisers and Resources for the Future. Rethinking Climate Diplomacy, Bussels Forum Paper Series, March 2010 <http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2010/docs/BF2010-Paper-Purvis-Stevenson.pdf>

Ramping up international clean-energy cooperation through new climate financing, of course, would have implications for global climate talks. In the past, financial assistance has been seen by Europe and America as one of the few levers they have to convince developing nations to accept legally binding emissions mitigation commitments. However, as discussed previously, conditioning climate financing on negotiated commitments can be both self-defeating and ineffective. Emissions reductions are urgently needed and can be achieved now if funds are made available, with economic and security co-benefits for the United States, Europe, and the world. Moreover, new conditional offers of financial assistance are highly unlikely to convince China, India, and other major emitters to accept ideas they have rejected so consistently. Those nations are simply not interested in a strong multilateral climate protection regime. Making good on financial pledges without too many conditions relating to global climate talks is essential. The key here is to understand that doing so is not raising the white flag of surrender, but that helping to reduce the cost of climate action is a winning strategy for convincing developing nations to act even if those nations continue to resist international climate commitments. America and Europe should insist that emerging economies make good on the commitments they made in the Copenhagen Accord, but holding out for other elements of the original European vision for Copenhagen would be the wrong strategy. New funding would build trust with developing nations and help demonstrate that domestic climate action is affordable and consist with other development priorities, making climate talks easier down the road.

Viability is not an obstacle-Renewable energy can fill in globally

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ‘12

Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation

<http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf>

The global technical potential of RE sources will not limit continued growth in the use of RE. A wide range of estimates is provided in the literature, but studies have consistently found that the total global technical potential for RE is substantially higher than global energy demand (Figure SPM.4) [1.2.2, 10.3, Annex II]. The technical potential for solar energy is the highest among the RE sources, but substantial technical potential exists for all six RE sources. Even in regions with relatively low levels of technical potential for any individual RE source, there are typically signiﬁcant opportunities for increased deployment compared to current levels. [1.2.2, 2.2, 2.8, 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.2, 6.4, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3, 10.3] In the longer term and at higher deployment levels, however, technical potentials indicate a limit to the contribution of some individual RE technologies. Factors such as sustainability concerns [9.3], public acceptance [9.5], system integration and infrastructure constraints [8.2], or economic factors [10.3] may also limit deployment of RE technologies

#### CTBT ratification boost US leadership and solves proliferation

Joseph, Senior Democratic Foreign Policy Staffer in the United States Senate, ‘9 (Jofi, April, “Renew the Drive for CTBT Ratification” Washington Quarterly)

The 1999 vote fell short of an absolute majority, much less the two-thirds majority required for treaty ratification under the U.S. Constitution. This failure undercut traditional U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation issues, and offered an easy justification for China to continue to refuse to ratify the CTBT, as well as for India and Pakistan to avoid signing the treaty altogether. An announcement in Obama’s first year in office that he will call on the Senate to initiate the consideration of the CTBT by holding the appropriate hearings over the next year, with the goal of scheduling a ratification vote prior to the end of his first term in 2012, will send an unmistakable signal that the United States is once again committed to multilateral, rules-based cooperation with the international community to advance mutual interests. It will reenergize a flagging nonproliferation regime and offer the United States important leverage on key challenges like Iran and North Korea. With a healthy majority of Democratic senators in place, and close relationships with key moderate Republicans, Obama is within reach of the 67 votes necessary to secure ratification, and accomplish a significant foreign policy and national security goal.

#### Observation Two: Net Benefits

Pushing global nuclear power risk catastrophic accidents, environmental crisis, and wide-spread proliferation-The plan and permutation trade-off with a shift to renewable energy which is key to solve climate change.

Ticknell- nuclear engineer, Nuclear Pledge-8/20/12

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/20/world-need-nuclear-power-climate-crisis>

Does the world need nuclear power to solve the climate crisis?

So this is the question: does the world need nuclear power for us to solve the climate crisis, as Monbiot claims? To borrow a second thought, this time from Margaret Thatcher, must we accept that there is no alternative? Let's look at the figures. In 2010 the world demand for primary energy was equivalent to 12,000 million tonnes of oil (Mtoe), 87% of which was provided by oil, gas and coal. Nuclear power contributed a gross 626 Mtoe, about 5% of the total, while renewables accounted for 935 Mtoe, almost 8%. To solve the climate problem, the world must not only reverse the trend of increasing carbon emissions over the next few decades, but bring them down to less than they are now. So can nuclear power do it? Assume a 2% growth in primary energy demand per year over the next 35 years, and that demand will double to some 24,000 Mtoe. Rely on nuclear power to accommodate all the growth, and knock out 4,000 Mtoe-worth of coal, and it will have to produce 16,000 Mtoe of energy per year – a 25-fold increase on its current level. Today the world has 440 operational nuclear reactors, so 25 times more means 11,000 reactors. To have these in 35 years means building, on average, about one a day. Or in an exponential growth scenario, the world would need to sustain an annual increase of 8% per year in the number of operational nuclear reactors for 35 years. Given that nuclear power generation has flatlined over the last decade, and has sharply declined in the last few years, that looks like a tall order. There are currently plans for about 200 new nuclear reactors around the world, mainly in China, the Middle East and the USA. But few observers expect all of these to be built, since the economics of nuclear power are unattractive to private investors, owing to high construction cost, long lead time, electricity price uncertainty, political hazard and long-term liabilities. Realistically the world might build 100 or so new reactors over the coming decade or so – perhaps one every 35–50 days. Over this same period a similar number of existing reactors will reach the end of their lives and close, leading to a net growth rate close to zero. That does not mean it's impossible to build 11,000 reactors in 35 years if the world dedicates sufficient resources to the task. At a construction cost of about US$10 billion per reactor, we would need to dedicate US$110 trillion, or about two years' gross world product, while also providing for long-term liabilities. But before we seriously consider doing so, we should ask what an 11,000-reactor world would be like. For a start, it would be much more radioactive than it is now. Routine radioactive discharges, for example of gaseous fission products like xenon-133, would be 25 times greater. Serious accidents, such as those at Windscale, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima – the last of which came very close to making Tokyo uninhabitable for decades to come – would become commonplace events. To date the nuclear industry has produced one major radiation release for every 3,000 years of reactor operation. On that basis our 11,000 reactors would give us four such events a year. Safer reactor design would reduce the danger, but as nuclear power reaches into countries where safety standards are not so exacting as in the UK, the US, Russia and Japan, and where suitably trained personnel may be hard to recruit, the risk would surely rise. And what about the nuclear fuel? The only naturally occurring fissile substance, uranium-235, is in short supply, so to power all those reactors we will have to 'breed' new fissile material. This may be done in two ways: by irradiating abundant uranium-238 with neutrons to make fissile plutonium-239, or by irradiating abundant thorium-232 with neutrons to make fissile uranium-233. And to use the newly bred fissile material, it has to be reprocessed – a complex, expensive, hazardous and polluting process that inevitably discharges significant amounts of radiation into the environment. A further hazard is that both plutonium-239 and uranium-233 can be used to make nuclear bombs, so the wholesale expansion of nuclear power and the widespread use of breeder reactors would create an uncontrollable proliferation hazard. The world already has some 2,000 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium, and is producing a further 75 tonnes of plutonium per year from its 440 reactors. Just 8kg of plutonium is enough to make a small nuclear bomb, so it is inconceivable that proliferation could be contained securely in a 11,000-reactor world producing enough plutonium for hundreds of thousands of bombs every year. So it seems that this 11,000-reactor world is not only an improbable one, but also decidedly unpleasant. But what's the alternative? Other than nuclear, what other low-carbon energy sources could possibly rise up to the challenge? Renewables? Surely not! Most renewable energy production is from large hydroelectric dams, and there are very limited opportunities for expansion. And in 2010 renewables other than hydro contributed just 160 Mtoe, a mere 1.5% of primary energy. However, non-hydro renewables are growing very fast – up 15% in 2010. And within this figure just three power sources are responsible for most of the growth: wind power, solar PV and solar hot water. From 2005 to 2010, global solar hot water and wind power capacity both grew at 25% per year, while solar PV capacity grew at over 50% per year. If these growth rates were to be sustained for 35 years, wind capacity would rise 6,300-fold from 200 gigawatts (GW) in 2010 to about 1.25 million GW, solar hot water 6,300-fold from 185 GW to 1.15 million GW, and solar PV 40 million-fold from 40 GW to 1.6 billion GW. These figures are not predictions. Exponential growth will not continue for so long, as prime sites for wind turbines and solar panels get used up. Other technologies, such as concentrated solar power, will also become important. And there will be demand-side constraints: the projected 1.6 billion GW of solar PV capacity alone would produce over 3 billion billion kilowatt hours per year, equivalent to a primary energy burn of some 30 million Mtoe – over 1,000 times our projected world primary energy demand in 35 years. We would not even know what to do with so much energy. But while not predictive, the figures are highly indicative of the low-carbon energy choices the world should make. The one, nuclear power, is expensive and becoming more so. It will be a practical impossibility to increase its capacity to a scale big enough to make a real difference to global climate within a realistic time frame. Worse, if we were somehow to build our 11,000 nuclear reactors, we would face the certainty of repeated catastrophic accidents and the spread of nuclear weapons, not to mention unimaginable liabilities for decommissioning and long-term nuclear-waste management. We can fairly say that nuclear power is both repulsive and utterly wrong. The other choice, renewable power, already costs less than fossil fuels for many applications, thanks in large part to generous subsidies in Germany, Japan and other countries, which have had the effect of greatly reducing prices. Solar electricity is now cheaper than power from diesel generators in the tropics and subtropics – and so the rapid spread of solar power across China, India, Africa and Latin America is being driven not by subsidy but by the market. And it is getting cheaper all the time as increased demand, caused by its lower price, stimulates greater competition among manufacturers, technological advance, and even greater price falls, in a delightful virtuous circle. Moreover, renewable energy is free of catastrophic dangers and long- term liabilities. It is both romantic and right. That does not mean that the transition to a renewable energy world will be easy or straightforward. We will need to reconfigure power grids so they operate as networks accepting high volumes of 'embedded generation', not just as distribution systems; to build new long-distance electricity links to smooth out fluctuations in supply and demand; to develop the technologies to convert electrical power into liquid fuels for road vehicles and aviation; to create 'smart grids' in which the demand for power responds to the available supply; to find ways to store surplus power for those days or weeks when the wind isn't blowing and the sun isn't shining; and to waste less of the energy that we produce. All of this will require considerable investment in research, development, manufacture and installation – and will incidentally create many millions of jobs. All the more reason then not to throw our finite national capital into the bottomless pit of nuclear subsidies. Currently 86% of the entire budget of the UK's Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is dedicated to decommissioning old power stations – power stations that have already cost the country dear to build and operate. Any more money we throw at nuclear power now will only create additional liabilities for us and for generations to come. As for renewables, wind, solar PV and solar hot water technologies have already reached a point of no return. The question is not whether they will come to dominate world energy supply, but when. By investing wisely in the critical enabling technologies, Britain can make a huge contribution to bringing that time forward, not just here in the UK but across the world. To really make a difference to global climate, and to achieve energy security and abundance for ourselves and for the wider world, we must wholeheartedly back the renewable revolution – and bring a decisive end to the nuclear nightmare.

#### Scenario One: Warming

#### Nuclear power makes warming worse---slow and costly trades off with renewables

Aurilio and Sargent 2011

Anna and Rob, Anna Aurilio is Director of the DC office for Environment America responsible for policy development, research and advocacy on energy issues and anti-environmental subsidies and MS in Environmental Engineering from MIT. Rob Sargent is the Energy Program Director for Environment America. Nuclear Power Will Set Back Race Against Global Warming, New Report Shows <http://www.environmentamerica.org/news/ame/nuclear-power-will-set-back-race-against-global-warming-new-report-shows>

Washington, DC- Far from a solution to global warming, nuclear power will actually set America back in the race to reduce pollution, according to a new report by Environment America. Environment America, the Sierra Club and a national energy expert called on states and Congress to focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy instead of nuclear power as the solution to global warming. “When it comes to global warming, time and money are of the essence and nuclear power will fail America on both accounts,” said Anna Aurilio, Washington DC Office Director of Environment America. “With government dollars more precious than ever, nuclear power is a foolish investment that will set us back in the race against global warming,” she added. Environment America’s new report released today, Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming (click here for report) analyzes the role, under a best-case scenario, that nuclear power could play in reducing global warming pollution. Some key findings of the report include: To avoid the most catastrophic impacts of global warming, America must cut power plant emissions roughly in half over the next 10 years. No new reactors are now under construction in the United States, and building a single reactor could take a decade or longer. As a result, it is quite possible that nuclear power could deliver no progress in the critical next decade, despite spending billions on reactor construction. Even if the nuclear industry somehow managed to build 100 new nuclear reactors by 2030, nuclear power could reduce total U.S. emissions of global warming pollution over the next 20 years by only 12 percent. As a result, America would burn through its 40-year electric sector carbon budget - the limit on carbon emissions determined by scientists to be necessary to stave off the worst impacts of climate change - in just 15 years. In contrast, energy efficiency and renewable energy can immediately reduce global warming pollution. Energy efficiency programs are already cutting electricity consumption by 1-2 percent annually in leading states, and the U.S. wind industry is already building the equivalent of three nuclear reactors per year in wind farms. America has vast potential to do more. Building 100 new reactors would require an up-front investment on the order of $600 billion dollars – money which could cut at least twice as much carbon pollution by 2030 if invested in clean energy. Taking into account the ongoing costs of running the nuclear plants, clean energy could deliver as much as 5 times more pollution-cutting progress per dollar overall. Nuclear power is not necessary to provide clean, carbon-free electricity for the long haul. The need for base-load power is exaggerated and small-scale clean energy solutions can actually enhance the reliability of the electric grid. “Nuclear energy remains as flawed an idea today as it was in the 1980’s -- the last time it was rejected by the American public,” said Dave Hamilton, Director of Energy Programs at the Sierra Club. “Today we have cleaner, cheaper, faster solutions that we should be investing in before we seriously consider reviving the nuclear dinosaur,” he added. To address global warming, state and federal policy makers should focus on improving energy efficiency and generating electricity from clean sources that never run out – such as wind, solar, biomass and geothermal power, according to Environment America and the coalition groups that attended today’s event. “Every new nuclear power plant built would be a step backwards when it comes to solving global warming.” said Aurilio. “Clean energy solutions like energy efficiency and renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power are far more effective than nuclear power in both cutting global warming pollution and saving consumers’ money,” she added. “New nuclear power investments would actually worsen climate change because the money spent on nuclear reactors would not be available for solutions that fight it faster and at lower cost,” said Peter Bradford, a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner. “Counting on new nuclear reactors as a climate change solution is no more sensible than counting on an un-built dam to create a lake to fight a nearby forest fire."

#### Warming causes extinction---outweighs nuclear war

Deibel 7 [Terry L., Professor of IR @ National War College, “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today]

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serious the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

#### Scenario Two: Accidents

#### The risk of an accident is linear and precautions don't check.

Coplan 2008

Karl S., Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, Pace Law School ARTICLE: The Externalities of Nuclear Power: First, Assume We Have a Can Opener... 35 Ecology L. Currents 17 Lexis

As the incidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have demonstrated, the operation of nuclear power plants entails a risk of malfunctions that could potentially lead to core meltdown and atmospheric release of radioactivity These two incidents are comfortably in the past, but as recently as 2002, undiscovered deterioration of the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio brought that facility within weeks of a core meltdown event, [31](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=328531bf2d461b13d4e756e3d86e0a4a&searchType=&docnum=7&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzV-zSkAl&_md5=a0f90ee85e444ffafee2418bd557886b&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n31" \t "_self) and this past year, an earthquake ruptured pipes and led to the release of radioactive contamination at Japan's Kashiwazaki plant. [32](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=328531bf2d461b13d4e756e3d86e0a4a&searchType=&docnum=7&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzV-zSkAl&_md5=a0f90ee85e444ffafee2418bd557886b&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n32" \t "_self) As it turns out, even based on industry reliability estimates, the operation of hundreds of nuclear power plants domestically and thousands of nuclear power plants internationally is statistically certain to result in more severe accidents in the mid-term. According to industry estimates, a severe nuclear power accident can be expected to occur less frequently than once every 10,000 reactor-years. [33](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=328531bf2d461b13d4e756e3d86e0a4a&searchType=&docnum=7&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzV-zSkAl&_md5=a0f90ee85e444ffafee2418bd557886b&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n33" \t "_self) While this number sounds comfortably large, this translates into one severe accident every one hundred years for the 104 currently operating nuclear power plants in the United States, or one severe accident every twenty-five years if the number of operating reactors is quadrupled to reduce the global warming impacts of electricity generation. Since the NRC has not required the next generation of nuclear power plants to be any safer than the existing power plants, [34](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=FULL&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22expandedNewLead%22&fpSetup=0&brand=&_m=328531bf2d461b13d4e756e3d86e0a4a&searchType=&docnum=7&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzV-zSkAl&_md5=a0f90ee85e444ffafee2418bd557886b&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n34" \t "_self) the expected accident rate is not likely to change. Even in the mid-term, a severe nuclear accident is a likelihood if we increase nuclear power production enough to make a substantial dent in our greenhouse gas emissions.

#### Extinction

Wasserman, 1 (Harvey, Senior Editor – Free Press, “America's Terrorist Nuclear Threat to Itself”, October, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2001/10/00\_wasserman\_nuclear-threat.htm)

Without continous monitoring and guaranteed water flow, the thousands of tons of radioactive rods in the cores and the thousands more stored in those fragile pools would rapidly melt into super-hot radioactive balls of lava that would burn into the ground and the water table and, ultimately, the Hudson. Indeed, a jetcrash like the one on 9/11 or other forms of terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Prevailing winds from the north and west might initially drive these clouds of mass death downriver into New York City and east into Westchester and Long Island. But at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, winds ultimately shifted around the compass to irradiate all surrounding areas with the devastating poisons released by the on-going fiery torrent. At Indian Point, thousands of square miles would have been saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created or imagined, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. In nearby communities like Buchanan, Nyack, Monsey and scores more, infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Virtually all pregnant women would spontaneously abort, or ultimately give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Emphysema, heart attacks, stroke, multiple organ failure, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinance, sterility and impotence, asthma, blindness, and more would kill thousands on the spot, and doom hundreds of thousands if not millions. A terrible metallic taste would afflict virtually everyone downwind in New York, New Jersey and New England, a ghoulish curse similar to that endured by the fliers who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaskai, by those living downwind from nuclear bomb tests in the south seas and Nevada, and by victims caught in the downdrafts from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Then comes the abominable wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented, and new dimensions of agony will beg description. Indeed, those who survived the initial wave of radiation would envy those who did not. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Bridges and highways would become killing fields for those attempting to escape to destinations that would soon enough become equally deadly as the winds shifted. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. At Chernobyl, pilots flying helicopters that dropped boron on the fiery core died in droves. At Indian Point, such missions would be a sure ticket to death. Their utility would be doubtful as the molten cores rage uncontrolled for days, weeks and years, spewing ever more devastation into the eco-sphere. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees were forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up. They are dying in droves. Who would now volunteer for such an American task force? The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl blanketed the vast Ukraine and Belarus landscape, then carried over Europe and into the jetstream, surging through the west coast of the United States within ten days, carrying across our northern tier, circling the globe, then coming back again. The radioactive clouds from Indian Point would enshroud New York, New Jersey, New England, and carry deep into the Atlantic and up into Canada and across to Europe and around the globe again and again. The immediate damage would render thousands of the world's most populous and expensive square miles permanently uninhabitable. All five boroughs of New York City would be an apocalyptic wasteland. The World Trade Center would be rendered as unusable and even more lethal by a jet crash at Indian Point than it was by the direct hits of 9/11. All real estate and economic value would be poisonously radioactive throughout the entire region. Irreplaceable trillions in human capital would be forever lost. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, and as at Chernobyl, where soil, water and plant life have been hopelessly irradiated, natural eco-systems on which human and all other life depends would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed, Spiritually, psychologically, financially, ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere forty miles near New York City on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse now operating in the United States. They generate just 18% of America's electricity, just 8% of our total energy. As with reactors elsewhere, the two at Indian Point have both been off-line for long periods of time with no appreciable impact on life in New York. Already an extremely expensive source of electricity, the cost of attempting to defend these reactors will put nuclear energy even further off the competitive scale. Since its deregulation crisis, California---already the nation's second-most efficient state---cut further into its electric consumption by some 15%. Within a year the US could cheaply replace virtually with increased efficiency all the reactors now so much more expensive to operate and protect. Yet, as the bombs fall and the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking a form of legal immunity to protect the operators of reactors like Indian Point from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Why is our nation handing its proclaimed enemies the weapons of our own mass destruction, and then shielding from liability the companies that insist on continuing to operate them? Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

#### The permutation links to our net benefits-Nuclear Power and renewable energy are competitive options--Financial and political trade-offs

Burke et al 2012

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The costs of nuclear new build are extremely high. UK governments, both Labour and the Coalition Government, have made it clear that money for new nuclear must come from the private sector, and yet, despite promising not to, have then gone on to attract private sector investment, thus committing large amounts of public money not available for other energy supply or demand management options. The scale of both the financial and the political investment required are such that they will crowd out equivalent investment in renewables and energy efficiency. The cost of the new nuclear build that Coalition Governments hopes for is in the region of £50 billion. Since private investors money is to be channelled through energy utilities (either as equity borrowing or simple bank lending), it will come from the same funding pools that other types of energy generation investment would access; part of the opportunity cost of nuclear power is that it will inevitably draw investment away from alternatives. But it’s not just the scale of the investment needed that undermines other possibilities. The massive timescales for bringing nuclear power online are also important - once investment has begun in nuclear, the entirety of the investment must remain in nuclear or be lost. Renewables are much nimbler – if problems occur, the project can be scaled down and still provide some generated energy. Lastly, there is a substantial political opportunity cost. When governments throw their weight behind a particular course of action, they divert resources from all others. In the past decade, UK governments of both parties have established over three dozen taxpayer-funded quangos and agencies to support the nuclear industry. It is inevitable that the pronuclear perspective of these bodies will pervade the thinking of the Civil Service, and of politicians and business investors too. Speaking about Finland’s experience with the disastrous Olkiluoto reactor, Oras Tynkynnen, a former climate policy advisor to the Office of the Finnish Prime Minister, said: “We concentrated so much on nuclear that we lost sight of everything else ... And nuclear has failed to deliver. It has turned out to be a costly gamble for Finland, and for the planet”. 2

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#### ---Government energy incentives are self-defeating --- The affirmative’s political planning lays the foundation for a new totalitarian priesthood.

Epstein 2009

Alex, founder and director of the Center for Industrial Progress, Energy at the Speed of Thought: The Original Alternative Energy Market, TOS Vol. 4, No. 2.

What is the solution? We just need the right government “energy plan,” leading politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen tell us. Of course “planners” such as Barack Obama, John McCain, Al Gore, Thomas L. Friedman, T. Boone Pickens, and countless others favor different plans with different permutations and combinations of their favorite energy sources (solar, wind, biomass, ethanol, geothermal, occasionally nuclear and natural gas) and distribution networks (from decentralized home solar generators to a national centralized so-called smart grid). But each agrees that there must be a plan—that the government must lead the energy industry using its power to subsidize, mandate, inhibit, and prohibit. And each claims that his plan will lead to technological breakthroughs, more plentiful energy, and therefore a higher standard of living. Consider Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore, who claims that if only we follow his “repower American plan”—which calls for the government to ban and replace all carbon-emitting energy (currently 80 percent of overall energy and almost 100 percent of fuel energy)4 in ten years—we would be using fuels that are not expensive, don’t cause pollution and are abundantly available right here at home. . . . We have such fuels. Scientists have confirmed that enough solar energy falls on the surface of the earth every 40 minutes to meet 100 percent of the entire world’s energy needs for a full year. Tapping just a small portion of this solar energy could provide all of the electricity America uses. And enough wind power blows through the Midwest corridor every day to also meet 100 percent of US electricity demand. Geothermal energy, similarly, is capable of providing enormous supplies of electricity for America. . . . [W]e can start right now using solar power, wind power and geothermal power to make electricity for our homes and businesses.5 And Gore claims that, under his plan, our vehicles will run on “renewable sources that can give us the equivalent of $1 per gallon gasoline.”6 Another revered thinker, Thomas L. Friedman, also speaks of the transformative power of government planning, in the form of a government-engineered “green economy.” In a recent book, he enthusiastically quotes an investor who claims: “The green economy is poised to be the mother of all markets, the economic investment opportunity of a lifetime.”7 Friedman calls for “a system that will stimulate massive amounts of innovation and deployment of abundant, clean, reliable, and cheap electrons.”8 How? Friedman tells us that there are two ways to stimulate innovation—one is short-term and the other is long-term—and we need to be doing much more of both. . . . First, there is innovation that happens naturally by the massive deployment of technologies we already have [he stresses solar and wind]. . . . The way you stimulate this kind of innovation—which comes from learning more about what you already know and doing it better and cheaper—is by generous tax incentives, regulatory incentives, renewable energy mandates, and other market-shaping mechanisms that create durable demand for these existing clean power technologies. . . . And second, there is innovation that happens by way of eureka breakthroughs from someone’s lab due to research and experimentation. The way you stimulate that is by increasing government-funded research. . . .9 The problem with such plans and claims: Politicians and their intellectual allies have been making and trying to implement them for decades—with nothing positive (and much negative) to show for it. For example, in the late 1970s, Jimmy Carter heralded his “comprehensive energy policy,” claiming it would “develop permanent and reliable new energy sources.” In particular, he (like many today) favored “solar energy, for which most of the technology is already available.” All the technology needed, he said, “is some initiative to initiate the growth of a large new market in our country.”10 Since then, the government has heavily subsidized solar, wind, and other favored “alternatives,” and embarked on grand research initiatives to change our energy sources—claiming that new fossil fuel and nuclear development is unnecessary and undesirable. The result? Not one single, practical, scalable source of energy. Americans get a piddling 1.1 percent of their power from solar and wind sources,11 and only that much because of national and state laws subsidizing and mandating them. There have been no “eureka breakthroughs,” despite many Friedmanesque schemes to induce them, including conveniently forgotten debacles such as government fusion projects,12 the Liquid Fast Metal Breeder Reactor Program,13 and the Synfuels Corporation.14 Many good books and articles have been written—though not enough, and not widely enough read—chronicling the failures of various government-sponsored energy plans, particularly those that sought to develop “alternative energies,” over the past several decades.15 Unfortunately, the lesson that many take from this is that we must relinquish hope for dramatic breakthroughs, lower our sights, and learn to make do with the increasing scarcity of energy. But the past failures do not warrant cynicism about the future of energy; they warrant cynicism only about the future of energy under government planning. Indeed, history provides us ample grounds for optimism about the potential for a dynamic energy market with life-changing breakthroughs—because America once had exactly such a market. For most of the 1800s, an energy market existed unlike any we have seen in our lifetimes, a market devoid of government meddling. With every passing decade, consumers could buy cheaper, safer, and more convenient energy, thanks to continual breakthroughs in technology and efficiency—topped off by the discovery and mass availability of an alternative source of energy that, through its incredible cheapness and abundance, literally lengthened and improved the lives of nearly everyone in America and millions more around the world. That alternative energy was called petroleum. By studying the rise of oil, and the market in which it rose, we will see what a dynamic energy market looks like and what makes it possible. Many claim to want the “next oil”; to that end, what could be more important than understanding the conditions that gave rise to the first oil? Today, we know oil primarily as a source of energy for transportation. But oil first rose to prominence as a form of energy for a different purpose: illumination. For millennia, men had limited success overcoming the darkness of the night with man-made light. As a result, the day span for most was limited to the number of hours during which the sun shone—often fewer than ten in the winter. Even as late as the early 1800s, the quality and availability of artificial light was little better than it had been in Greek and Roman times—which is to say that men could choose between various grades of expensive lamp oils or candles made from animal fats.16 But all of this began to change in the 1820s. Americans found that lighting their homes was becoming increasingly affordable—so much so that by the mid-1860s, even poor, rural Americans could afford to brighten their homes, and therefore their lives, at night, adding hours of life to their every day.17 What made the difference? Individual freedom, which liberated individual ingenuity. The Enlightenment and its apex, the founding of the United States of America, marked the establishment of an unprecedented form of government, one established explicitly on the principle of individual rights. According to this principle, each individual has a right to live his own life solely according to the guidance of his own mind—including the crucial right to earn, acquire, use, and dispose of the physical property, the wealth, on which his survival depends. Enlightenment America, and to a large extent Enlightenment Europe, gave men unprecedented freedom in the intellectual and economic realms. Intellectually, individuals were free to experiment and theorize without restrictions by the state. This made possible an unprecedented expansion in scientific inquiry—including the development by Joseph Priestly and Antoine Lavoisier of modern chemistry, critical to future improvements in illumination.18 Economically, this freedom enabled individuals to put scientific discoveries and methods into wealth-creating practice, harnessing the world around them in new, profitable ways—from textile manufacturing to steelmaking to coal-fired steam engines to illuminants. There had always been a strong desire for illumination, and therefore a large potential market for anyone who could deliver it affordably—but no one had been able to actualize this potential. In the 1820s, however, new scientists and entrepreneurs entered the field with new knowledge and methods that would enable them to harness nature efficiently to create better, cheaper illuminants at a profit. Contrary to those who believe that the government is necessary to stimulate, invest in, or plan the development of new energy sources, history shows us that all that is required is an opportunity to profit. That said, profiting in the illumination industry was no easy task. The entrenched, animal-based illuminants of the time, whatever their shortcomings, had long histories, good reputations, refined production processes, established transportation networks and marketing channels, and a large user base who had invested in the requisite lamps. In other words, animal-based illuminants were practical. For a new illumination venture to be profitable, it would have to create more value (as judged by its customers) than it consumed. A successful alternative would not only have to be a theoretical source of energy, or even work better in the laboratory; it would have to be produced, refined, transported, and marketed efficiently—or it would be worthless. Unlike today, no government bureaucrats were writing big checks for snazzy, speculative PowerPoint presentations or eye-popping statistics about the hypothetical potential of a given energy source. Thus, scientists and entrepreneurs developed illumination technologies with an eye toward creating real value on the market. They began exploring all manner of potential production materials—animal, vegetable, and mineral—and methods of production and distribution. Many of their attempts failed, such as forays into fish oils and certain plant oils that proved unprofitable for reasons such as unbearable smell, high cost of mass production, and low-quality light.19 But, out of this torrent of entrepreneurial exploration and experimentation, three illumination breakthroughs emerged. One, called camphene, came from the work of the enterprising scientist Isaiah Jennings, who experimented with turpentine. If turpentine could create a quality illuminant, he believed, the product held tremendous commercial potential as the lowest-cost illuminant on the market: Unlike animal fat, turpentine was neither in demand as a food product nor as a lubricant. Jennings was successful in the lab, and in 1830, he took out a patent for the process of refining turpentine into camphene. The process he patented was a form of distillation—boiling at different temperatures in order to separate different components—a procedure that is vital to the energy industry to this day. Before camphene could succeed on the market, Jennings and others had to solve numerous practical problems. For example, they discovered that camphene posed the threat of explosion when used in a standard (animal) oil lamp. The initial solution was to design new lamps specifically for use with camphene—but this solution was inadequate because the money saved using camphene would barely defray the expense of a new lamp. So, producers devised methods that enabled customers to inexpensively modify their existing lamps to be camphene-safe. The payoff: In the 1840s, camphene was the leading lamp oil, while use of animal oils, the higher-cost product, as illuminants declined in favor of their use as lubricants. Camphene was the cheapest source of light to date, creating many new customers who were grateful for its “remarkable intensity and high lighting power.”20 Second, whereas Jennings had focused on developing a brand-new source of illumination, another group of entrepreneurs—from, of all places, the Cincinnati hog industry—saw an opportunity to profitably improve the quality of light generated from animal lard, an already widely used source of illumination. At the time, the premium illuminant in the market was sperm whale oil, renowned for yielding a safe, consistent, beautiful light—at prices only the wealthy could afford. In the 1830s, soap makers within the hog industry set out to make traditional lard as useful for illumination as the much scarcer sperm whale oil. They devised a method of heating lard with soda alkali, which generated two desirable by-products that were as good as their sperm equivalents but less expensive: a new lard oil, dubbed stearin oil, for lamps and stearic acid for candles. This method, combined with a solid business model employing Cincinnati’s feedstock of hogs, created a booming industry that sold 2 million pounds of stearin products annually. The price of stearin oil was one third less than that of sperm whale oil, making premium light available to many more Americans.21 Thus camphene and stearin became leaders in the market for lamps and candles—both portable sources ofillumination. The third and final new form of illumination that emerged in the early 1800s was a bright, high-quality source of illumination delivered via fixed pipes to permanent light fixtures installed in homes and businesses. In the 17th century, scientists had discovered that coal, when heated to extremely high temperatures (around 1600 degrees), turns into a combustible gas that creates a bright light when brought to flame. In 1802, coal gas was used for the first time for commercial purposes in the famous factory of Boulton & Watt, near Birmingham, England.22 Soon thereafter, U.S. entrepreneurs offered coal gas illumination to many industrial concerns—making possible a major extension of the productive day for businesses, and thus increasing productivity throughout American industry. Initially, the high cost of the pipes and fixtures required by gas lighting precluded its use in homes. But entrepreneurs devised more efficient methods of installing pipes in order to bring gas into urban homes, and soon city dwellers in Baltimore, Boston, and New York would get more useful hours out of their days. Once the infrastructure was in place, the light was often cheaper than sperm whale oil, and was reliable, safe, and convenient. As a result, during the 1830s and 1840s, the coal-gas industry grew at a phenomenal rate; new firms sprang up in Brooklyn, Bristol (Rhode Island), Louisville, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia.23 By the 1840s, after untold investing, risk-taking, thinking, experimentation, trial, error, failures, and success, coal gas, camphene, and stearin producers had proven their products to be the best, most practical illuminants of the time—and customers eagerly bought them so as to bring more light to their lives than ever before. But this was only the beginning. Because the market was totally free, the new leaders could not be complacent; they could not prevent better ideas and plans from taking hold in the marketplace. Unlike the static industries fantasized by today’s “planners,” where some government-determined mix of technologies produces some static quantity deemed “the energy Americans need,” progress knew no ceiling. The market in the 19th century was a continuous process of improvement, which included a constant flow of newcomers who offered unexpected substitutes that could dramatically alter Americans’ idea of what was possible and therefore what was “needed.” In the early 1850s, entrepreneurs caused just such a disruption with a now-forgotten product called coal oil.24 Coal oil initially emerged in Europe, which at the time also enjoyed a great deal of economic freedom. Scientists and entrepreneurs in the field of illumination were particularly inclined to look for illuminants in coals and other minerals because of the relative scarcity of animal and vegetable fats, and correspondingly high prices for both. Beginning with the French chemist A. F. Selligue, and continuing with the British entrepreneur James Young, Europeans made great strides in distilling coal at low heat (as against the high heat used to create coal gas) to liquefy it, and then distilling it (as Jennings had distilled turpentine into camphene) to make lamp oil and lubricants that were just as good as those from animal sources. Coal was plentiful, easy to extract in large quantities, and therefore cheap. The primary use of coal oil in Europe, however, was as a lubricant. In North America, the primary use would be as an illuminant. Beginning in the 1840s, a Canadian physician named Abraham Gesner, inspired by the Europeans, conducted experiments with coal and was able to distill a quantity of illuminating oil therefrom. Gesner conceived a business plan (like so many scientists of the day, he was entrepreneurial), and teamed with a businessman named Thomas Cochrane to purchase an Alberta mining property from which he could extract a form of coal (asphaltum), refine it at high quality, and sell it below the going price for camphene. But in 1852 the project was aborted—not because the owners lost the means or will to see it through, but because the Canadian government forbade it. The government denied that the subsurface minerals belonged to those who harnessed their value; it held that they were owned by the Crown, which did not approve of this particular use. Gesner’s experience in Canada highlights a vital precondition of the rapid development of the American illumination energy industry: the security of property rights. All of the industries had been free to acquire and develop the physical land and materials necessary to create the technologies, make the products, and bring them to market based on the entrepreneurs’ best judgment. They had been free to cut down trees for camphene, raise hogs for stearin, and mine coal and build piping for gas lighting, so long as they were using honestly acquired property. And this freedom was recognized as a right, which governments were forbidden to abrogate in the name of some “higher” cause, be it the Crown or “the people” or the snail darter or protests by those who say, “Not in my backyard” about other people’s property. Because property rights were recognized, nothing stopped them from acting on their productive ideas. Had property rights not been recognized, all their brilliant ideas would have been like Gesner’s under Canadian rule: worthless. Not surprisingly, Gesner moved to the United States. He set up a firm, the New York Kerosene Company, whose coal-oil illuminant, kerosene, was safer and 15 percent less expensive than camphene, more than 50 percent less expensive than coal gas, 75 percent less expensive than lard oil, and 86 percent less expensive than sperm whale oil. Unfortunately, this was not enough for Gesner to succeed. His product suffered from many problems, such as low yields and bad odor, and was not profitable. However, his limited successes had demonstrated that coal’s abundance and ease of refining made it potentially superior to animal and vegetable sources. That potential was fully actualized by a businessman named Samuel Downer and his highly competent technical partners, Joshua Merrill and Luther Atwood. Downer had devoted an existing company to harnessing a product called “coup oil,” the properties of which rendered it uncompetitive with other oils. Recognizing the hopelessness of coup oil, Downer set his sights on coal-oil kerosene. Downer’s firm made major advances in refining technology, including the discovery of a more efficient means of treating refined oil with sulfuric acid, and of a process called “cracking”—also known as “destructive distillation”—which uses high heat to break down larger molecules into smaller ones, yielding higher amounts of the desired substance, in this case kerosene. (Unbeknownst to all involved, these discoveries would be vital to the undreamed of petroleum industry, which would emerge in the near future.) By 1859, after much effort went into developing effective refining processes and an efficient business model, Downer’s firm was able to make large profits by selling kerosene at $1.35 a gallon—a price that enabled more and more Americans to light their houses more of the time. Others quickly followed suit, and by decade’s end, businessmen had started major coal-oil refineries in Kentucky, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. The industry had attracted millions in investment by 1860, and was generating revenues of $5 million a year via coal oil—a growing competitor to coal gas, which was generating revenues of $17 million a year and had attracted $56 million (more than $1 billion in today’s dollars) in investment.25 As the 1850s drew to a close, coal oil and coal gas were the two leading illuminants. These new technologies brightened the world for Americans and, had the evolution of illumination innovation ended here, most Americans of the time would have died content. Their quality of life had improved dramatically under this energy revolution—indeed, so dramatically that, were a comparable improvement to occur today, it would dwarf even the most extravagant fantasies of today’s central planners. This points to a crucial fact that central planners cannot, do not, or will not understand: The source of an industry’s progress is a free market—a market with real economic planning, profit-driven individual planning. The revolution in illumination was a process of thousands of entrepreneurs, scientists, inventors, and laborers using their best judgment to conceive and execute plans to make profits—that is, to create the most valuable illuminant at the lowest cost—with the best plans continually winning out and raising the bar. As a result, the state of the market as a whole reflected the best discoveries and creativity of thousands of minds—a hyperintelligent integration of individual thinking that no single mind, no matter how brilliant, could have foreseen or directed. Who knew in 1820 that, of all the substances surrounding man, coal—given its physical properties, natural quantities, and costs of extraction and production—would be the best source for inexpensive illumination? Who knew all the thousands of minute, efficiency-producing details that would be reflected in the operations of the Samuel Downer Company—operations developed both by the company and by decades of trial and error on the market? Consider, then, what it would have meant for an Al Gore or Thomas Friedman or Barack Obama to “plan” the illumination energy market. It would have meant pretending to know the best technologies and most efficient ways of harnessing them and then imposing a “plan.” And, given that neither Gore nor Friedman nor anyone else could possibly possess all the knowledge necessary to devise a workable plan, what would their “plan” consist of? It would consist of what all central planners’ “plans” consist of: prohibition, wealth transfers, and dictates from ignorance. Depending on when the “planners” began their meddling and who was whispering in their ear, they might subsidize tallow candles or camphene, thereby pricing better alternatives out of the market or limiting lighting choices to explosive lamps. Thankfully, there was no such “planner”—there were only free individuals seeking profit and free individuals seeking the best products for their money. That freedom enabled the greatest “eureka” of them all—from an unlikely source. George Bissell was the last person anyone would have bet on to change the course of industrial history. Yet this young lawyer and modest entrepreneur began to do just that in 1854 when he traveled to his alma mater, Dartmouth College, in search of investors for a venture in pavement and railway materials.26 While visiting a friend, he noticed a bottle of Seneca Oil—petroleum—which at that time was sold as medicine. People had known of petroleum for thousands of years, but thought it existed only in small quantities. This particular bottle came from an oil spring on the land of physician Dr. Francis Beattie Brewer in Titusville, Pennsylvania, which was lumber country. At some point during or soon after the encounter, Bissell became obsessed with petroleum, and thought that he could make a great business selling it as an illuminant if, first, it could be refined to produce a high quality illuminant, and, second, it existed in substantial quantities. Few had considered the first possibility, and most would have thought the second out of the question. The small oil springs or seeps men had observed throughout history were thought to be the mere “drippings” of coal, necessarily tiny in quantity relative to their source. But Bissell needed no one’s approval or agreement—except that of the handful of initial investors he would need to persuade to finance his idea. The most important of these was Brewer, who sold him one hundred acres of property in exchange for $5,000 in stock in Bissell’s newly formed Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company of New York. To raise sufficient funds to complete the project, Bissell knew that he would have to demonstrate at minimum that petroleum could be refined into a good illuminant. He solicited Benjamin Silliman Jr., a renowned Yale chemist, who worked with the petroleum, refined it, and tested its properties for various functions, including illumination. After collecting a $500 commission (which the crash-strapped firm could barely put together), Silliman delivered his glowing report: 50 percent of crude petroleum could be refined into a fine illuminant and 90 percent of the crude could be useful in some form or another. Proof of concept in hand, Bissell raised just enough money to enact the second part of his plan: to see if oil could be found in ample quantities. According to the general consensus, his plan—to drill for oil—was unlikely to uncover anything. (One of Bissell’s investors, banker James Townsend, recalled his friends saying, “Oh, Townsend, oil coming out of the ground, pumping oil out of the earth as you pump water? Nonsense! You’re crazy.”) But Bissell’s organization had reason to suspect that the consensus was wrong—mostly because saltwater driller Samuel Kier had inadvertently found modest quantities of oil apart from known coal deposits, which contradicted the coal-drippings theory. And so Bissell proceeded, albeit with great uncertainty and very little money. He sent Edwin Drake, a former railroad conductor and jack-of-many-trades, to Titusville to find oil. Drake and his hired hands spent two years and all the funds the company could muster, but after drilling to 69.5 feet with his self-made, steam-powered rig, he found nothing. Fortunately, just as the investors told Drake to wrap up the project, his crew noticed oil seeping out of the rig. Ecstatic, they attempted to pump the oil out of the well—and succeeded. With that, a new industry was born. That is, a new potential industry was born. In hindsight we know that oil existed in quantities and had physical qualities that would enable it to supplant every other illuminant available at the time. But this was discovered only later by entrepreneurs with the foresight to invest time and money in the petroleum industry. Bissell and other oilmen faced a difficult battle. They had to extract, refine, transport, and market at a profit this new, little-understood material, whose ultimate quantities were completely unknown—while vying for market share with well-established competitors. Fortunately, they were up to the task, and many others would follow their lead. When word got out about Drake’s discovery, a “black gold” rush began, a rush to buy land and drill the earth for as much of this oil as possible. For example, upon seeing Drake’s discovery, Jonathan Watson, a lumber worker on Brewer’s land, bought what would become millions of dollars worth of oil land. George Bissell did the same. Participants included men in the lumber industry, salt borers turned oil borers, and others eager to take advantage of this new opportunity.27 Progress in this new industry was messy and chaotic—and staggering. In 1859, a few thousand barrels were produced; in 1860, more than 200,000; and in 1861, more than 2 million.28 Capital poured in from investors seeking to tap into the profits. In the industry’s first five years, private capitalists invested $580 million—$7 billion in today’s dollars.29 Even in the middle of the 19th century, when wealth was relatively scarce, the supposed problem of attracting capital to fund the development of a promising energy source did not exist so long as the energy source was truly promising. As producers demonstrated that enormous quantities of oil existed, they created a huge profit opportunity for others to build businesses performing various functions necessary to bring oil to market. At first, would-be transporters were hardly eager to build rail lines to Titusville, and would-be refiners were hardly eager to risk money on distillation machines (“stills”) that might not see use. As such, the oil industry was not functioning efficiently, and much of the oil produced in the first three years went to waste. The oil that did not go to waste was expensive to bring to market, requiring wagon-driving teamsters to haul it 20–40 miles to the nearest railroad station in costly 360-pound barrels.30 But once production reached high levels, driving crude oil prices down, the transportation, refining, and distribution of oil attracted much investment and talent. An early, price-slashing solution to transportation problems was “pond fresheting.” Entrepreneurial boatmen on Oil Creek and the Alleghany River, which led to Pittsburgh, determined that they could offer cheaper transportation by strapping barrels of oils on rafts and floating them down the river. But this only worked half the year; the rest of the time, water levels were too low. The ingenious workaround they devised was to pay local dam owners to release water (“freshet”) at certain points in the year in order to raise water levels, thereby enabling them to float their rafts downstream. The method worked, and Pittsburgh quickly became the petroleum refining capital of America.31 Railroads entered the picture as well, building lines to new cities, which allowed them to become refining cities. In 1863, the Lake Shore Railroad built a line to Cleveland, inspiring many entrepreneurs to establish refineries there—including a 23-year-old named John Rockefeller.32 Another innovation in oil transport was “gathering lines”—small several-mile-long pipelines that connected drilling sites to local storage facilities or railroads. At first, gathering lines were halted by the Pennsylvania government’s lax enforcement of property rights; the politically-influential teamsters would tear down new pipelines, and the government would look the other way. But once rights were protected, gathering lines could be constructed quickly for any promising drilling site, enabling sites to pump oil directly to storage facilities or transportation centers without the loss, danger, and expense of using barrels and teamsters. Still another innovation was the tank car. These special railroad cars could carry far more oil than could normal boxcars loaded with barrels, and, once certain problems were solved (wood cars were replaced by iron cars and measures were taken to prevent explosion), they became the most efficient means of transportation.33 In the area of refining, innovation was tremendous. Certain industry leaders, such as Joshua Merrill of the Samuel Downer Company and Samuel Andrews of Clark, Rockefeller, and Andrews (later to be named Standard Oil), continuously experimented to solve difficulties associated with the refining process. To refine crude oil is to extract from it one or more of its valuable “fractions,” such as kerosene for illumination, paraffin wax for candles, and gasoline for fuel. The process employs a still to heat crude oil at multiple, increasing temperatures to boil off and separate the different fractions, each of which has a different boiling point. Distillation is simple in concept and basic execution, but to boil off and bottle kerosene was hugely problematic: Impure kerosene could be highly noxious and highly explosive. Additionally, early stills did not last very long, yielded small amounts of kerosene per unit, took hours upon hours to cool between batches, and raised numerous other challenges. Throughout the 1860s, the leading refiners experimented with all aspects of the refining process: Should stills be shaped horizontally or vertically? How should heat be applied for evenness of temperature? How can the life of the still be maximized? How can the tar residue at the bottom be cleaned quickly and with as little damage to the still as possible? What procedures should one employ to purify the kerosene once distillation has been performed? When the process involves a chemical treatment, how much of that treatment should be used? Is it profitable to “crack” the oil, heating it at high temperature to create more kerosene molecules, which creates more kerosene per barrel but takes longer and requires expensive purification procedures? The leading refiners progressively asked and answered these questions, and profited immensely from the knowledge they gained. By the end of the 1860s, the basics of refining technology had been laid down,34 though it would not be until the 1870s—the Rockefeller era—that they would be employed industry-wide. On the marketing and distribution end, kerosene became a widely available good. Refining firms made arrangements with end sellers, most notably wholesale grocers and wholesale druggists, to sell their product. Rockefeller’s firm was a pioneer in international sales, setting up a New York office to sell kerosene all around the world—where it was in high demand thanks to its quality and cheapness, and to the lack of alternatives.35 The pace of growth of the oil industry was truly phenomenal. Within five years of its inception, with no modern communication or construction technology, the industry had made light accessible to even some of the poorest Americans. In 1864, a chemist wrote: Kerosene has, in one sense, increased the length of life among the agricultural population. Those who, on account of the dearness or inefficiency of whale oil, were accustomed to go to bed soon after the sunset and spend almost half their time in sleep, now occupy a portion of the night in reading and other amusements.36 Within five years, an unknown technology and an unimagined industry had become a source of staggering wealth creation. Had the early days of this industry been somehow filmed, one would see oilmen in every aspect of the business building up an enormous industry, moving as if the film were being fast-forwarded. Almost nothing in history rivals this pace of development, and it is inconceivable today that any construction-heavy industry could progress as quickly. It now takes more than five years just to get a permit to start building an oil derrick, let alone to complete the derrick, much less thousands of them. But in the mid-1800s, no drilling permits or other government permissions were required to engage in productive activity. This did not mean that oilmen could pollute at will—property rights laws prohibited polluting others’ property (though some governments, unfortunately, were lax in their enforcement of such laws). It did mean that, for the most part, they were treated as innocent until proven guilty; and they knew that so long as they followed clearly defined laws, their projects would be safe.37 Anyone with an idea could implement it as quickly as his abilities permitted. If he thought a forest contained a valuable mineral, he could buy it. If he thought drilling was the best means of extracting the mineral, he could set up a drilling operation. If he thought a railroad or a pipeline was economical, he could acquire the relevant rights-of-way, clear the land, and build one. If he thought he could do something better than others, he could try—and let the market be the judge. And he could do all of these things by right, without delay—in effect, developing energy at the speed of thought. As one prominent journalist wrote: It is certain . . . the development [of the petroleum industry] could never have gone on at anything like the speed that it did except under the American system of free opportunity. Men did not wait to ask if they might go into the Oil Region: they went. They did not ask how to put down a well: they quickly took the processes which other men had developed for other purposes and adapted them to their purpose. . . . Taken as a whole, a truer exhibit of what must be expected of men working without other regulation than that they voluntarily give themselves is not to be found in our industrial history.38 Imagine if George Bissell and Edwin Drake were to pursue the idea of drilling for oil in today’s political context. At minimum, they would have to go through a multiyear approval process in which they would be required to do environmental impact studies documenting the expected impact on every form of local plant and animal life. Then, of course, they would have to contend with zoning laws, massive taxes, and government subsidies handed to their competitors. More likely, the EPA would simply ax the project, declaring Titusville “protected” government land (the fate of one-third of the land in the United States today). More likely still, Bissell would not even seriously consider such a venture, knowing that the government apparatus would wreck it with unbearable costs and delays, or a bureaucratic veto. The speed of progress depends on two things: the speed at which men can conceive of profitable means of creating new value—and the speed at which they can implement their ideas. Since future discoveries depend on the knowledge and skills gained from past discoveries, delays in market activity retard both the application and the discovery of new knowledge. In 1865, members of the oil industry experienced a tiny fraction of the government interference with which the modern industry regularly contends: the Civil War’s Revenue Act of 1865. This was a $1 per barrel tax on crude inventory—approximately 13 percent of the price. This Act “slowed drilling to a virtual standstill” and “put hundreds of marginal producers out of business” by eating into businesses’ investment and working capital.39 Remarkably, the damage done by the Act scared the government away from taxing crude and oil products for decades, an effective apologyforits previous violation of property rights. Such was the general economic climate of the time. After the brief but crushing bout of confiscatory taxation, the economic freedom that made possible the rise of the oil industry resumed, as did the industry’s explosive growth. In 1865, kerosene cost 58 cents a gallon, much less expensive than any prior product had been—and half the price of coal oil.40 But entrepreneurs did not have time to revel in the successes of the past. They were too busy planning superior ventures for the future—knowing that with creativity they could always come up with something better, and that customers would always reward better, cheaper products. The paragon of this relentless drive to improve was Rockefeller, who developed a new business structure that would bring the efficiency of oil refining—and ultimately, the whole process of producing and selling oil—to new heights. Rockefeller was obsessed with efficiency and with careful accounting of profit and loss. In seeking to maximize his efficiency, he had one central realization that steered the fate of his company: Tremendous efficiency could be achieved through scale. From his first investment in a refinery in 1863, when he built the largest refinery in Cleveland, to his continual borrowing to expand the size of his operations, Rockefeller realized that the more oil he refined, the more he could invest in expensive but efficient devices and practices whose often-high costs could be spread over a large number of units. He created barrel-making facilities that cut his barrel costs from $3 to $1 each. He built large-scale refineries that required less labor per barrel. He purchased a fleet of tank cars, and created an arrangement with a railroad that lowered his costs from $900,000 to $300,000 a trip. (Such savings are the real basis of Rockefeller’s much-maligned rebates from railroads.) Rockefeller’s improvements, which can be enumerated almost indefinitely, helped lower the prevailing per-gallon price of kerosene from 58 cents in 1865, to 26 cents in 1870—a price at which most of his competitors could not afford to stay in business—to 8 cents in 1880. These incredible prices represented the continuous breakthroughs that the Rockefeller-led industry was making. Every five years marked another period of dramatic progress—whether through long-distance pipelines that eased distribution or through advances in refining that made use of vast deposits of previously unrefinable oil. Oil’s potential was so staggering that no alternative was necessary. But then someone conceived of one: the electric lightbulb. Actually, many men had conceived of electric lightbulbs in one form or another; but Thomas Edison, beginning in the late 1870s, was the first to successfully develop one that was practical and potentially profitable. Edison’s lightbulb lasted hundreds of hours, and was conceived as part of a practical distribution network—the Edison system, the first electrical utility and distribution grid. As wonderful as kerosene was, it generated heat and soot and odor and smoke and had the potential to explode; lightbulbs did not. Thus, as soon as Edison’s lightbulb was announced, the stock prices of publicly traded oil refiners plummeted. Oil, it appeared, was no longer the future of illumination energy; electricity was. This fact, and the competitive pressures it placed on the oil industry, prompted entrepreneurs to figure out whether their product could enjoy comparable consumer demand in any other sphere, inside or outside of the energy industry. They worked to expand the market for oil as a lubricant and as a fuel for railroads and tankers. But the fate of the industry would hinge on the rise of the automobile in the 1890s.41 It is little known that most builders of automobiles did not intend them to run on gasoline. Given the growth and popularity of electricity at the time, many cars were designed to run on electric batteries, whereas other cars ran on steam or ethanol. Gasoline’s dominance was not a fait accompli. If the market had not been free, the electric car would likely have been subsidized into victory, given the obsession with electricity at the time. But when the technologies were tested in an open market, oil/gasoline won out—because of the incredible efficiency of the Rockefeller-led industry coupled with gasoline’s energy density. Per unit of mass and volume, it could take a car farther than an electric battery or a pile of coal or a vat of ethanol (something that remains true to this day). Indeed, Thomas Edison himself explained this to Henry Ford, in a story told by electricity entrepreneur Samuel Insull. “He asked me no end of details,” to use Mr. Ford’s own language, “and I sketched everything for him; for I have always found that I could convey an idea quicker by sketching than by just describing it.” When the conversation ended, Mr. Edison brought his fist down on the table with a bang, and said: “Young man, that’s the thing; you have it. Keep at it. Electric cars must keep near to power stations. The storage battery is too heavy. Steam cars won’t do, either, for they require a boiler and fire. Your car is self-contained—carries its own power plant—no fire, no boiler, no smoke and no steam. You have the thing. Keep at it.”. . . And this at a time when all the electrical engineers took it as an established fact that there could be nothing new and worthwhile that did not run by electricity.42 By 1912, gasoline had become a staple of life—and was on the way to changing it even more than kerosene had. A trade journal from 1912, Gasoline—The Modern Necessity, read: It seems almost unbelievable that there was once a time when the refiners and manufacturers of petroleum products concerned themselves seriously with finding a market for the higher distillates. At the present time it is the higher distillate known as gasoline that is giving not alone the refiners grave concern but modern civilization as well. Then it was how to find an adequate and profitable market for it; now it is how to meet the ever-increasing demand for it.43 Oil was the ultimate alternative energy—first for illumination, then for locomotion. In a mere half century, oil went from being useless black goo to the chief energy source leading the illumination and mobilization of the world. Young couples filling up their automobiles in 1910 had nary a clue as to how much thought and knowledge went into their ability to power their horseless carriages so cheaply and safely. Nor did most appreciate that all of this depended on a political system in which the government’s recognition and protection of the right to property and contract enabled businessmen to develop the world around them, risk their time and money on any innovation they chose, and profit from the results. If we compare today’s “planned” energy market to the rights-respecting energy market that brought about the emergence of oil, we can see in concrete fact the practicality of a genuinely free market. Instead of protecting property rights and unleashing the producers of energy to discover the best forms of energy and determine how best to deploy them (which includes genuine privatization of the electricity grid and other transcontinental development),44 our government randomly dictates what the future is to be. Today, we are told, as if it were written in the stars, that plug-in hybrids powered by solar and wind on a “smart grid” are the way to go—a claim that has no more validity than an 1860s claim that a network of wagon drivers should deliver coal oil nationwide. What sources of energy are best pursued and how best to pursue them can be discovered only by millions of minds acting and interacting freely in the marketplace—where anyone with a better idea is free to prove it and unable to force others to fund his pursuit. When the government interferes in the marketplace, countless productive possibilities are precluded from coming into existence. Today’s government as “energy planner” not only thwarts the market by coercively subsidizing the “right” energy technologies; it damages the market by opposing or even banning the “wrong” energy technologies or business models. Today’s energy policy severely restricts the production of every single practical, scalable form of energy: coal, natural gas, oil, and, above all, nuclear. Nuclear energy deserves special mention because it has tremendous proven potential, the result of its incredible energy density: more than one million times that of any fossil fuel—which, unlike oil, coal, or natural gas, has never been allowed to develop in anything resembling a free market. Thanks to environmentalist hysteria, this proven-safe source of energy has been virtually banned in the United States. And when nuclear plants have been permitted, construction costs and downtime losses have been multiplied many times over by multi-decade regulatory delays. Even in other countries, where nuclear power is much more welcome, it is under the yoke of governments and is therefore progressing at a fraction of its potential. If the scientists, engineers, and businessmen in the nuclear power industry had been able to pursue their ideas and develop their products in a free market—as oilmen once were able to do—how much better would our lives be today? What further technologies would have blossomed from that fertile foundation? Would automobiles even be running on gasoline? Would coal be used for anything anymore? And if entrepreneurs with other, perhaps even better, energy ideas had been free to put them into practice as quickly as their talents would allow—just as their 19th-century forebears had—might we by now have realized the dream of supplanting nuclear fission with nuclear fusion, which many consider the holy grail of energy potential? The fact is, we cannot even dream of what innovations would have developed or what torrents of energy would have been unleashed. As the history of the original alternative energy industry illustrates, no one can predict the revolutionary outcomes of a market process. Happily, however, with respect to the future, we can do better than dream: We can see for ourselves what kind of untapped energy potential exists, by learning from the 19th century. We can—and must—remove the political impediments to energy progress by limiting the government to the protection of rights. Then, we will witness something truly spectacular: energy at the speed of 21st-century thought.

#### ---The alternative is a question of ethics --- Reject the affirmative’s managerial self-hatred for the creative freedom of the market.

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Edward J., Lecturer with honors at Boston College of Management, Noble Markets: The Noble/Slave Ethic in Hayek’s Free Market Capitalism, Journal of Business Ethics, DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9748-6

The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from the triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value posting eye—this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction (Nietzsche, 1989b, pp. 36–37, italics in the original.) What connects the master/slave moralities is the ‘‘will to power.’’ Nietzsche considered this the primary psychological driving force of human behavior (Kaufman, 1974, p. 183). There are several references to the ‘‘will to power’’ in Beyond Good and Evil (Kaufman, 1989a, p. 203), On the Genealogy of Morals, where he likens the ‘‘will to power’’ to ‘‘an instinct for freedom’’ (Kaufman, 1989b, p. 87, italics in the original,), in Zarathustra where, according to Kaufmann, Nietzsche introduces the ‘‘will to power for the first time’’ (Kaufman, 1954, p. 7) and in The Will to Power, where it is discussed in depth. The ‘‘will to power’’ is found in both slave and master moralities. Nietzsche uses the term power in several ways. The term is used to describe the moral right of the masters to liberation and the creation of new values. The term is used to illustrate how slave morality weakens the noble and, by forcing society to accept slave morality, it leads society into decay, dependency and despair (Kaufman, 1968, p. 37). Finally, the ‘‘will to power’’ is used as a description of the noble as an individual who seeks excellence and self overcoming (Kaufman, 1974, pp. 201, 203). Power is not simply for the control of the herd, though it must play that role. The fundamental use of power is the freedom that allows individuals to be creative, to fulfill their potentiality and be their own master. In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek analyzes the major reasons why some societies descended into the tragedy of totalitarianism. He argues that these societies, in a false quest for utopia, were seduced by the promise of central planning to abandoned freedom in favor of distributive justice. Hayek analyses the practice of central planning and argues that any implementation of planning, even the most innocuous, will lead inevitably to totalitarianism. To the economist perhaps, what planning does to the economy and the production of wealth is of central importance. While this is important to the ethicist, too, what drives this choice is of equal importance. For Hayek, however, the driving force for planning and central control of the economy is the ‘‘demand for an equal distribution of wealth’’ (Hayek, 1994, p. 30). Distributive justice is offered as the road to freedom. By destroying private property it becomes the road to subservience where individual freedom is exchanged for some unachievable absolute security. Socialism is the doctrine of the slave and herd: all the docile, and gullible, who have no strong convictions of their own but are prepared to accept a ready-made system of values if it is only drummed into their ears sufficiently loudly and frequently. It will be those whose vague and imperfectly formed ideas are easily swayed and whose passions and emotions are readily aroused who will thus swell the ranks of the totalitarian party…It seems to be almost a law of human nature that it is easier for people to agree on a negative program—on the hatred of an enemy, on the envy of those better off—than on any positive task. (Hayek, 1994, p. 153) Over time this need for subservience will create a psychological dependency which will erode further freedom and independence. (T)he most important change which extensive governmental control produces is a psychological change, an alteration in the character of the people. This is necessarily a slow affair, a process which extends not over a few years but perhaps over one or two generations. The important point is that the political ideals of a people and its attitude toward authority are much the effect as the cause of the political institutions under which it lives. (Hayek, 1994, p. xxxix) For Hayek, socialism is not the only slave morality. He has equal contempt for conservatism and what he calls modern liberalism as solutions to the problem of political organization. Conservatism is found wanting because it offers only resistance to change but no alternative vision. It is fearful of change, ‘‘appeals to the timid mind’’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 400), and has a ‘‘fondness for authority’’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 400). Similarly, modern liberalism, the liberalism of Continental Europe and the English utilitarians, is found wanting because ‘‘socialist influences…have intruded into it’’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 409). If socialism, conservativism, and modern liberalism are false, Hayek is left to offer a positive moral foundation for his ‘‘Old Whig’’ society. He must offer a way to move forward toward his ideal society. For Hayek, the solution is free market capitalism as the foundation for conditions of individual freedom. For free markets to function effectively minimum regulation is required to allow for the maximum freedom. Therefore, what is needed is general agreement by all members of society to accept a minimum set of rules, which allow for maximum freedom. These rules protecting private property, individual choice and so forth, allow the greatest area for individual action. It requires individuals to be responsible for their own actions and to develop their own moral foundation. If socialism leads to a psychology of dependency, free market capitalism requires a psychology of independence. It demands that individuals take responsibility for themselves and achieve their potential. Progress and human fulfillment must be found in the crucible of market competition. Whether one succeeds or fails is immaterial; one must rejoice in the freedom to achieve one’s capabilities. The risk of success and failure are the essence of free market competition; one must take the risk and not wallow in self-pity.

### 1NC – Gas

#### ---Economic decline does not cause war.

Miller 2000

Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### ---No Impact --- Iraq and Afghanistan prove that even if economic decline incentivizes war; power imbalances between nation states prevent escalation.

#### ---Economic decline creates a structural incentive for military caution --- Makes politicians sensitive to backlash.

Boehmer 2007

Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### Nations will not bandwagon with the US

Kupchan 12

Charles A., Senior fellow at CFR and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown, Second Mates, National Journal, 3-16-2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/is-american-primacy-really-diminishing—20120315

But Washington simply can’t expect emerging powers other than China to line up on its side. History suggests that a more equal distribution of power will produce fluid alignments, not fixed alliances. During the late 19th century, for example, the onset of a multi­polar Europe produced a continually shifting network of pacts. Large and small powers alike jockeyed for advantage in an uncertain environment. Only after imperial Germany’s military buildup threatened to overturn the equilibrium did Europe’s nations group into the competing alliances that ultimately faced off in World War I. As the 21st century unfolds, China is more likely than other emerging nations to threaten U.S. interests. But unless or until the rest of the world is forced to choose sides, most developing countries will keep their options open, not obediently follow America’s lead. Already, rising powers are showing that they’ll chart their own courses. Turkey for decades oriented its statecraft westward, focusing almost exclusively on its ties to the United States and Europe. Now, Ankara looks primarily east and south, seeking to extend its sway throughout the Middle East. Its secular bent has given way to Islamist leanings; its traditionally close connection with Israel is on the rocks; and its relations with Washington, although steadier of late, have never recovered from the rift over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. India is supposedly America’s newest strategic partner. Relations have certainly improved since the 2005 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, and the two nations see eye to eye on checking China’s regional intentions. But on many other fronts, Washington and New Delhi are miles apart. India frets, for instance, that the U.S. will give Pakistan too much sway in Afghanistan. On the most pressing national security issue of the day—Iran’s nuclear program—India is more of a hindrance than a help, defying Washington’s effort to isolate Iran through tighter economic sanctions. And the two democracies have long been at loggerheads over trade and market access. Nations such as Turkey and India, which Kagan argues will be either geopolitically irrelevant or solid American supporters, are already pushing back against Washington. And they are doing so while the United States still wields a pronounced preponderance of power. Imagine how things will look when the playing field has truly leveled out.

#### Decline of Japan and Germany kills resiliency.

Kupchan 12

Charles A., Senior fellow at CFR and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown, Second Mates, National Journal, 3-16-2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/is-american-primacy-really-diminishing—20120315

American primacy is not as resilient as Kagan thinks. His most serious error is his argument that Americans need not worry about the ascent of new powers because only Europe and Japan are losing ground to them; the United States is keeping pace. It’s true that the U.S. share of global output has held at roughly 25 percent for several decades. It’s also the case that “the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations … has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy.” But this is not, as Kagan implies, good news for the United States. The long run of Western hegemony has been the product of teamwork, not of America acting alone. Through the 19th century and up until World War II, Europe led the effort to spread liberal democracy and capitalism—and to guide Western nations to a position of global dominance. Not until the postwar era did the United States take over stewardship of the West. Pax Britannica set the stage for Pax Americana, and Washington inherited from its European allies a liberal international order that rested on solid commercial and strategic foundations. Moreover, America’s many successes during the past 70 years would not have been possible without the power and purpose of Europe and Japan by its side. Whether defeating communism, liberalizing the global economy, combating nuclear proliferation, or delivering humanitarian assistance, Western allies formed a winning coalition that made effective action possible. The collective strength of the West is, however, on the way down. During the Cold War, the Western allies often accounted for more than two-thirds of global output. Now they represent about half of output—and soon much less. As of 2010, four of the top five economies in the world were still from the developed world (the United States, Japan, Germany, and France). From the developing world, only China made the grade, coming in at No. 2. By 2050, according to Goldman Sachs, four of the top five economies will come from the developing world (China, India, Brazil, and Russia). Only the United States will make the cut; it will rank second, and its economy will be about half the size of China’s. Moreover, the turnabout will be rapid: Goldman Sachs predicts that the collective economic output of the top four developing countries—Brazil, China, India, and Russia—will match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. Kagan is right that the United States will hold its own amid this coming revolution. But he is certainly misguided to think that the relative decline of Europe and Japan won’t matter. Their falling fortunes will compromise America’s ability to maintain global sway. Indeed, Kagan seems to admit as much when he acknowledges, “Germany and Japan were and are close democratic allies, key pillars of the American world order.”

### 1NC – Prolif

#### Linear risk of causing prolif – latent proliferation.

Koplow 2011

Doug, Founder of Earth Track Inc, MBA from Harvard, has worked on energy subsidy policy for 20 years, Union of Concerned Scientists sponsored publication, Nuclear Power: Still not Viable Without Subsidies, February 2011 http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/nuclear\_subsidies\_report.pdf

The spread of nuclear materials throughout the world is a major security concern—the link between nuclear power development and nuclear weapons proliferation is widely recognized—and a growing civilian nuclear sector makes the situation even worse. 94 The International Security Advisory Board of the U.S. Department of State agrees, noting that, “The rise in nuclear power worldwide, and particularly within Third World nations, inevitably increases the risks of proliferation” (ISAB 2008: 1). This risk is much greater if the chosen path for civilian nuclear involves enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, something that “represent[s] quite dangerous paths to proliferation that are not effectively addressed by current international law or treaties,” according to the board (ISAB 2008: 3). Subsidies to nuclear reactor technology exacerbate proliferation concerns both by boosting the “latent proliferation” risk and by increasing opportunities for illicit diversion. 95 Latent proliferation exists if a company does not actually build any weapons but establishes the capabilities to build them. Under a latent proliferation scenario, “a nation’s nuclear power facilities give it the capability to quickly make nuclear weapons” (Gronlund et al. 2007). Nuclear proliferation expert Henry Sokolski notes that, “A large reactor program brings any nation quite a ways down the road to acquiring an option to build bombs” (Grossman 2008). If the diversion or theft of materials from the civilian sector cannot be detected quickly or at all, the latent proliferation concern from nuclear power expansion can become an active one. Proliferation conduits involve far more than just physical infrastructure. The increased number of people trained in closely related fields and the ability of a country to mask purchases of suspect materials through civilian activities are just as important.

#### Subsidies create pressure for bad exports.

Koplow 2011

Doug, Founder of Earth Track Inc, MBA from Harvard, has worked on energy subsidy policy for 20 years, Union of Concerned Scientists sponsored publication, Nuclear Power: Still not Viable Without Subsidies, February 2011 http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/nuclear\_subsidies\_report.pdf

However, moving from recognition of the linkage to actually quantifying the proliferation costs of nuclear power expansion is not easy. There are plausible arguments that the incremental proliferation risks of conventional reactors within the United States are fairly small, but if this country pursues subsidized reactor construction, many other nations may follow suit. The “low-incremental-risk” arguments work only in countries with a pre-existing base of fuel-cycle facilities, nuclear weapons, and strong oversight of both civilian and military sectors. Such arguments cannot be made for the promotion of reprocessing; for the construction of subsidized reactors or fuel-cycle facilities in countries lacking in governance, technical capabilities, or the rule of law; or for the export of technology that may enhance latent proliferation risks even from low-incremental-risk countries. Large subsidies are clearly a main factor driving the renewed utility interest in nuclear power, both in the United States and Europe. Subsidies probably underlie much of the Asian investment as well, though transparency of government operations in Asia is not nearly as advanced as in some western nations. Along with the expected surge in reactors is a renewed interest in expanding enrichment capabilities and constructing new reprocessing plants. All three areas are capital-intensive production systems. Once they are built, operators are under immense pressure to utilize them heavily, perhaps resulting in questionable decisions regarding the exportation of resulting products or technologies.

#### Nuclear energy kills the NPT – haves and have nots.

Hall 2006

Xanthe, disarmament expert and international campaigner at the German section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Spreading the Nuclear Disease, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Bulletin 26 http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap\_old/bulletin26/art02.htm

The civilian and military uses of nuclear energy are so inextricably linked that ultimately the situation that was recognised by the Acheson-Lilienthal Committee in 1946 has only worsened in the last 60 years. Despite the development of new detection technologies, tightened export controls and strengthened safeguards, the world is still dependent on the good intentions of states for its security. The answer to the problem cannot therefore be found in technical solutions, and the idea of multilateral uranium centres would worsen the perception of states that they are being excluded from having independent access to nuclear energy. The only solution is the phasing out of nuclear power and the development of sustainable energy. While on the one hand, the nuclear industry is trying to sell the myth of a return to “Atoms for Peace” as a palliative for environmental catastrophe, Iran’s argument that it wants to develop this energy resource to cover its domestic energy needs is dismissed as not being credible. The nuclear industry is trying to sell nuclear energy as economically viable, environmentally safe and proliferation resistant – none of which it is. But in order to sell the third claim, it needs to introduce a new system that directly contradicts Article IV of the NPT – the inalienable right of all parties to civilian nuclear energy. That new system, however, divides the world into another one of “haves” and “have-nots” creating further tensions that will, for certain, tear the NPT apart and could even lead to war.

#### Technology doesn’t equate to non-proliferation – political considerations outweigh

Feiveson 1 (Harold, currently serves as the Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of American Scientists Council and is a Senior Research Policy Scientist of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. “The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power” http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm )

It should be recognized straight away that many in the nuclear industry worldwide believe that intrinsic or technical proliferation resistance should not be given much attention in the development of nuclear power. Their arguments are several. For example: Proliferation is manifestly a political problem. Therefore, it is counterproductive to impose technical constraints on the development of nuclear power except in a few problem countries, such as Iraq and North Korea. If countries are determined to obtain nuclear weapons they can do so most directly via a dedicated program and not through civil nuclear power. Institutional constraints - that is, the entire nonproliferation regime defined by the NPT, safeguards agreements, supplier agreements, etc. � are adequate and could be improved further without imposing technical constraints on nuclear power. The shape of technology, international politics, and ways people think about weapons of mass destruction are impossible to gauge over the long term. Indeed, nuclear weapons may in the future be far less a matter of concern than other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we cannot sensibly attempt today to design a proliferation-resistant nuclear future for the long term. In practice, it will be extraordinarily difficult to contrive an effective proliferation- resistant nuclear fuel cycle for sophisticated states, and difficult even to do so for unsophisticated states. To a point, there is merit in all of these arguments, and taken together they underscore the truth that the civilian nuclear fuel cycle is only a part, possibly even a small part, of the greater problem of addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

#### The US will not exercise leadership

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2/7/12, Obama's Nuclear Mistake, www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/290330

What prompted Obama to kick this political nest? A stunning inattention to nuclear-export realities, his own nuclear-control rhetoric, and history. In 2008, President Bush negotiated a nuclear-cooperative agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This agreement featured two new and important nonproliferation conditions. The first required the UAE to forswear making nuclear fuel — a process that can bring states to the very brink of acquiring bombs. The second stipulated that the UAE must open its nuclear facilities to intrusive nuclear inspections authorized under a special international understanding known as the Additional Protocol. While it negotiated this agreement with the UAE, the Bush administration also peddled its new, tougher conditions to existing and prospective U.S. civilian-nuclear-technology recipients, including Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. Initially, this effort enjoyed President Obama’s support after he succeeded Bush: He put the final touches on the UAE deal and in 2009 sold it as the new nonproliferation “Gold Standard” for future civilian nuclear-cooperation deals. After a year’s effort trying to get Jordan, Vietnam, and South Korea to forswear making nuclear fuel, though, Team Obama started to go wobbly. First, in the late summer of 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. had initialed a nuclear deal with Vietnam that lacked the Gold Standard conditions. The Hill went nuts. Letters were sent to the secretary of state, and State quietly put the Vietnam agreement on ice while the National Security Council ordered an interagency policy review. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, who wanted to uphold the standard, fought Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, who did not. Nothing was decided. Then, in July of 2011, Steinberg left the government. In short order, Poneman prevailed over remaining resistance within State. Late last year, State resumed nuclear cooperation talks with Vietnam. Anxious to notify the Hill, as required by law, Undersecretary of State Eileen Tauscher and Deputy Secretary Poneman tried to arrange a private, classified briefing with the House and Senate foreign-affairs committee chairmen and ranking members. But all the important members were out of town. So instead, the two officials sent them a short note. It was a knee-slapper. First, it said the administration had decided that pushing the Bush administration’s Gold Standard would actually risk undermining nuclear nonproliferation. “We are concerned,” Tauscher and Poneman argued, that pushing this standard would “reduce[ ] the number of future U.S. partners, minimizing our nonproliferation influence.” Second, they noted that “France and Russia in particular are very aggressive in pursuing nuclear business,” that “neither imposes enrichment or reprocessing conditions in their agreements,” and that for every billion dollars of exports, the U.S. is able to support 10,000 jobs. So, if we want jobs, we have to back off pushing nuclear nonproliferation? That seems to be the letter’s conclusion. Yet it’s unclear if there are any significant U.S. reactor exports to be made, or any truly American vendors to make them. Nearly 80 percent of Westinghouse’s nuclear division is now Japanese- and Kazakhstani-owned; roughly half of General Electric’s is Japanese-owned. As for nuclear manufacturing, nearly all of that is now done overseas. Also, the Fukushima tsunami disaster has endangered whatever U.S. nuclear reactor or component exports might otherwise be left. Certainly prospective foreign customers have been loath to forswear suing U.S. nuclear firms in the case of a nuclear accident. Yet without such a pledge, U.S. vendors will not sell. The letter’s most egregious error, though, is its misreading of the nuclear market. Contrary to the two officials’ suggestion, the most profitable nuclear sales prospect is not overseas reactors, where profit margins can be negative. Instead, it’s supplying nuclear fuel to run the U.S.’s 104 power reactors, the world’s largest fleet. Russia and France are eager to penetrate this market. France is building a $4.8 billion fuel-fabrication plant in Georgia for the U.S. Department of Energy and has secured a $2 billion conditional federal loan guarantee to enrich uranium in Idaho. Russia would like to establish a similar U.S. enrichment project. Bottom line: If the U.S. wants to make a nuclear buck, doing so while maintaining nonproliferation standards depends far less on what other nuclear suppliers are doing overseas than those foreign suppliers’ export profits depend on securing U.S. taxpayer funds and loan guarantees. So far, however, Team Obama has avoided exploiting this leverage. Impatient, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has reported out a bill (H.R. 1280) to push the Gold Standard by increasing congressional oversight over U.S. civilian nuclear-cooperative agreements. The Senate has yet to act.

### 1NC – Solvency

#### Turn – loan guarantees cause trade-offs with better projects.

De Rugy 2012

Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program, Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jun 19, 2012, http://mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

3. Mal-investments Loan guarantee programs can also have an impact on the economy beyond their cost to taxpayers. Mal-investment—the misallocation of capital and labor—may result from these loan guarantee programs. In theory, banks lend money to the projects with the highest probability of being repaid. These projects are often the ones likely to produce larger profits and, in turn, more economic growth. However, considering that there isn’t an infi- nite amount of capital available at a given interest rate, loan guarantee programs could displace resources from non-politically motivated projects to politically motivated ones. Think about it this way: When the government reduces a lender’s exposure to fund a project it wouldn’t have funded otherwise, it reduces the amount of money available for projects that would have been viable without subsidies. This government involvement can distort the market signals further. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, independently of the merits of the projects, taking capital away from unsubsidized projects that have a better probability of success without subsidy and a more viable business plan. As the Government Accountability Office noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will siphon private capital away.”[26] This reallocation of resources by private investors away from viable projects may even take place within the same industry—that is, one green energy project might trade off with another, more viable green energy project. More importantly, once the government subsidizes a portion of the market, the object of the subsidy becomes a safe asset. Safety in the market, however, often means low return on investments, which is likely to turn venture capitalists away. As a result, capital investments will likely dry out and innovation rates will go down.[27] In fact, the data show that in cases in which the federal government introduced few distortions, private inves- tors were more than happy to take risks and invest their money even in projects that required high initial capital requirements. The Alaska pipeline project, for instance, was privately financed at the cost of $35 billion, making it one of the most expensive energy projects undertaken by private enterprise.[28] The project was ultimately aban- doned in 2011 because of weak customer demand and the development of shale gas resources outside Alaska. [29] However, this proves that the private sector invests money even when there is a chance that it could lose it. Private investment in U.S. clean energy totaled $34 billion in 2010, up 51 percent from the previous year.[30] Finally, when the government picks winners and losers in the form of a technology or a company, it often fails. First, the government does not have perfect or even better information or technology advantage over private agents. In addition, decision-makers are insulated from market signals and won’t learn important and necessary lessons about the technology or what customers want. Second, the resources that the government offers are so addictive that companies may reorient themselves away from producing what customers want, toward pleasing the government officials.

#### Loan guarantees don’t raise capital – nuclear is just that bad.

Lovins 2010

Amory B., Cofounder and Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, 1993 MacArthur Fellow, one of the TIME 100 most influential people and Foreign Policy 100 Influential thinkers, Energy subsidies—of any kind—are bad business, Weekly Standard, October 25, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 06, http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/nuclear-socialism.pdf

Given Americans’ increasing anxiety over made-in-Washington socialism, it’s a wonder that the nuclear power industry has escaped scrutiny for so long. The federal government socializes the risk of investing in nuclear power while pri-vatizing profits. This same formula drove the frenzied speculation that cratered the housing and financial markets. What might it cause with nuclear power? We got a taste three decades ago. Congress grew infatuated with the promises of nuclear promoters. It overrode the risk assessment of private capital markets, and expanded subsidies for nuclear projects to $0.08 per kilowatt-hour—often more than investors risked or than the power could be sold for. This seduced previously prudent utilities and regulators into a nuclear binge that Forbes in 1985 called “the largest managerial disaster in business history.” Threefold cost overruns amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars. Three-fifths of the ordered plants were abandoned. Many others proved uncompetitive. Steep debt downgrades hit four in five nuclear utilities. Some went broke. Through 1978, 253 U.S. reactors were ordered (none since). Only 104 survive. Two-fifths of those have failed for a year or more at least once. New nuclear plants, we’re assured, are different—novel enough to merit technology-demonstration subsidies, yet proven enough that investors can rest easy. They’re allegedly so much safer than deep-sea oil drilling that we needn’t fret, yet so risky that one major nuclear operator insured itself eleven times more against nuclear accidents’ consequences than its potential liability to the public. New reactors are supposedly so cheap they crush competitors, yet so costly they need subsidies of 100 percent or more. That’s right: $0.04-$0.06 of new 2005-07 subsidies, plus $0.01-$0.04 of remaining old subsidies, brings total federal support for new nuclear plants, built by private utility companies, to $0.05-$0.10 for a kilowatt-hour worth $0.06. Some people are outraged that the federal government is subsidizing the new Chevrolet Volt, retailing at $41,000, with a tax credit of $7,500. Imagine if the tax credit were $50,000! If new reactors can produce competitive power, they don’t need subsidies; if not, they don’t deserve subsidies. Yet nuclear subsidies to some of the world’s largest corporations have become shockingly large. A Maryland reactor’s developer reckoned just its requested federal loan guarantee would transfer $14.8 billion of net present value, comparable to its construction cost, from American taxpayers to the project’s 50/50 owners—Électricité de France (EDF), 84 percent owned by the French government, and a private utility 9.5 percent owned by EDF. The project’s builder, AREVA, is 93 percent owned by the French state, yet has been promised a $2 billion U.S. loan guarantee for a fuel plant competing with an American one. EDF just booked a billion-euro loss provision, mainly over the Maryland plant’s deteriorating prospects. AREVA’s construction fiascoes in Finland and France have “seriously shaken” confidence, says EDF’s ex-chairman, and four nations’ safety regulators have criticized the design. Meanwhile, the chairman of Exelon, the top U.S. nuclear operator, says cheap natural gas will postpone new nuclear plants for a decade or two. Slack electricity demand and unpriced carbon emissions further weaken the nuclear case. Markets would therefore charge a risk premium. But U.S. nuclear power evades market discipline—or did until October 8, 2010, when the Maryland promoter shelved the project because, for its $7.5 billion federal loan guarantee, it would have to have paid an “unworkable” $0.88 billion fee, or 11.6 percent, to cover the default risk to taxpayers. Another $8.3 billion of the $18.5 billion nuclear loan guarantees authorized in 2007 was provisionally issued in February to two Georgia reactors. Taxpayers will be on the hook for about $100 per American family. To offset that risk, the Department of Energy proposed to charge a default fee that’s only a small fraction of the likely loss rate that the Congressional Budget Office and Government Accountability Office have estimated. In bankruptcy, taxpayers wouldn’t even recover before private lenders—not that there are any private lenders. The Treasury’s Federal Financing Bank, financed by new Treasury debt, would issue the DOE-guaranteed loan. Failure would cost taxpayers $8.2 billion net. The developer keeps any upside. The Georgia project’s loan-guarantee default fee is much lower than the Maryland plant’s, partly because the Georgia developers have already shifted more of their remaining risks to ratepayers. Their project is 54 percent owned by municipal utilities and rural co-ops with access to cheaper financing than private utilities, including subsidized stimulus bonds. Some of these munis and co-ops signed 50-year contracts with the nuclear operators that would put them and their customers on the hook even for power not needed or wanted. In 1982-83, the analo-gously financed five-reactor WPPSS (“Whoops”) project in the Northwest defaulted on municipal bonds, vaporizing $3-$4 billion in today’s dollars. Moreover, a few southeastern states now make utility customers finance new reactors in advance—often whatever they cost, whether they ever run, no questions asked, plus a return to the utilities for risks that they no longer bear. This scraps all five bedrock principles of utility regulation: payment only for service delivered and only for used and useful assets; accountability for cost and prudence; return matching risk; and no commission able to bind its successors. Such laws re-create for nuclear power the same moral hazard that just shredded America’s financial sector. With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any private capital? Because there’s no business case. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak fundamentals. A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive. American taxpayers already reimburse nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating. Since 2000, as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18 percent.

#### Other uncertainty overwhelms solvency

Sullivan 2010

Paul, Professor of Economics – National Defense University, Loan guarantees are not enough, January 13 2010 http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/01/should-taxpayers-back-new-nucl.php

Policy uncertainty in one part of the energy industry can spread to other parts of the industry given that many different forms of energy production are substitutable to some extent. Solar, wind, coal, natural gas, geothermal, nuclear and more are far more connected in policy implications than many would like to think. Policy uncertainties are also connected internationally as well as locally. There are many recursive and wide spread policy implications to many of the policies now being considered. Giving loan guarantees seems like a very simple solution to a very complex problem, and likely will have less of an impact than many may think. Until overall energy policy is clarified many of the major investors in the nuclear industry may still be sitting on the fence. These are smart people. Many of them also face other investment opportunities outside of the nuclear industry. The smart money goes with the best investments. Investments that have lots of uncertainty, particularly multibillion dollar ones like a nuclear plant, make many investors skittish. Also, these investors could send their funds to invest in nuclear plants or other energy or non-energy developments in another country rather easily. We should expect, given the huge costs involved in developing a nuclear power plant, that many of the future plants will have investors that will be part of large international coalitions. So far this seems to be a building trend. If this will help start a safer, more effective, efficient and environmentally friendly nuclear industry then so be it. However, we also need to be aware of the concerns of the public, our national security institutions and others about foreign investments in nuclear technologies. However, we should not sacrifice our energy, environment and national securities to the false altar of xenophobia.

## 2nc

### Grid addon

#### Renewables solve supply disruptions better

Lovins 2007

Amory B., Cofounder and Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, 1993 MacArthur Fellow, one of the TIME 100 most influential people and Foreign Policy 100 Influential thinkers., Nuclear Power and Climate Change, Bulleting of Atomic Scientists September 2007, “Nuclear is Uneconomic” <http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/nuclear-power-and-climate-change>

On the supply side, "micropower"--small-scale generation that emits little or no carbon dioxide--provided one-sixth of the world's electricity and one-third of its new electricity in 2005, meeting from one-sixth to more than one-half of all electrical needs in 13 industrial countries. The smaller of micropower's components, distributed renewable sources of electricity, was a $56 billion global equipment market in 2006, while the larger, combined-heat-and-power, was probably even larger. Micropower added four times the electricity and 8-11 times the capacity that nuclear power added globally in 2005, now produces more electricity than nuclear power does, and is financed by private risk capital. Micropower plus "negawatts," which are probably about as big, now provide more than half of the world's new electrical services. Nuclear power is unnecessary and uneconomic, so we needn't debate its safety. As retirements of aging plants overwhelm construction, global capacity and output will decline (as they did slightly in 2006). Most independent analysts doubt the private capital market will finance any new nuclear plants. Even in the United States, where new subsidies would roughly repay the next six units' entire capital cost, Standard & Poor's said this wouldn't materially improve the builders' credit ratings. I expect this experiment will be like defibrillating a corpse: It'll jump, but it won't revive. Nuclear power's market meltdown is good for global development: Saving electricity needs around 1,000 times less capital and repays it about 10 times faster than supplying more electricity. Shifting capital to saving electricity can potentially turn the power sector (now gobbling one-fourth of global development capital) into a net funder of other development needs. Further, an efficient, diverse, dispersed, and renewable energy system can make major supply failures, whether caused by accident or malice, impossible by design rather than (as now) inevitable by design. The nuclear phaseout will also speed climate protection, because buying negawatts and micropower instead will save 2-10 times more carbon per dollar, and will do so more quickly. And it can belatedly stem nuclear proliferation, too, by removing from commerce a vast flow of ingredients of do-it-yourself bomb kits in civilian disguise.

#### Renewables are comparatively best at solving blackouts

PR Newswire 3 (“Wind Power Developers Convene in Wyoming, Discuss Wind's Long-term Benefits to the Environment, the Economy and the Grid” http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/wind-power-can-help-prevent-the-next-blackout-70976537.html)

Grid stability can be achieved through distributed generation -- placing generating facilities throughout the region's grid so that when one section of the grid goes down, the distribution facilities are able to keep the rest of the grid in operation. Wind farms are particularly suitable for this strategy because they are scalable in nature and therefore can be sized according to local energy needs. Fossil fuel plants, on the other hand, can work only as large-scale power plants. Additionally, wind farms, which can be plugged directly into a metropolitan area like New York City or a local pocket such as Long Island, can also ease transmission bottlenecks. The transmission bottlenecks north of New York City that likely contributed to the Blackout of 2003 could have been reduced had a wind farm in close proximity been in place and operating -- such as the off-shore project currently proposed for the south shore of Long Island. "One of the most attractive features of wind power and off-shore wind, in particular, is the ability to site a plant close to where the electricity will be used," said Tom Gray, Deputy Executive Director of the American Wind Energy Association. "The recent blackout makes a compelling case for a wind plant off of Long Island that can deliver electricity directly to neighboring communities and the region." Another benefit of wind power in a blackout situation is that as long as the grid is operating, a wind power facility can begin generating electricity almost immediately. In contrast, nuclear and fossil fuel plants must go through long restart and warm-up procedures of up to 48 hours. Time is also reduced in the development of wind power generating facilities, which can be built in just six to nine months. A conventional power plant generally cannot be completed from design to operation in less than two years.

### Accidents

#### Nuclear accidents result in radioactive clouds that damage ecosystems and the livelihoods of millions – it’ll make several areas uninhabitable, kill future generations through disease, and cause high cancer rates – that’s Wasserman

#### And no one will buy our exports – kills global transition

Lyman 11 (Dr. Edwin Lyman Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors”http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf)

UCS acknowledges the concerns of members of Congress who fear that the United States is lagging in creation of a robust SMR export market and may lose out to a country like China if it takes too long to develop and license SMRs. However, we believe that the best way for the United States to maintain a competitive edge is to establish American brands with the highest safety standards. If, as some say, NRC design certification is seen as a “gold standard” worldwide, it makes sense to preserve that standard rather than erode it by weakening SMR safety requirements. To this end, Congress should prohibit DOE from selecting SMR proposals for its cost-sharing program if their business case depends on a weakening of NRC safety and security regulations or marketing reactors to countries with inadequate safety rules and regulatory oversight mechanisms.

### At perm do both

#### ---Links to our nuclear power bad arguments-Accidents, Warming, etc are reasons to prefer the CP alone.

#### ---Nuclear power and Renewable energy are competitive strategies that compete for political and financial support-that’s Ticknell and Burke

#### ---Nuclear power makes climate negotiations impossible and global renewable shift impossible

Scheffran et al 2011

Jürgen Scheffran is Professor at the Institute for Geography and head of the Research Group Climate Change and Security at the KlimaCampus of Hamburg University. He is a member of the World Future Council’s Peace and Disarmament Working Group and serves on the Board of Editors of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, Climate Change, Nuclear Risks and Nuclear Disarmament: From Security Threats to Sustainable Peace, May 17th 2011, <http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/110517_WFC_Scheffran_Report.pdf>

Whether nuclear risks and climate change will lead to more conflict or cooperation will depend on how human beings and their societies respond to these challenges. In the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), countries agreed to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, most nations supported the goal of limiting global temperature change to 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, but failed to define concrete steps toward that goal. During his election campaign in 2008, candidate Barack Obama committed to an 80 percent reduction of CO2 emissions by the middle of the century, a goal that has not been further pursued during his presidency. Throughout 2010, progress in climate policy was blocked by Republican resistance in the US Congress; meanwhile, carbon emissions have continued to rise. The agreement of Cancun in December 2010 offers a path forward, but requires determined efforts by the major polluters. Obama also spoke in favour of a nuclear weapon-free world in Berlin in 2007 and in Prague in 2009, but so far concrete measures have lagged behind rhetoric. While the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review offers some promising language, more concrete is the decision of the Obama administration to increase the budget for nuclear weapons development. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is a moderate and important step towards further reduction of the US and Russian nuclear arsenals. Its ratification in the US Senate in December 2010 demonstrates that the strong resistance at the domestic front can be overcome, albeit at the cost of meeting the Republican Party’s demands for a modernization of the nuclear arsenals. On the international level, the goal of nuclear abolition has found wide support, in particular in recent resolutions in the UN General Assembly and a vote by the UN Security Council in 2009. A focal point of activities was the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 where a number of NGOs and countries expressed their support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) that would implement the comprehensive goal of a world without nuclear weapons (ICAN 2010). The final document of the conference noted UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon’s five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of 24 October 2008, ―which proposes, inter alia, consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification‖ (NPT 2010). Many states and anti-nuclear civil society groups see negotiation of a NWC as politically feasible and necessary to move beyond the current disarmament stalemate (Scheffran 2010a, Ware 2010). So far, major progress has not been achieved due to resistance from the nuclear weapon states. If the nuclear and climate problems are not tackled comprehensively but remain stuck in piecemeal approaches, one problem could impede solving the other. As long as countries acquire nuclear power and nuclear weapons, arms races and threat perceptions could spoil international relations, which in turn could undermine the conditions for cooperative climate policies. On the other hand, progressing climate change could undermine human and international security, causing incentives to use violent means to protect resources and interests. To avoid such a doomsday scenario, it is essential to strengthen the positive linkages between both policy areas. Negotiations on roadmaps for nuclear disarmament and carbon emission reduction could overcome the stalemate in both areas. Regional approaches could help to trigger global solutions, such as establishing Nuclear WeaponFree Zones (NWFZ) in the Middle East, Northeast Asia and the Arctic (see figure 15 for existing NWFZs). Regional partnerships in environmental security could prevent disasters in climate hot spots and support the capacity building of societies against the risks of climate change. In a win-win scenario, nuclear disarmament would improve the conditions for climate cooperation which, in turn, would support an international political climate that would make nuclear weapons increasingly obsolete.

#### ---The aff is a market signal against renewables

Roche 2009

Peter, National Nuclear Campaigner at Greenpeace UK co-founder of the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace Building New Reactors Damages Attempts to Tackle Climate Change <http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/reports/NewNuclearDamagesClimate.pdf>

OK, you might think, nuclear power might not be the most effective way to reduce carbon emissions, but as long as we spend enough we should still be able to tackle climate change. Unfortunately, this also turns out to be wrong. Nuclear power’s contribution can only ever be really small, so we are going to have to develop energy efficiency and renewables, but we will be in real trouble if reactor construction programmes damage our efforts to develop alternative carbon abatement programmes. With nuclear power only providing around 4% of the UK’s final energy consumption, (18) we need to make absolutely sure that spending on building new reactors is not going to hinder our efforts to reduce carbon emissions from the rest of the UK energy system providing the other 96% of final energy consumption. The UK Government’s Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), (19) Warwick Business School (WBS) (20) and the Environment Agency (21) have all warned that a decision to proceed with new reactors could seriously undermine the development of a low carbon energy system. Warwick Business School (WBS) argues that, far from complementing the necessary shift to a low carbon economy, the scale of the financial and institutional arrangements needed for new nuclear stations means they would fatally undermine the implementation of low carbon technologies and measures such as demand management, and therefore will ultimately undermine the shift to a true low carbon economy. (22) Dr Catherine Mitchell (23) of WBS, who was a member of the previous Energy Review team, says the 2007 White Paper has nothing to do with placing the UK on a path for carbon reductions that might meet the challenge of climate change. It has sealed the fate of the UK in not being able to meet its future carbon dioxide reduction targets. Nor will UK businesses be able to benefit from the enormous opportunities a sustainable non-nuclear future offers. (24) “Britain has visionary goals”, says Mitchell. We have made commitments to the European Union to provide 15% of our total energy from renewable sources by 2020, and to cut projected energy demand by 20%. “If the UK meets these legally binding targets, there is no need for new nuclear or coal plants. Why does government - ie Treasury - policy seem to concentrate on technologies we don't need?” (25) The UK Government’s Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) points out that, even with a doubling of nuclear capacity from current levels, cuts of at least 50% would still be needed from other measures if the UK is to meet its climate targets for 2050. (26) So it is important that our capacity to implement other carbon abatement measures is not damaged by any decision to go ahead with the construction of new reactors. SDC says a new nuclear programme would give out the wrong signal to consumers and businesses, implying that a major technological fix is all that’s required, weakening the urgent action needed on energy efficiency. The Commission says a decision to proceed with a new reactor programme will require “a substantial slice of political leadership … political attention would shift, and in all likelihood undermine efforts to pursue a strategy based on energy efficiency, renewables and more CHP.” (27) Sir Jonathon Porritt, chair of the Commission, says nuclear power is already seriously diverting attention from the hard decisions required to solve the UK's energy challenges. (28) Jeremy Leggett of Solar Century believes there has already been a deliberate focus on nuclear to the detriment of renewables. He was a member of the Renewables Advisory Board established in November 2002 to advise ministers on how to implement a plan, based on renewables and energy efficiency. By September 2003 the board’s industry members were already troubled by slow progress and issued a statement of concern. Leggett says he was warned that DTI officials would deliberately go slowly to keep hopes for nuclear alive and renewables would be teed up to fail. The slow-motion UK treatment of renewables since then, while renewables markets abroad have grown explosively, now makes it clear they were successful. (29)

### Renewables solve

#### ---Renewables are viable now and the CP spurs innovation through R&D and incentives- That’s Jenkins and IPCC

#### Our Romm evidence says that the technology exists now to solve global warming – technology has been demonstrated however its not deployed because of cost concerns – prefer our evidence because it cites nuclear engineers.

---Technology already exist to solve warming-deployment key

Romm-Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress-9/26/11

World’s Engineers: “The Technology Needed to Cut the World’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 85% by 2050 Already Exists”

<http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/09/26/329233/world%E2%80%99s-engineers-technology-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions-exists/>

The technology needed to cut the world’s greenhouse gas emissions by 85% by 2050 already exists, according to a joint statement by eleven of the world’s largest engineering organisations…. The statement says that generating electricity from wind, waves and the sun, growing biofuels sustainably, zero emissions transport, low carbon buildings and energy efficiency technologies have all been demonstrated. However they are not being developed for wide-scale use fast enough and there is a desperate need for financial and legislative support from governments around the world if they are to fulfil their potential. That’s the news release from the UK’s Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IME), one of the 11 signatory groups. The groups explicitly call for a peak in global emissions in 2020 and an intensive effort to train workers for green technology jobs.

---Aggressive deployment of existing technology key to emissions reductions---deployment will create innovation.

Romm-Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress-10/31/11

<http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/10/31/356735/revkin-sheen-report-debunks-anti-deployment-climate-strategy/>

Back in May, a major study, California’s Energy Future — the View to 2050, was released by an independent state science and technology advisory panel. It had two central findings: California can achieve emissions roughly 60% below 1990 levels with technology we largely know about today if such technology is rapidly deployed at rates that are aggressive but feasible. We could further reduce 2050 greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels with significant innovation and advancements in multiple technologies that eliminate emissions from fuels. All of these solutions would require intensive and sustained investment in new technologies plus innovation to bridge from the laboratory to reliable operating systems in relatively short timeframes. This report is an incredibly strong endorsement of the “deploy, deploy, deploy, research & develop, deploy, deploy, deploy,” strategy that I and others have been advocating. In fact, the report explicitly states that failing to adopt “Aggressive efficiency measures for buildings, industry and transportation” and “Aggressive electrification to avoid fossil fuel use” would “significantly increase the 2050 emissions.” Amazingly, Revkin asserts the exact opposite in “A Reality Check on Ambitious Climate Targets.” Certainly misreporting on energy and climate in the NY Times is legion, as we’ve seen. But Andy Revkin’s latest head-exploding post easily wins the “Charlie Sheen” award. A leading journalist and climate expert, Robert Collier, debunked Revkin’s “real spinning of the report” — see “Sticking the long knives into energy efficiency” (reposted below). It’s worth spending some time on this because the report’s actual conclusions and implications are very important to understand. I have long asserted that it is not possible to make a positive contribution to the climate debate if you don’t spell out what your emissions or temperature target (or range) is. Revkin’s post proves that conclusively, as I will show.

 Revkin’s glass-is-one-tenth-empty caption: “An analysis finds that California will not meet its climate target for 2050 even with a wartime-scale push on energy efficiency and installing non-polluting technologies like these solar panels in a housing subdivision in Rocklin.” Revkin claims in his post: Given that California is a best-case scenario\* compared to other states (and, of course, countries) far more dependent on coal, Long’s piece and the underlying report pose a strong challenge to those calling for a “deploy, deploy, deploy” approach to cutting climate risks. This is a link to – and swipe at — me, needless to say. Blunder number one is for Revkin to assert the report challenges the aggressive deployment strategy for meeting ambitious climate targets. Quite the reverse. The report makes clear that without aggressive deployment, the target can’t possibly be reached. Revkin added the asterisk (\*) because, buried way, way at the bottom of his post is this Postcript, In a Twitter reaction, Alan Nogee, the former clean-energy program director for the Union of Concerned Scientists, noted that California’s lack of coal dependence makes it more a worst case than a best case, because it doesn’t have a lot of coal emissions that might be relatively easily displaced. Duh. Rather than an asterisk, Revkin should simply remove his misleading error. The fact is that California has been pushing efficiency and low-carbon electricity aggressively since the 1970s. It is considerably more efficient in its use of energy than almost every other state. For a long time now the CO2 intensity of its electricity (CO2/Mwh) has been nearly half that of the rest of the nation. So obviously the rest of the country — which is far more coal-intensive and inefficient — has considerably more low-hanging fruit for emissions reductions. That’s blunder two. Blunder three is really the most amazing and amusing. Revkin appears to be unaware that a 60% reduction vs. 1990 levels is the target that the IPCC believes the rich countries (Annex I) should adopt if the goal is to stabilize at 550 ppm CO2-eq. I discussed the science underlying this at length two years ago. Here’s the key chart from the full Working Group III report (Box 13.7, page 776): Now 550 ppm CO2-equivalent is about 450 ppm CO2 (because of the warming from the other greenhouse gases), and it means ultimately stabilizing at 3°C (5.4°F) above preindustrial levels using the “best estimate” of climate sensitivity — see the IPCC’s Synthesis Report “Summary for Policymakers” (Table SPM.6). Of course, Revkin continues to this day to only endorse his vague R&D-focused “energy quest” and criticize those of us (including the National Academy of Sciences) who push for strong emissions reductions starting now. Since Revkin refuses to tell us what level of concentrations he thinks the world should aim for – even a broad range, say 450 ppm to 550 ppm — he retains the luxury of attacking those who are willing to state what their target is while maintaining a faux high ground that they are being politically unrealistic while he can pretend his essentially do-nothing do-little\* strategy is scientifically or morally viable, which it ain’t. That said, based on his new post, Revkin apparently thinks the target should be stronger than 550 ppm CO2-eq. After all, it’s quite clear from the California report, which he does not dispute, that we should be able to meet the 60% below 1990 levels target by aggressively deploying existing technology. And yet Revkin says the report is a strong challenge to those of us who believe our climate strategy should be based on aggressive deployment. So apparently that target is too weak for Revkin since you only need the major technology advances for the stronger target. On the other hand, it’s hard to believe that he supports the 450 ppm CO2-eq target, which is roughly stabilization at 2°C given the IPCC’s best estimate for climate sensitivity. He has spent so much time criticizing me and others who do lay out strategies to meet that target (and yes, those strategies include more R&D — everybody but the hard-core libertarians and fossil fuel types support more clean energy R&D). Moreover, if Revkin does believe in the stronger target, his post makes even less sense. He would be implying that because we can only go most of the way with existing technology therefore we MUST NOT START aggressive deployment until we have every piece of technology available. Otherwise, why not start aggressive deployment now? Obviously, the report he cites doesn’t take that absurd view since it would mean a staggeringly greater amount of emissions in the near term — which means we would need even more breakthroughs and an incomprehensibly fast rate of deployment. There just is no logic underlying Revkin’s post or his critique of aggresive deployment. The bottom line is that by failing to spell out what target or range he supports, Revkin’s critique of aggressive deployment implodes. Indeed, it backfires. It proves he cannot make a positive contribution to the debate until he spells out his climate target. For the record, I do not know a single environmentalist who would not gladly agree to a bill requiring a nation-wide 2050 GHG target of a 60% reduction below 1990 levels — with aggressive deployment plus R&D and a reevaluation of the target every 10 years based on advances in science and technology. Revkin seems painfully unaware of the fact that one of the best way to get major technology advances — if not the best way — is by deployment, not R&D (as I’ve explained many times, see “The breakthrough technology illusion“) and in any case the two aren’t mutually exclusive. Finally, it bears repeating that, as we learned in 2009, “The world will have to spend an extra $500 billion to cut carbon emissions for each year it delays implementing a major assault on global warming, the International Energy Agency said on Tuesday.” Aggressive deployment (along with more R&D) is the only cost-effective strategy if you want to avoid catastrophic global warming. Here is Collier’s must-read piece: Sticking the long knives into energy efficiency A new, authoritative study has concluded that California can reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent from 1990 levels by 2050 using technologies that already exist or are in demonstration. By nearly any measure, that’s good news. It shows that serious action on global warming is feasible right now and does not require futuristic technological breakthroughs that might never come to fruition.

### At natural gas

#### Renewables trades off with natural gas production – cost competitiveness

Medlock Et Al 11 (Kenneth B., Ph.D. – James A. Baker, III, and Susan G. Baker Fellow in Energy and Resource Economics at the Baker Institute – also an adjunct professor and lecturer in the Rice University Department of Economics. \*Amy Myers Jaffe, A Princeton University graduate in Arabic Studies, is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Bakaer Institue. \*Peter R. Hartley, “Shale Gas and U.S. National Security” – James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy – Supported by the U.S. Department of Energy)

More generally, the United States has a well-developed, competitive regulatory framework governing natural gas infrastructure development, transportation services, marketing, and mineral rights ownership and acreage acquisition. This environment has promoted the rapid development of shale resources, and it may not be fully or quickly replicable in other markets around the globe where state involvement in resource development and transportation is more prevalent. For example, investor access to shale resources is likely to be more heavily controlled in China and most European countries, where land ownership is generally distinct from the ownership of mineral rights, than in the United States, where landowners can directly negotiate terms for access to minerals under their acreage. Another potential impediment to shale development comes in the form of demand-side policies toward energy use. In particular, many European countries have proactive policies that in some cases favor competing resources (renewables. nuclear, etc.). These types of policies could also serve as a brake on shale investment by limiting overall demand for the resource. In addition, beyond Europe's environmental regulations, any new U.S. or Chinese policies that reduce demand for natural gas—possibly including renewable portfolio standards or carbon dioxide (CO2) cap-and-trade programs that grandfather coal resources—could also hamper future investments in shale gas resources.

#### Promoting renewables crowds out reliance on gas

Doran and Reed 8/13/12 (\*Kevin, institute fellow and assistant research professor at the Renewable and Sustainable Energy Institute (RASEI), a joint institute of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and the University of Colorado at Boulder. His research focuses on the legal, regulatory and public policy dimensions of energy development. \*Adam, is a research associate at RASEI. He researches and writes on the legal, policy, and regulatory issues surrounding the deployment of sustainable energy technologies. “Natural Gas and Its Role In the U.S.’s Energy Endgame” <http://e360.yale.edu/feature/natural_gas_role_in_us_energy_endgame/2561/>)

Second, as we pursue the gift of plentiful and cheap natural gas as the primary alternative to coal-fired generation, we should ensure that renewables — particularly wind and solar — are used as strategic hedges against the risks presented by increased reliance on natural gas for electricity generation. Whatever the factors that could lead to increases in natural gas prices — overestimation of resources, increased regulation, seismic events from drilling or wastewater injection, internationalization of prices via export linkages — these factors are fundamentally an argument for rather than against renewable energy expansion. Renewable energy’s zero-fuel-cost realities operate as a hedge against fluctuating fuel prices. A power system that balances gas and renewables will be able to take advantage of cheap gas while simultaneously insuring itself against fuel price spikes. It is thus imperative that we expand renewable energy standards at the state level. We must also ensure such expansions are strategically and legislatively coupled to the deployment of natural gas.

## 1nr

### a2 Permutations --- Link 2nc

#### ---All permutations are intrinsic or severance --- There is no alternative beyond calling upon the judge to be an ethical decision maker; means if we win the plan is unethical then you vote negative. Voting issue --- Intrinsicness allows the affirmative unpredictable plan planks & severance destroys negative link ground destroying negative strategy.

Rothbard 2004

Murray, Updated by Ludwig von Mises Institute in 2004, Man, Economy & State, Chapter 6--Antimarket Ethics: A Praxeological Critique, http://mises.org/resources.aspx?Id=0cb48bc0-2f84-408e-8c90-757e02a29094

Now, it should become evident that the “middle-of-the-road” statist, who concedes the evil of violence but adds that the violence of government is sometimes necessary to counteract the “private coercion of economic power,” is caught in an impossible contradiction. A refuses to make an exchange with B. What are we to say, or what is the government to do, if B brandishes a gun and orders A to make the exchange? This is the crucial question. There are only two positions we may take on the matter: either that B is committing violence and should be stopped at once, or that B is perfectly justified in taking this step because he is simply “counteracting the subtle coercion” of economic power wielded by A. Either the defense agency must rush to the defense of A, or it deliberately refuses to do so, perhaps aiding B (or doing B’s work for him). There is no middle ground! B is committing violence; there is no question about that. In the terms of both doctrines, this violence is either invasive and therefore unjust, or defensive and therefore just. If we adopt the “economic-power” argument, we must choose the latter position; if we reject it, we must adopt the former. If we choose the “economic-power” concept, we must employ violence to combat any refusal of exchange; if we reject it, we employ violence to prevent any violent imposition of exchange. There is no way to escape this either-or choice. The “middle-of-the-road” statist cannot logically say that there are “many forms” of unjustified coercion. He must choose one or the other and take his stand accordingly. Either he must say that there is only one form of illegal coercion—overt physical violence—or he must say that there is only one form of illegal coercion—refusal to exchange. We have already fully described the sort of society built on libertarian foundations—a society marked by peace, harmony, liberty, maximum utility for all, and progressive improvement in living standards. What would be the consequence of adopting the “economic-power” premise? It would be a society of slavery: for what else is prohibiting the refusal to work? It would also be a society where the overt initiators of violence would be treated with kindness, while their victims would be upbraided as being “really” responsible for their own plight. Such a society would be truly a war of all against all, a world in which conquest and exploitation would rage unchecked.

#### ---Politics requires objective ideals --- Political compromise kills more than all wars combined.

Shaffer 2000

Butler, teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law, Why I Do Not Vote, http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/shaffer1.html

One of the sadder comments that I heard, just prior to the recent election, was from a radio talk show host whose thoughtful and analytical mind I generally respect. In response to a caller who complained that Gov. Bush was philosophically inconsistent upon some issue, he declared that "politics is the art of compromise," and that if one wanted principled consistency, one could find it "only in a religion." It is this attitude upon which I wish to focus, for I believe that the conflicts we experience – both within ourselves as individuals and socially – derive from a sense of division. The attitude that one’s philosophic principles are nothing more than interesting "ideas" that have no relevance to how we behave with others – an attitude that is implicit in this talk show host’s remarks – is what is destroying us, both individually and societally. It derives from the same sentiment, articulated in the actions of Bill Clinton, that truth-telling is simply one of a number of strategies available in efforts to reach political "**compromise**"; that a lie is as good as the truth if you can get others to believe it. It **is the notion that principles are nothing more than fungible commodities** – to be traded according to the prices dictated by prevailing fashion – that now directs the seemingly endless cycle of vote recounts in Florida. As Groucho Marx put it: "Those are my principles. If you don’t like them, I have others." I have long found nourishment in the words of Richard Weaver: "**ideas have consequences**." **If I am of the view that politics** is destroying our world – and let us not forget that politics **managed to kill off some 200,000,000 of our fellow humans in the 20th century alone** – **am I prepared to direct my energies into such a** destructive **system**? If I answer "yes," which I would do if I voted, then do my philosophic principles have any real-world meaning to them, or are they simply amusing ideas to be talked about, debated, or dispersed across cyberspace? **If I cannot end the division within myself by living with integrity** (i.e., **by having my behavior and my principles integrated into a coherent whole**) **then what hope is there for the rest** of mankind doing so? I am mankind, as are you, and as Carl Jung so eloquently put it: "if the individual is not truly regenerated in spirit, society cannot be either"; that **the individual must realize "that he is the one important factor and that the salvation of the world consists in the salvation of the individual soul**." **To participate in politics is to consciously devote one’s energies to mass-mindedness; to the statist proposition that collective thinking and collective behavior preempt the will of the individual**.

### War --- Impact 2nc

#### ---Collectivism causes war.

Nyquist 2006

J.R., author of a book Origins of the Fourth World War and is currently a regular geopolitical columnist for Financial Sense Online, Anatomy of a Delusion, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2006/0908.html

The free market teaches men to love peace, while the miserable circumstances of socialist decline teach men the necessity of predatory warfare. According to Mises, the market’s love of peace “does not spring from philanthropic considerations” but depends on a proper appreciation of economic self-interest. Those who believe in profit and the free market reject war because war signifies the destruction of property. Wars are not initiated by corporate greed. Wars are initiated by backward cults who seek a return to medieval conditions. World revolution is the cry of the militant socialists, the Marxist-Leninists of the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the KGB clique that presently governs the “former” Soviet Union. To understand world events properly we must understand the distinction between socialist and free market economies.

### A2 Markets => Environmental Destruction --- 2nc Alternative

#### ---Environmental destruction offense only links to the affirmative --- Market communication creates overwhelming incentives against irresponsible stewardship that can only be maintained via artificial support from governments.

Long 2011

Roderick, Auburn University, How to Reach the Left, prepared for the Mises Circle, Chicago, http://praxeology.net/RTLreachleft.pdf

Similar remarks apply to environmental concerns. Left-wing support for environmentalist legislation is, to be sure, sometimes driven by the aristocratic leftist attitude I described earlier – the desire for an idyllic world micromanaged to suit the aesthetic sensibilities of affluent white “liberals.” But there are also genuine concerns about pollution and the wasteful consumption of resources. To such concerns we rightly respond that free markets and private ownership tend to promote responsible stewardship; but unless we also address the conflationist assumption that we’re living in a free market now, leftists will see the prevalence of irresponsible stewardship as evidence that we’re wrong. But in fact the irresponsible stewardship that prevails is driven by government intervention – as when government sells pollution rights and restricts the right to sue polluters; or when logging companies are allowed to harvest trees on federal lands at submarket prices (and via taxfunded access roads), thus socialising the costs of deforestation; or when oil companies like BP are promised liability caps, thus encouraging them to engage in environmentally riskier activities. Unless we point such facts out, though, our defense of free-market approaches to environmental problems will be heard as a defense of the status quo. That’s yet another reason we need to whip conflation now.

### a2 Survival Outweighs --- 2nc Impact

#### ---Survival is meaningless without individual liberty --- Only prolongs genocide.

Callahan 1973

Edward, Director of the Institute for Society, Ethics, and Life Sciences, The Tyranny of Survival, pg 91

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in *Korematsu v. United States* (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts othwerwise blatantly unconstitutional. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless *apartheid*, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. For all these reasons, it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a “tyranny of survival.” There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy of course to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival is a value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the right to life-then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival? To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be a Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

#### ill finish the 1nc De Rugy evidence---

De Rugy 2012

Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program, Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jun 19, 2012, http://mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

3. Mal-investments Loan guarantee programs can also have an impact on the economy beyond their cost to taxpayers. Mal-investment—the misallocation of capital and labor—may result from these loan guarantee programs. In theory, banks lend money to the projects with the highest probability of being repaid. These projects are often the ones likely to produce larger profits and, in turn, more economic growth. However, considering that there isn’t an infi- nite amount of capital available at a given interest rate, loan guarantee programs could displace resources from non-politically motivated projects to politically motivated ones. Think about it this way: When the government reduces a lender’s exposure to fund a project it wouldn’t have funded otherwise, it reduces the amount of money available for projects that would have been viable without subsidies. This government involvement can distort the market signals further. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, independently of the merits of the projects, taking capital away from unsubsidized

 projects that have a better probability of success without subsidy and a more viable business plan. As the Government Accountability Office noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will siphon private capital away.”[26] This reallocation of resources by private investors away from viable projects may even take place within the same industry—that is, one green energy project might trade off with another, more viable green energy project. More importantly, once the government subsidizes a portion of the market, the object of the subsidy becomes a safe asset. Safety in the market, however, often means low return on investments, which is likely to turn venture capitalists away. As a result, capital investments will likely dry out and innovation rates will go down.[27] In fact, the data show that in cases in which the federal government introduced few distortions, private inves- tors were more than happy to take risks and invest their money even in projects that required high initial capital requirements. The Alaska pipeline project, for instance, was privately financed at the cost of $35 billion, making it one of the most expensive energy projects undertaken by private enterprise.[28] The project was ultimately aban- doned in 2011 because of weak customer demand and the development of shale gas resources outside Alaska. [29] However, this proves that the private sector invests money even when there is a chance that it could lose it. Private investment in U.S. clean energy totaled $34 billion in 2010, up 51 percent from the previous year.[30] Finally, when the government picks winners and losers in the form of a technology or a company, it often fails. First, the government does not have perfect or even better information or technology advantage over private agents. In addition, decision-makers are insulated from market signals and won’t learn important and necessary lessons about the technology or what customers want. Second, the resources that the government offers are so addictive that companies may reorient themselves away from producing what customers want, toward pleasing the government officials.

#### Loan guarantees don’t raise capital – nuclear is just that bad.

Lovins 2010

Amory B., Cofounder and Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, 1993 MacArthur Fellow, one of the TIME 100 most influential people and Foreign Policy 100 Influential thinkers, Energy subsidies—of any kind—are bad business, Weekly Standard, October 25, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 06, http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/nuclear-socialism.pdf

Given Americans’ increasing anxiety over made-in-Washington socialism, it’s a wonder that the nuclear power industry has escaped scrutiny for so long. The federal government socializes the risk of investing in nuclear power while pri-vatizing profits. This same formula drove the frenzied speculation that cratered the housing and financial markets. What might it cause with nuclear power? We got a taste three decades ago. Congress grew infatuated with the promises of nuclear promoters. It overrode the risk assessment of private capital markets, and expanded subsidies for nuclear projects to $0.08 per kilowatt-hour—often more than investors risked or than the power could be sold for. This seduced previously prudent utilities and regulators into a nuclear binge that Forbes in 1985 called “the largest managerial disaster in business history.” Threefold cost overruns amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars. Three-fifths of the ordered plants were abandoned. Many others proved uncompetitive. Steep debt downgrades hit four in five nuclear utilities. Some went broke. Through 1978, 253 U.S. reactors were ordered (none since). Only 104 survive. Two-fifths of those have failed for a year or more at least once. New nuclear plants, we’re assured, are different—novel enough to merit technology-demonstration subsidies, yet proven enough that investors can rest easy. They’re allegedly so much safer than deep-sea oil drilling that we needn’t fret, yet so risky that one major nuclear operator insured itself eleven times more against nuclear accidents’ consequences than its potential liability to the public. New reactors are supposedly so cheap they crush competitors, yet so costly they need subsidies of 100 percent or more. That’s right: $0.04-$0.06 of new 2005-07 subsidies, plus $0.01-$0.04 of remaining old subsidies, brings total federal support for new nuclear plants, built by private utility companies, to $0.05-$0.10 for a kilowatt-hour worth $0.06. Some people are outraged that the federal government is subsidizing the new Chevrolet Volt, retailing at $41,000, with a tax credit of $7,500. Imagine if the tax credit were $50,000! If new reactors can produce competitive power, they don’t need subsidies; if not, they don’t deserve subsidies. Yet nuclear subsidies to some of the world’s largest corporations have become shockingly large. A Maryland reactor’s developer reckoned just its requested federal loan guarantee would transfer $14.8 billion of net present value, comparable to its construction cost, from American taxpayers to the project’s 50/50 owners—Électricité de France (EDF), 84 percent owned by the French government, and a private utility 9.5 percent owned by EDF. The project’s builder, AREVA, is 93 percent owned by the French state, yet has been promised a $2 billion U.S. loan guarantee for a fuel plant competing with an American one. EDF just booked a billion-euro loss provision, mainly over the Maryland plant’s deteriorating prospects. AREVA’s construction fiascoes in Finland and France have “seriously shaken” confidence, says EDF’s ex-chairman, and four nations’ safety regulators have criticized the design. Meanwhile, the chairman of Exelon, the top U.S. nuclear operator, says cheap natural gas will postpone new nuclear plants for a decade or two. Slack electricity demand and unpriced carbon emissions further weaken the nuclear case. Markets would therefore charge a risk premium. But U.S. nuclear power evades market discipline—or did until October 8, 2010, when the Maryland promoter shelved the project because, for its $7.5 billion federal loan guarantee, it would have to have paid an “unworkable” $0.88 billion fee, or 11.6 percent, to cover the default risk to taxpayers. Another $8.3 billion of the $18.5 billion nuclear loan guarantees authorized in 2007 was provisionally issued in February to two Georgia reactors. Taxpayers will be on the hook for about $100 per American family. To offset that risk, the Department of Energy proposed to charge a default fee that’s only a small fraction of the likely loss rate that the Congressional Budget Office and Government Accountability Office have estimated. In bankruptcy, taxpayers wouldn’t even recover before private lenders—not that there are any private lenders. The Treasury’s Federal Financing Bank, financed by new Treasury debt, would issue the DOE-guaranteed loan. Failure would cost taxpayers $8.2 billion net. The developer keeps any upside. The Georgia project’s loan-guarantee default fee is much lower than the Maryland plant’s, partly because the Georgia developers have already shifted more of their remaining risks to ratepayers. Their project is 54 percent owned by municipal utilities and rural co-ops with access to cheaper financing than private utilities, including subsidized stimulus bonds. Some of these munis and co-ops signed 50-year contracts with the nuclear operators that would put them and their customers on the hook even for power not needed or wanted. In 1982-83, the analo-gously financed five-reactor WPPSS (“Whoops”) project in the Northwest defaulted on municipal bonds, vaporizing $3-$4 billion in today’s dollars. Moreover, a few southeastern states now make utility customers finance new reactors in advance—often whatever they cost, whether they ever run, no questions asked, plus a return to the utilities for risks that they no longer bear. This scraps all five bedrock principles of utility regulation: payment only for service delivered and only for used and useful assets; accountability for cost and prudence; return matching risk; and no commission able to bind its successors. Such laws re-create for nuclear power the same moral hazard that just shredded America’s financial sector. With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any private capital? Because there’s no business case. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak fundamentals. A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive. American taxpayers already reimburse nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating. Since 2000, as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18 percent.

#### Other uncertainty overwhelms solvency

Sullivan 2010

Paul, Professor of Economics – National Defense University, Loan guarantees are not enough, January 13 2010 http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/01/should-taxpayers-back-new-nucl.php

Policy uncertainty in one part of the energy industry can spread to other parts of the industry given that many different forms of energy production are substitutable to some extent. Solar, wind, coal, natural gas, geothermal, nuclear and more are far more connected in policy implications than many would like to think. Policy uncertainties are also connected internationally as well as locally. There are many recursive and wide spread policy implications to many of the policies now being considered. Giving loan guarantees seems like a very simple solution to a very complex problem, and likely will have less of an impact than many may think. Until overall energy policy is clarified many of the major investors in the nuclear industry may still be sitting on the fence. These are smart people. Many of them also face other investment opportunities outside of the nuclear industry. The smart money goes with the best investments. Investments that have lots of uncertainty, particularly multibillion dollar ones like a nuclear plant, make many investors skittish. Also, these investors could send their funds to invest in nuclear plants or other energy or non-energy developments in another country rather easily. We should expect, given the huge costs involved in developing a nuclear power plant, that many of the future plants will have investors that will be part of large international coalitions. So far this seems to be a building trend. If this will help start a safer, more effective, efficient and environmentally friendly nuclear industry then so be it. However, we also need to be aware of the concerns of the public, our national security institutions and others about foreign investments in nuclear technologies. However, we should not sacrifice our energy, environment and national securities to the false altar of xenophobia.

#### Loan guarantees make default more likely

De Rugy 2012

Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program, Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jun 19, 2012, http://mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

1. Socialized Losses and Privatized Gains Historically, loans guaranteed by the government have had a higher default rate than the loans issued by the pri- vate sector without government guarantee. For instance, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has a long-term default rate of roughly 17 percent.[20] This compares to 4.3 percent for credit cards and 1.5 percent for bank loans guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Also, the Congressional Budget Office has calculated that the risk of default on the DOE’s nuclear loan guarantee program, for example, is well above 50 percent.[21] In 2011, the CBO updated its study and replaced the embarrassing default rate with a list of variables affecting the rate.[22] While it doesn’t provide a specific rate, the report asserts that higher equity financing of these projects would reduce the risk of default. However, this is rarely the case, as most loan guarantee programs cover 80 percent of their financing through debt rather than equity. Moreover, according to the CBO, when the federal government extends credit, the associated risk of those obli- gations is effectively passed along from private lenders onto taxpayers who, as investors, would view this risk as costly. In other words, when the federal government encourages a risky loan guarantee it is “effectively shifting risk to the members of the public.” Also, if the loan isn’t repaid, then the cost of the investment is to taxpayers. However, if the loan is repaid as expected, the lender will benefit from all the interest payments it collected thanks to a fairly risk-free loan, and the borrower will collect the fruit of its successful business venture. In other words, loan guarantee programs are yet another way that the federal government socializes losses while privatizing benefits.[23]

#### Loan guarantees create a moral hazard – the market solves better.

De Rugy 2012

Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program, Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Jun 19, 2012, http://mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

2. Moral Hazard Federally backed loans create a classic moral hazard. Because the loan amount is guaranteed, banks have less incentive to evaluate applicants thoroughly or apply proper oversight. In other words, the less skin the lender has in the game, the less likely the lender will effectively vet the quality of the project. Also, the company that borrows the money has less skin in the game than it would if its loan weren’t guaranteed. In addition, each time the government bails out a firm or has to shoulder the cost of a loan guarantee that got into financial trouble, it reinforces the signal to borrowers and bankers alike that it’s OK to take excessive risks. In a March 2012 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the DOE loan guarantee pro- gram was riddled with program inefficiencies, putting the fairness of decisions about what firms receive loan guarantees into question.[24] When GAO requested data from the DOE on the status of the applications, the DOE did not have consolidated data readily available and had to assemble these data over several months from various sources. Inadequate documentation and out-of-date review processes reduce the assurance that the DOE has treated applicants consistently. These findings do not prove the ability of the DOE to fully assess and mitigate project risks. Moreover, while in the absence of government intervention the private sector builds the infrastructure to assess risk, the federal gov- ernment has neither the expertise nor the incentive to build such a safety net. This increases the likelihood that loan guarantees will be awarded based on factors other than the ability of the borrower to repay the loan, such as political connections and congressional interest in local pork.[25] The moral hazard of loan guarantees increases when rules intended to prevent the program from being a pure giveaway to companies are removed. This is the case, for instance, when as part of the stimulus bill of 2009, the government lifted the subsidy fees for 1705 loans. This move increases the cost to taxpayers and attracts high-risk companies.

#### Loan guarantees are insufficient – other risks.

O'Keefe 2012

William, No Credible Path for Nuclear Power, CEO of George C. Marshall Institute, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/02/is-america-poised-for-nuclear.php>

If loans guarantees and production tax credits are the foundation for a renaissance, we can’t afford it. We have seen the future of industrial policy and it doesn’t work. Tax credits simply make the deficit larger when what is needed are actions to reduce the deficit and debt. Several years ago an assessment of the nuclear loan guarantee program concluded that perhaps as much as 50% would end up in default. Loan guarantees are also the route to moral hazard. We have seen during our recent financial crisis. The consequences of moral hazard created by misaligned incentives and shifting of risk are the last thing that we need with nuclear power. The two Southern Company NRC authorized units may be rock solid but there is a reason why private capital is sitting on the sidelines. The market simply does not see a credible path forward for nuclear power. Not only is Yucca Mountain nowhere near being approved but the cost of generated power is 20%-30% more than conventionally generated power. Until the cost of capital gets lower, the storage issue is resolved, the regulatory process rationalized and streamlined, and the public is more accepting, nuclear power’s renaissance will remain a wish but not a reality. Public and environmental opposition to nuclear power in “my backyard”, slow government permitting, and the risks of accidents all combine to drive up the cost of capital and therefore the cost of delivered power. The government regulatory process and the storage debacle can be dealt with in a constructive way even if it is unlikely that they will. But, the recent accident at Fukushima was a stark reminder that systems designed and operated by humans are not perfect and the consequences of a “black swan” event can be significant. How the citizens of Georgia and special interests group react to the new Southern units may tell us a lot about the public’s willingness to support an expansion of nuclear power in this country. Without strong public support or at least muted opposition, politics will be too much of an obstacle. The risk of a nuclear accident is small, although not insignificant. The nuclear industry, which has an outstanding record, will be challenged to make it even smaller through better design and construction, even more rigorous training and inspection, and greater redundancy in systems. All of that takes time and with the best of efforts risk cannot be taken to zero. Since the government is unwilling to go ahead with making Yucca Mountain operational, even though it is more than safe enough, the nuclear industry is going to have to find a means of handling wastes that is politically acceptable and operationally cost-effective. All of these efforts and others that will arise have the effect of raising the cost of nuclear power when what is needed are actions and breakthroughs that will lower it. Under these circumstances, it is hard to be optimistic. A few years ago, it appeared that nuclear had a brighter future because of the growing demand for electric power and growing opposition to coal. Now we have a real renaissance in natural gas which will enable us to meet a growing demand while reducing air pollutants and CO2. Given our abundance of natural gas, its price should stay low unless the heavy hand of federal government over regulation constrains its production and bright future. With the abundance and affordability of natural gas, a logical question is why promote nuclear? And, if nuclear cannot compete with natural gas fired power plants, why offer loan guarantees and production tax credits. Competition among fuels is a good thing. The federal government has a poor track record in the energy field. It has squandered hundreds of millions of dollars, imposed an embargo on potentially significant increases in domestic oil production, driven investment and jobs overseas, and imposed unnecessary costs on consumers with renewable fuel mandates. In other words, to quote John Dingell on another topic, it has created a glorious mess. The United States is rich in energy resources and as our economy continues the shift to service industries and to more widespread use of information and communication technologies, we will consume enormous amounts of electricity in the future. That need can be more easily met if the government abandons its industrial policy on energy and lets market forces and private capital work their will.

### no impact

#### Accidents don’t happen and wouldn’t escalate

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 115-116

Another question is whether India and Pakistan can firmly control and safely deploy nuclear forces sufficient to deter. Because I have already said enough about the ease of deterrence, I shall concentrate on questions of safety and control. Sagan claims that “the emerging history of nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan strongly supports the pessimistic predictions of organizational theorists” (Ch. 3, p. 90). Yet the evidence, accumulated over five decades, shows that nuclear states fight with nuclear states only at low levels, that accidents seldom occur, and that when they do they never have bad effects. If nuclear pessimists were right, nuclear deterrence would have failed again and again. Nuclear pessimists deal with the potential causes of catastrophe; optimists, with the effects the causes do not produce. Since the evidence fails to support the predictions of pessimists, one wonders why the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia should have bad rather than good effects. What differences in the situation of India and Pakistan may cause their fates to depart from the nuclear norm? If they and their situations are different, then the happy history of the nuclear past does not forecast their futures. American commentators dwell on the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union earlier and India and Pakistan today. Among the seeming differences, these are given prominence: differences in the states involved, differences in their histories of conflict, and differences in the distance between the competing parties. I consider them in turn.

### econ

#### ---No Impact --- Iraq and Afghanistan prove that even if economic decline incentivizes war; power imbalances between nation states prevent escalation.

#### ---Economic decline creates a structural incentive for military caution --- Makes politicians sensitive to backlash.

Boehmer 2007

Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### ---Empirical evidence disproves the connection between recession and conflict.

Barnett 2009

Thomas P.M, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### ---Economic conflicts are unlikely and self-contained --- Empirically a decline in spending power precludes large scale military engagements.

Deudney 1999

Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics

The international consequences of these domestic changes may be increased conflict and war. If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because of their lack of democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and lack of socialization into international norms and processes, then a world political system containing more such states is likely to be more violent. **The historical record from previous economic depressions supports the general proposition that widespread economic stagnation** and unmet economic expectations **contributes to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has flaws** as well. First, **the pessimistic interpretation of the relationship between environmental sustainability and economic growth is** arguably **based on unsound economic theory. Wealth formation is not so much a product of cheap natural resource availability as of capital formation via savings and more efficient ways of producing. The fact that so many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resource endowments are poor, demonstrates that there is no clear and direct relationship between abundant resource availability and economic well-being**. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing raw material through-puts, rather than an end to growth in the output of goods and services. **Second, even if economic decline does occur, interstate conflict may be dampened, not stoked.** In the Neo-Malthusian scenario, domestic political life is an intervening variable connecting environmentally induced economic stagnation with interstate conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may in large measure depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. A compensating factor here is the possibility that **as people get poorer they will be less willing to spend increasingly scarce resources for military capabilities. In this regard, the experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may not be relevant, because such depressions were characterized by underutilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending had a stimulative effect, but in a world in which economic growth had been retarded by environmental constraints military spending would exacerbate the economic problem**

### heg

**Even if the US is engaged they don’t solve war**

Mearsheimer 2011 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

**The US can’t influence other states, laundry list of empirics prove**

Haass, 8 [Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, “ The Age of Nonpolarity,” Foreign Affairs; May/Jun2008, Vol. 87 Issue 3, p44-56, 13p, 1 ]

Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity. U.S. calls for others to reform will tend to fall on deaf ears, U.S. assistance programs will buy less, and U.S.-led sanctions will accomplish less. After all, China proved to be the country best able to influence North Koreas nuclear program. Washington's ability to pressure Tehran has been strengthened by the participation of several western European countries--and weakened by the reluctance of China and Russia to sanction Iran. Both Beijing and Moscow have diluted international efforts to pressure the government in Sudan to end its war in Darfur. Pakistan, meanwhile, has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to resist U.S. entreaties, as have Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

No decline, the US is bouncing back hard and will absorb your shocks, history is on our side

Drezner 12 (Daniel, is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a senior editor at The National Interest , and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy. Prior to Fletcher, he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado at Boulder. “Predictions about the death of American hegemony may have been greatly exaggerated” <http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/22/predictions_about_the_death_of_american_hegemony_may_have_been_greatly_exaggerated?wpisrc=obinsite>, Donnie)

Let's face it, there's a general anxiety about the future of America. There's Tom Friedman's column today, which my doctors have now forbade me from critiquing in order to keep my blood pressure down. Books suggesting the United States is kowtowing to China are forthcoming. The Economist recently observed on the highlights of a sobering survey of Harvard Business School graduates, which contained the following: Fully 71% of the businesspeople polled expected America’s competitiveness to decline over the next three years. (National competitiveness is a slippery concept: countries do not compete in the same way that firms do. But the businessfolk in question answered some clearer questions, too.) Some 45% said that American firms will find it harder to compete in the global economy. A startling 64% said that American firms will find it harder to pay high wages and benefits. Intriguingly, the Harvard alumni were gloomy about where America is headed, rather than how it is now. Some 57% felt that today the business environment in America is somewhat or much better than the global average; only 15% said it was worse. But when asked to compare its prospects with those of other industrialised economies, only 9% felt that America was pulling ahead; some 21% said it was falling behind. A striking 66% expected America to lose ground to Brazil, India and China; only 8% thought it would pull away from them. This would seem to jibe with popular laments about why Apple can't make its products domestically. There are a lot of reasons, but a significant one is the lack of necessary skills for higher-end manufacturing. This is in no small part because American students shy away from the training necessary to do these kind of jobs even if they originally think they want to be engineers. Why? Because American college students don't like doing homework. So, America is doomed, right? To be honest, this sounds like a lot of pious baloney. As Michael Beckley points out in a new article in International Security, "The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991." The whole article is worth a read, and a good cautionary tale on the dangers of overestimating the ease of national catch-up: The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical flaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita income, value added in hightechnology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China’s decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China’s growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up. What about the future? One could point to the last few months of modestly encouraging economic data, but that's ephemeral. Rather, there are three macrotrends that are worth observing now before (I suspect) they come up in the State of the Union: 1) The United States is successfully deleveraging. As the McKinsey Global Institute notes, the United States is actually doing a relatively good job of slimming down total debt -- i.e., consumer, investor and public debt combined. Sure, public debt has exploded, but as MGI points out, that really is the proper way of doing things after a financial bubble: The deleveraging processes in Sweden and Finland in the 1990s offer relevant lessons today. Both endured credit bubbles and collapses, followed by recession, debt reduction, and eventually a return to robust economic growth. Their experiences and other historical examples show two distinct phases of deleveraging. In the first phase, lasting several years, households, corporations, and financial institutions reduce debt significantly. While this happens, economic growth is negative or minimal and government debt rises. In the second phase of deleveraging, GDP growth rebounds and then government debt is gradually reduced over many years.... As of January 2012, the United States is most closely following the Nordic path towards deleveraging. Debt in the financial sector has fallen back to levels last seen in 2000, before the credit bubble, and the ratio of corporate debt relative to GDP has also fallen. US households have made more progress in debt reduction than other countries, and may have roughly two more years before returning to sustainable levels of debt. Indeed, the deleveraging is impressive enough for even Paul Krugman to start sounding optimistic: the economy is depressed, in large part, because of the housing bust, which immediately suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle: an improving economy leads to a surge in home purchases, which leads to more construction, which strengthens the economy further, and so on. And if you squint hard at recent data, it looks as if something like that may be starting: home sales are up, unemployment claims are down, and builders’ confidence is rising. Furthermore, the chances for a virtuous circle have been rising, because we’ve made significant progress on the debt front. 2) Manufacturing is on the mend. Another positive trend, contra the Harvard Business School and the GOP presidential candidates, is in manufacturing. Some analysts have already predicted a revival in that sector, and now the data appears to be backing up that prediction. The Financial Times' Ed Crooks notes: Plenty of economists and business leaders believe that US manufacturing is entering an upturn that is not just a bounce-back after the recession, but a sign of a longer-term structural improvement. Manufacturing employment has grown faster in the US since the recession than in any other leading developed economy, according to official figures. Productivity growth, subdued wages, the steady decline in the dollar since 2002 and rapid pay inflation in emerging economies have combined to make the US a more attractive location. “Over the past decade, the US has had some huge gains in productivity, and we have seen unit labour costs actually falling,” says Chad Moutray, chief economist at the National Association of Manufacturers. “A lot of our members tell us that it sometimes is cheaper to produce in the US, especially because labour costs are lower.” Now, whether this boom in manufacturing will lead to a corresponding boom in manufacturing employment is much more debatable. Still, as The Atlantic's Adam Davidson concludes: "the still-unfolding story of manufacturing’s transformation is, in many respects, that of our economic age. It’s a story with much good news for the nation as a whole. But it’s also one that is decidedly less inclusive than the story of the 20th century." 3) A predicted decline in energy insecurity. British Petroleum has issued their Energy Outlook for 2030. The Guardian's Richard Wachman provides a useful summary: Growth in shale oil and gas supplies will make the US virtually self-sufficient in energy by 2030, according to a BP report published on Wednesday. In a development with enormous geopolitical implications, the country's dependence on oil imports from potentially volatile countries in the Middle East and elsewhere would disappear, BP said, although Britain and western Europe would still need Gulf supplies. BP's latest energy outlook forecasts a growth in unconventional energy sources, "including US shale oil and gas, Canadian oil sands and Brazilian deepwater, plus a gradual decline in demand, that would see [North America] become almost totally energy self-sufficient" in two decades. BP's chief executive, Bob Dudley, said: "Our report challenges some long-held beliefs. Significant changes in US supply-and-demand prospects, for example, highlight the likelihood that import dependence in what is today's largest energy importer will decline substantially." The report said the volume of oil imports in the US would fall below 1990s levels, largely due to rising domestic shale oil production and ethanol replacing crude. The US would also become a net exporter of natural gas. Note that this will take a while, and doesn't mean that the U.S. will be energy independent. Still, it's quite a trend. Or, rather, trends. Since the Second World War, the pattern in the global political economy has been for the United States to adjust to systemic shocks better than any potential challenger country. A lot of very smart people have predicted that this time was different -- the United States wouldn't be able to do it again. These trends suggest that maybe, just maybe, that might be wrong

### methane

#### **Methane production from cows is increasing in the status quo**

Jorgenson and Birkholz 10 –

(Andrew and Ryan, “Assessing the causes of anthropogenic methane emissions in comparative perspective, 1990–2005”, Ecological Economics, p. 2636, ScienceDirect, August 31st, 2010, KTOP)

A large proportion of the world's livestock are ruminants, such as cattle. These animals possess four chambered stomachs that generate methane as a byproduct while breaking down food (Kaiser and Drennen, 1993; Drake, 2000). Global cattle production and subsequent human consumption by far exceeds the raising of other ruminant animals (e.g., goats, buffalo, sheep) for human use (World Resources Institute, 2010). Further, much more cross-national panel data are available for the former than any of the latter (e.g., Jorgenson, Austin, and Dick, 2009). Thus, in this study we focus on the effects of cattle production but recognize that other ruminants are known to contribute to the emission of methane gas as well. Moore et al. (1998) argue that methane emissions from cattle and their manure commonly arise from high-density livestock operations (see also Subak, 1999). What is more, large-scale and high-intensity cattle production for human consumption has increased substantially in less-developed countries in recent decades, often for export to developed nations (e.g., Jorgenson et al., 2009). Cattle confined in feedlots or in intensive confinement dairy operations are often fed an unnatural diet of high-protein feed consisting of soybeans and corn. This sort of unnatural diet can lead to increased methane emissions since the resulting manure has a high methane producing capacity. In contrast, cattle that are fed a more natural, low-energy diet composed of grasses and other forages produce manure with about half of the potential to generate methane (Koneswaran and Nierenberg, 2008). Of particular relevance for the current study, prior cross-sectional analyses of per capita and total methane emissions identify positive associations between both and the number of cattle (being raised for human use) present in a given country (Burns et al., 1997; Jorgenson, 2006). Thus, in our panel analyses we expect to find a linear effect of the number of cattle within a country on total methane emissions.

# Round 3

## 1nc

### 1NC

#### We, the flesh of the United States federal government, are capable of reasserting the excessive enjoyment of life through sacrifice.  We, the flesh of the United States federal government, should hold a binding national policy referendum over whether to gloriously sacrifice our flesh to live like suns and implement the result.

#### ---Genuine citizen engagement in energy policy formation is critical engage the body politic with it’s own beurocratic excess.

Hendriks 2009

Carolyn M., Crawford School of Economics and Government @ Australia National University, Securing public legitimacy for long-term energy reforms, PUBLIC POLICY NETWORK CONFERENCETHE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, CANBERRA29-30 JANUARY

Integrate policy development with empowered forms of citizen engagement A more radical strategy would be to extend energy debates into the public realm by facilitating inclusive forms of citizen engagement on energy reform. The idea here is to not only explore citizens’ ideas and feedback, but also their considered preferences of various scenarios or policy options. In many respects this proposal builds on the social mapping component of CSIRO’s EFF project described above. Here the recommendation is to ensure that public views are not merely informing research, but that they are fed into, and affect policy discussions and decisions. Another inspiring project in this respect is a recent Belgian project in which energy futures were co-produced with citizens and stakeholders.15 This strategy will only be successful if citizen input can penetrate through the highly elite and technical nature of existing energy discussions. For this to happen, actors in the energy community may have to reconsider their views on the role of citizens in energy politics.

#### ---Engagement with the people is a prerequisite to larger expressions of uselessness.

Löwy 2009

Michael, Fellow of the IIRE in Amsterdam and former research director of the French National Council for Scientific Research, Climate Change - a contribution to the debate, IV Online magazine : IV418, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1741

Ecosocialist planning must be based on democratic and pluralist debate, at every level of decision. Organized in the form of parties, platforms or any other kind of political movement, the delegates of the planning organizations would be elected and the various proposals would be presented to all those whom they concern. In other words, representative democracy must be enriched - and improved - by the direct democracy which makes it possible for people to directly choose - at the local, national and, finally, international level - between various proposals. The whole population would then discuss questions such as free public transport, a special tax paid by car owners to subsidize public transport, the subsidizing of solar energy, the reduction of working time to 30, 25 or even fewer hours a week, even if that involves a reduction of production. The democratic character of planning does not make it incompatible with the participation of experts whose role is not to decide, but to present their arguments - often different, even opposing - during the democratic process of decision-making. A question arises: what guarantee do we have that people will make the right choices, those which protect the environment, even if the price to be paid is to change some of their consumption habits? Such a “guarantee” does not exist, only the reasonable prospect that the rationality of democratic decisions will triumph once the fetishism of consumer goods has been abolished. It is certain that people will make mistakes by making bad choices, but don’t the experts themselves make mistakes? It is impossible to conceive of the construction of a new society without the majority of people attaining a high level of socialist and ecological consciousness as a result of their struggles, their self-education and their social experience.

#### ---The impact is American imperialism.

Cox 2012

William John, retired police officer, prosecutor, public interest lawyer, author and political activist, Global Research - Political Transformation in America: Effectuating Real Democracy by a Voters’ Rights Amendment, http://thevoters.org/

A National Policy Referendum can produce a number of positive results: First, the grassroots (and netroots) movement that compels the enactment of a referendum, whether by constitutional amendment or by congressional action will, in and of itself, transform the government. Once true representative democracy is effectuated, government will never again be the same. Second, the referendum process will result in a transformation of apathetic voters of every political persuasion into a more engaged, informed and motivated electorate. Once the power to create policy is realized by voters, they will naturally become more questioning and inquisitive. Moreover, voters will likely insist on civics classes in public schools to better prepare young people to evaluate and resist political propaganda and negative advertising in the future. Third, Congress will be compelled to identify actual problems, rather than the profit-motivated issues promoted by their corporate sponsors in the military-industrial complex and the health care, financial, and petroleum industries. In a representative democracy, it will necessarily be the responsibility of Congress to decide upon the most critical issues facing the nation during presidential elections; however, the Internet Age provides myriad opportunities for public participation in the process and for political parties to promote competing questions. Fourth, candidates for all elective offices, particularly presidential candidates, will be forced to take a public stand on a range of real problems. Undoubtedly, politicians will try to lie and dissemble about their positions on issues, but much like witnesses under cross-examination in a court case, they can be forced to simply answer yes or no to the most important questions. Finally, referendum voters will be much more inclined to study the issues, to confront their own prejudices and to challenge the positions of others before arriving at well-thought-out conclusions. Thoughtful answers to a policy referendum at the conclusion of an educational process are far more instructive and useful than quick answers offered during surprise opinion polls. Irrespective of their intelligence, level of education, or station in life, ordinary people are legally required to file income tax returns each year, as the government dips into their pockets to fund its operations and to pay the salaries of their representatives. If people are smart enough to pay taxes and brave enough to die in the wars started by their government, they also possess the ability to decide public policy. The collective wisdom of motivated and well-informed voters in a free society is a powerful force that will better protect its members against oppression by their own government and the people of other countries from the wars started for the financial benefit of corporate sponsors. The People’s Government The sanctity of elections in a representative democracy is directly dependent upon the strength of voter turnouts, which in turn depends on the trust of voters that their vote will make a difference, and by the integrity of the ballot box, which insures that all valid votes are properly counted. Voter Participation. In the United States, voter turnouts are historically much lower than in most other established democracies, and they have been steadily decreasing since peaking at 65% in 1960. The low point was reached in 1988 when barely half of the eligible voters appeared at the polls. Since then, the turnout has bounced up and down depending upon ballot issues, the closeness of the election and whether voters felt their lives would be affected or changed by the result. Even within the vagaries of turnouts, percentages are closely correlated with income, with 86% of people earning more than $75,000 voting, as compared to 52% of those with incomes of less than $15,000. Unsurprisingly, legislators are far more responsive to the issues that concern high-income voters. The best way to eliminate or minimize these disparities in participation is to hold elections on a national paid voting holiday to celebrate the federal elections held every two years and to honor the voters, who are the most important element of a democracy. A measure of the character of a person should not be which party, candidate or cause he or she supports, but whether or not the person actively participates in their government by casting a wise vote. Effective voting must become a sacrament in the nation’s political religion. Voter Suppression. Fair elections are best guaranteed by large turnouts; however, increasingly, there are political strategies that seek to subvert the process by actively suppressing voter turnout by those of opposing viewpoints. Rather than encouraging voters to support their position or candidate, campaigns engage in voter suppression efforts to discourage whole classes of people from exercising their right to vote. Suppression can operate indirectly through legislative processes, such as enacting unreasonable photo identification laws making it more difficult or expensive for low income, minority or elderly voters to register or to cast ballots, or by directly intimidating voters by threatening challenges at the polling place. Voter suppression can also take the form of mailings or telephone calls directing voters to the wrong polling place, by intentionally misleading voters about voting requirements, or by providing too few polling places in opposition precincts. Legislative restrictions on registration or voting must balance the benefits of an increased voter turnout with the risk of voting fraud, and all forms of intentional voter suppression should be prohibited. Computerized Voting. It might appear on the surface that computerized voting could supply a modern and secure method of voting; however, evidence of its vulnerabilities continues to accumulate. In addition to the facts that voting machines are manufactured and marketed by political partisans who refuse to disclose their operating codes, that the computers can be and have been easily hacked, and that voting machines are mechanically and electronically unreliable and often break down during elections, they do not produce an auditable paper ballot completed and verified by the voter. Paper Ballots. If American voters are to regain and retain control over their elections, they must refuse to use computerized voting machines or any other electronic ballot. Instead, voters must insist on hand-countable paper ballots upon which to record their choices. Even still, paper ballots can be optically scanned and quickly counted, but most importantly, each ballot is, indisputably, evidence of an individual’s vote and, collectively, paper ballots serve as a tangible symbol of democracy in action. Write-in Voting. Once in the voting booth, instead of responding like laboratory animals pushing a button in response to the stimulus of the latest ten-second television attack ad, voters should take time to carefully consider the issues and candidates presented on their ballots by the various political parties. Once a decision is reached, each voter should have the choice of demonstrating his or her literacy and inherent political power by voting on the most critical issues and by clearly writing in his or her personal choice for president of the United States, whether or not the name is printed on the ballot. So what if it takes a little longer to count, or recount, the ballots? Isn’t delayed gratification a small price to pay for ensuring that voters control elections, rather than those who profit from elections? If voter turnouts were to dramatically increase, and if only 15 to 25 percent of voters were to cast write-in votes, trust that the politicians would quickly register their willingness to accept every write-in vote naming them for any office of public trust and that they will be scrambling to ensure that all write-in votes cast for them are legally counted. The Future. Young Americans continue to be grievously wounded and killed in their nation’s wars to defend a “government of the people, by the people and for the people.” The question that must be answered now is what kind of government will these young people have in the future? Will it be a despotic government enabled by lazy and easily misled voters, who foolishly rely on robots to count their ballots? More likely, the People of the United States, of every political party, will prove once again they are smart enough to figure out they are being taken advantage of, and they will have the courage to do something about it. They just need to figure out what that “something” is. A Voters’ Rights Amendment Since its creation two hundred years ago, the People of the United States have traveled a long path toward achieving true representative democracy. Initially, only male property owners were allowed to cast ballots, but along the way the franchise has been extended, with a few exceptions, to all adult citizens. With its decision in Citizens United, the Supreme Court not only reversed two hundred years of progress toward a democracy for all of the people, it slammed the door shut and handed over the keys to corporations and other moneyed interests. Amending the Constitution. There has been a groundswell of bipartisan opposition to Citizens United, and a number of organizations representing tens of thousands of voters have proposed constitutional amendments to overcome the decision. Move to Amend is the best known and best organized of the opposition groups, and its proposed amendment aims to reverse the granting of corporate personhood and the equation of money and free speech ordered by the Court. Its proposal follows in the first three sections: Section 1 The rights protected by the Constitution of the United States are the rights of natural persons only. Artificial entities, such as corporations, limited liability companies, and other entities, established by the laws of any State, the United States, or any foreign state shall have no rights under this Constitution and are subject to regulation by the People, through Federal, State, or local law. The privileges of artificial entities shall be determined by the People, through Federal, State, or local law, and shall not be construed to be inherent or inalienable. Section 2 Federal, State and local government shall regulate, limit, or prohibit contributions and expenditures, including a candidate’s own contributions and expenditures, for the purpose of influencing in any way the election of any candidate for public office or any ballot measure. Federal, State and local government shall require that any permissible contributions and expenditures be publicly disclosed. The judiciary shall not construe the spending of money to influence elections to be speech under the First Amendment. Section 3 Nothing contained in this amendment shall be construed to abridge the freedom of the press. The V.R.A. A Voters’ Rights Amendment securing voter control over the government must not only reverse corporate personhood and provide for the control of money in politics, it must also clearly establish voter primacy as a matter of inherent constitutional right and it must include a solid foundation upon which to build a true and long-lasting representative democracy for future generations. Following is a working blueprint for such a structure: Section 4 The right of all adult citizens of the United States to cast effective votes in all elections is inherent under this Constitution and shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State. Section 5 During the calendar year preceding a presidential election, Congress shall solicit public comment regarding the political issues that most concern the People. Prior to the end of the calendar year preceding a presidential election, Congress shall adopt a joint resolution enumerating the 12 most critical policy questions that should be addressed by the next President and Congress. Failure of Congress to adopt a joint resolution prior to the end of the calendar year shall result in the disqualification of all sitting members of Congress to be eligible for reelection. Section 6 Federal elections conducted every second year for Senators and Representatives shall be held on a national voter’s holiday, with full pay for all citizens who cast a ballot. Federal elections shall be conducted on uniform, hand-countable paper ballots and, for the presidential election, ballots shall include the 12 most critical policy questions identified by Congress, each to be answered yes or no by the voters. Paper ballots shall provide space allowing voters to handwrite in their choice for all elective federal offices, if they choose, and all such votes shall be counted. Section 7 The States shall ensure that all citizens who are eligible to vote are registered to vote. In balancing the public benefit of maximum voter participation with the prevention of voting fraud, Congress and the States shall not impose any unreasonable restriction on registration or voting by the People. The intentional suppression of voting is hereby prohibited and, in addition to any other penalty imposed by law, any person convicted of the intentional suppression of voting shall be ineligible for public office for a period of five years. Transformation The United States Constitution once stood as a model for new nations; however, today it is viewed by many as an outdated and difficult-to-amend document that guarantees few rights, when compared to other established democracies. There is an inherent right in a representative democracy to cast an effective vote, and a failure by the government to protect that right nullifies the electoral process. By amending their constitution to ensure the primacy of voters and their right to control their government, the People of the United States will once again demonstrate an evolutionary model for democratic governments around the world. Transformation of the United States government to a true representative democracy is no longer an option. It is a matter of survival!

#### ---War turns the affirmative --- Military conflict always subordinates sovereignty to a particular project.

Irwin 2002

Alexander, Saints of the impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the politics of the sacred, pg

The military is and must be dominated by the principle of action, by the mode of behavior that in *Inner Experience* Bataille will designate as the project (*BOC* V, 59-60). “The army has only an active life. And one does not imagine ‘contemplative’ soldiers” (*BOC* VII, 251). “Action and decision spur the rapid rhythm of wars and the immediate forgetting of all horror. The conqueror must go quickly; he subordinates what he does to the result.” And in war, Junger’s rapturous proclamations notwithstanding, it is the result that matters, not the intensity of the participants’ experiences. “Terror and horror increase ecstasy, but the reduce the chances of destroying the enemy” (254-55). Powerful emotions are of the interest in a military context never as ends in themselves, but only insofar as they facilitate or hinder the attainment of strategic objectives, insofar as they render men more or less efforts as fighting machines. The subordination of all efforts to a defined goal endows war with a globally rational, purposive structure, despite the irrational violence that seethes in combat on a moment-by-moment basis. Wars are fought to be won. The overarching objective gives a sense to the sacrifices demanded of individuals and dulls the horror that would otherwise envelope them. “[I]n battle one approaches horror with a movement that overcomes it: action and the project linked to action permit one to *go beyond* [*depasser*} horror. This going beyond gives to action, to the project a captivating grandeur, but the horror in itself is denied” (*BOC* V, 58). This denial, Bataille wants to claim, belongs inevitably to the modern practice (if not to the “idea” [*ML,* 290]) of war. War functions in the modern world by presenting itself precisely not as unlimited horror, but as a necessary instrument for the attainment of practical ends (the continuation of politics by other means, in Clausewitz’s formula). Only under the most anomalous circumstances is war’s claim to utility unmasked, and then only fleetingly. This is why Bataille addresses to Junger a rather stunning reproach: “Nothing can stand against a natural law of things: *war does not want to be deepened* and the lyricism of horror suits it badly.”

### 1NC

#### ---Interpretation --- Debate is a space for mutually exclusive clash over the desirability of eliminating restrictions and increasing federal government incentives for energy production.

#### ---Violation --- The affirmative does not defend an advocacy mutually exclusive with our offense against increasing federal energy production.

#### ---Standards

#### (A.) Education --- Resolution based policy debate enables the ideological clash key to critical thinking, argument development & real world policymaking skills.

Mitchell 2010

Gordon R., Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf

Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.” 54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. this would by no means sideline or even exclude scientiic assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation. 55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.” 56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public debate” 57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical beneit for student participants, and irst-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientiic artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production. 58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication ield’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a dif erent route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English ield’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.

#### (B.) Predictable Ground --- Resolution focused debate is key to pre-round research, argument development and equitable access to the debate space.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

Galloway (2007) also advances an argument concerning the privileging of the resolution as a basis for debating. Galloway (2007) cites three pedagogical advantages to seeing the resolution and the first affirmative constructive as an invitation to dialogue. “First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate” (p. 13). An important starting point for conversation, the resolution helps frame political conversations humanely. It preserves basic means for equality of access to base research and argumentation. Having a year-long stable resolution invites depth of argument and continuously rewards adaptive research once various topics have surfaced through practice or at debate tournaments.

#### ---Political planning is inevitable --- The affirmative’s refusal of government politics ignores the interconnected nature of waste and order; placing excess at the head of a new totalitarian project towards the future. Only our framework allows for the planned planlessness necessary for authentic meaning.

Stoekl 1990

Allan, Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness, Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 181-205

In both of these cases-the Aztec priest and the gangster-one notes that the figure's violence and subversion is doubled by erection centrality, and order; the Aztec's pyramid, the skyscraper associated with the gangster, are the organizing principles, the metonyms, of societies that are brutal and deliriously forceful, even if in decline. And one could say exactly the same thing about the "acephale": "he" is a figure that bears death, but at the same time "he" is a perfectly coherent and traditional "sacred figure" around which a society, albeit one of conspirators, can be established. "He" is not only the figure of an order, but (like the pyramid or skyscraper) a principle of order. One sees the representation of this political ambivalence-for want of a better word-in the famous "Acephale" drawing of 1936, by Andre Masson (VE, 180): while the head is clearly missing, the stars (nipples), bowels and death's head (genitals) only go to create another face, another "figure humaine." Further, the death's head itself has a miniature face.... The "acephale," in other words, has lost a head, a principle of organization and order, only to mutate and develop an- other, more hypnotic, doubled and doubling (replicating) face. It is no coincidence that, after the outbreak of the war, Bataille gave up the "whim" of starting a new religion and a new "order."22 As we see from the American example, "sacred figures and myths" seem to have a way of reversing themselves and turning into icons of centrality and oppression. Bataille's later fragmentary writings, in the Somme Atheologique, bear witness to his recognition of the need to disrupt any coherent movement, doctrine, or representation, no matter how "acephalic" it might be. But a renunciation of the marginal or elite "order" in Bataille's case returns him, surprisingly enough, in the last chapter of The Accursed Share (1949), to a certain affirmation of "planisme," and specifically to a celebration of the very culture that his Aztec priests and Chicago mobsters had seemed in principle to subvert: the planned American economy of the "New Deal." Does this mean that Bataille was simply jumping from one proto- fascism to another? After all, as Zeev Sternhell has shown, the links between "planisme," Lagardelle (the editor of Plans), "Ordre Nouveau," Henri de Man and, finally, collaboration with the Nazis are clear enough. By jettisoning democratic safeguards, and valorizing a conciliatory social "fusion" at the expense of the proletariat and the class struggle, "socialist" thinkers (and political leaders) like Henri de centrally directed as a de Man would have wished, whose net effect was to involve the government actively on the side of poor workers and farmers, thereby coopting (as the European "planistes" hoped to do) "harder core" Socialists and Communists. Thus the New Deal was much more interested in class cooperation than class conflict: the directors of the famous FSA photographic project, for example, sent Walker Evans and many others out into the field-literally-to record southern poverty, and the photographs they made were then seen by northern workers, with the resulting (at least hoped-for) bond of fraternity motivating both groups to vote for Roosevelt. The important thing, here, is that they would vote: the New Deal was never as authoritarian or as centralized as the "Plans" of the de Mans and Dandieus; some form of representative democracy was retained. Of course at the time many groups on both the left and the right in Europe considered post-1933 Washington, D.C. to be just another fascist, or at least totalitarian, capital.24 The very haphazardness of Roosevelt's "try anything" approach, however, and the retention and even strengthening of democracy by the New Deal and its avatars (the Voting Rights Act of 1965) disproved that. Pace Sternhell, then, a "planisme" could be, and was, developed in the prewar period that did not necessarily lead to fascism, that was "centralized" but was not authoritarian. One can argue that there is nothing intrinsically "fascist" in "planisme"; it can just as easily be "acephalic" as rigidly hierarchical. Indeed it was Roosevelt's successor, Truman, who, after the war, came to replace the "acephale" for Bataille as the figure of political and economic (disiorganization. "end" of planning is planlessness, the "self-consciousness" that has "nothing as its object," that is the "nothing of pure expenditure" (AS, 190). Bataille here, at the end of the chapter, reiterates the argument from "The Psychological Structure of Fascism": accumulation is sub-ordination to some future goal. (It is, in the terms of that essay, homo- geneous.) But Bataillean self-consciousness is a "becoming conscious of the decisive meaning of an instant in which increase (the acquisition of something) will resolve into expenditure" (AS, 190). Just as the most elaborately conceived planning is inseparable from potlatch, so too the most integrated, nonindividuated consciousness (the consciousness that arises at the end of history, through an impossible "awareness" of the [non] "object" of the Marshall Plan) is indissociable from the nothingness it "knows." At this point one can see how Bataille's economic project folds back into the secular mystical experience of the Somme Atheologique.

#### ---We solve their offense --- It’s all written in reference to European style socialism whereas the American political system we defend is thoroughly permeated by excess & waste which Bataille thought was the beez kneez.

Stoekl 1990

Allan, Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness, Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 181-205

Bataille has discarded his earlier fetishes, such as the proletariat in the street ("The solving of social problems no longer depends on street uprisings" [AS, 186]) and "'visions,' divinities and myths" (AS, 189). Now lucidity will guarantee both economic development, peace, and the end of economic selfishness. Finally, the very necessity of central planning will make America look like the Soviet Union in that the former will accord more importance to state-planned and financed production. "It [the US] defends free enterprise, but it thereby increases the importance of the state. It is only advancing, as slowly as it can, toward a point where the USSR rushed headlong" (AS, 186). Some form of socialism will be developed in the US, then, as the opposing parties come to resemble each other. But, implicitly at least, Bataille is arguing that an American Stalinism will not arise from this situation, because this state control is devoted not to accumulation (as in Russia) but to expenditure. If the Marshall Plan, and the similar plans that will follow, necessarily negate purely individual concerns and enterprises, then socialist state planning will be inseparable from the giving away of massive amounts of wealth, from potlatch. Even though law and directives will determine activity, the Stalinist "head" will be replaced by a "headlessness." Or we can say, following Bataille's logic, that this nonauthoritarian direction, this "acephalite," is already in place in America, since the Marshall Plan has been set in motion not by a "head," an oppressive command, but by Roosevelt's successor, who is precisely unaware of what he is doing: "Today Truman would appear to be blindly preparing for the final-and secret-apotheosis" (AS, 190). Confrontation will continue between the superpowers-it is integral to the model of potlatch, which is now being elaborated on an international scale-but coercive control, at least in America, seems a thing of the past.

#### ---Violates Solar Power

#### Solar power means electricity from solar.

California Energy Commission Glossary no date (“Glossary of Energy Terms- Letter S,” accessed 7-20-12, http://www.energy.ca.gov/glossary/glossary-s.html)

SOLAR POWER - Electricity generated from solar radiation.

#### The aff is about solar energy not solar power

#### Power is electrical generation- energy is the actual light and heat from the sun.

Everblue Training no date (“Solar Energy Defined,”

http://www.everblue.edu/renewable-energy-training/getting-started-with-solar-and-wind-energy)

The definition of solar energy is that it is the radiant light and heat from the sun that has been harnessed by humans to create energy. The definition of solar power is electrical generation by means of heat engines or photovoltaics. Uses for solar power include but are not limited to: space heating and cooling, water distillation, daylighting, hot water, thermal energy for cooking, and more.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

### 1NC

#### ---The affirmative’s gender neutral account of sacrifice masks the appropriation of female reproductive power and violence against women.

Roberts-Hughes 2008

Rebecca, Erotic transgression and sexual difference in Georges Bataille, Kings College, http://kcl.academia.edu/RebeccaRobertsHughes/Papers/139881/Erotic\_Transgression\_and\_Sexual\_Difference\_in\_Georges\_Bataille

As well as being sacrificial victims, in much of Bataille’s work women are related to and represent death and thus they often pave the path of transgression. In many poems Bataille explicitly links the female form with sex and death and often in his fiction the text reaches its climax (or one of its climaxes) in the suicide of a female lover of the protagonist, such as Marcelle in *Story of the Eye* or the protagonist’s mother in *My Mother*. In *Madame Edwarda* a prostitute claims she is God, and the sacred for Bataille is the realm outside humanity – the realm of death and continuity. That women are so central to eroticism and death in Bataille’s work is not surprising, since we have witnessed how he characterized them as the luxury used to forge the boundaries of society and upon which the incest taboo, which created human erotic activity, was placed. Secondly, like champagne they are a luxury excluded from the patriarchal world of work; this means they are a transgression: they are they path to continuity, they are death. Further, through their reproductive capacity, women are associated with the nature that humanity excludes; menstrual blood terrifies man because it reminds him of his natural, corporeal birth. As *erotic objects* and as *the embodiment of nature* women dissolve the boundaries of the subject since they are both *desirable* and *horrific*. This is how they come to represent (erotic) death for Bataille. For Irigaray this process is not the act of eroticism alone but the act performed by male theorists of eroticism, who have used women to create a self-glorifying conception of Eros that does not allow for sexual difference. In *Thinking the Difference* Irigaray states that our “path to reciprocal love between individuals has been lost, especially with respect to eroticism.” She holds that the dominant theory of Eros as “chaos, darkness, bestiality, sin, annihilation” and so on is a male form of experience which, in accessing the void and annihilating the subject, violently dissolves any potential for sexual difference. What Bataille venerates as a transitory state reached by eroticism (and the sacrifice of and fusion with the ‘female’), Irigaray disparages as the stagnant pit our erotic lives have fallen into. In limiting his account to male experience, and therefore to only one pole of sexual difference, Bataille fell into his own, male abyss corresponding not to any genuine otherness but to “the lack of rhythm and harmony of male desires, which specifically refuse any manifestation of the difference between the sexes so they can appropriate the fertility of the mother’s body.” Bataille’s male subject therefore not only sacrifices the female subject to reach his own dissolution and continuity but also to appropriate *in* this continuity, this realm of totality and fusion, her specifically female powers. Reproduction, as man’s corporeal tie to nature, has thus been appropriated by the male subject in a final denial of both nature *and* women. Reproduction has become the non-corporeal production of mankind, the (re)production of his community. The sacred is a new realm through which man relates himself to his surroundings, and takes the form of chaos because he imposes his own subjectivity upon the erotic ‘encounter’. In short, “man immerses himself in chaos because he refuses to make love *with* an other, to be *two* making love, to experience sexual attraction with tenderness and respect.” We have thus uncovered another problem in Bataille’s account of erotic transgression. We already understand that women are not subjects and therefore do not experience transgression outside subjectivity. Following Irigaray’s critique of Eros, we must add that the sacred realm outside subjectivity is a ‘continuity’ further denying women her difference, her own existence. Bataille wants to explore different relations to otherness that do not involve blindly denying that which we find horrific; subsuming otherness is not a way of achieving this. In terms of sacrifice, we must conclude that there is a threefold sacrifice of women. Mankind emerges because woman does not. Woman is sacrificed for society to exist (‘pledged to communication’) *and* for transgression to occur (she is murdered and he fuses with her death) *and* in the sacred realm of transgression (for the sake of his ecstatic communication with the universe, an ‘other’ part of himself woman came to represent to him) in which there can only be totality and no difference.

#### ---Reject the affirmative --- Only a strategy of feminist separatism can challenge the drive towards global destruction.

Weedon 1999

Chris, the Chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff University, Feminism, theory, and the politics of difference, p. 90-93

In the order of reason which has governed Western thought since the rise of Ancient Greek philosophy, feminine otherness is denied and reconstituted as a male-defined otherness. This results in the denial of subjectivity to potentially non-male-defined women. A maternal feminine subjectivity, were it to be realized, would enable women to step outside of patriarchal definitions of the feminine and become subjects in their own right. Whereas the unconscious in Freud and Lacan lays claim to fixed universal status, for Irigaray its actual form and content is a product of history. Thus, however patriarchal the symbolic order may be in Lacan, it is open to change. The question is how this change might be brought about. For Irigaray, the key to change is the development of a female imaginary. This can only be achieved under patriarchy in a fragmented way, as what she terms the excess that is realized in margins of the dominant culture. The move towards a female imaginary would also entail the transformation of the symbolic, since the relationship between the two is one of mutual shaping. This would enable women to assume subjectivity in their own right. Although, for Irigaray, the imaginary and the symbolic are both historical and changeable, this does not mean that, after thousands of years of repression and exclusion, change is easy. In a move not unlike that of ecofeminists, Irigaray suggests that the symbolic order, men and masculinity are shaped by patriarchy in ways which are immensely problematic not just for women but also for the future of the planet. The apparently objective, gender-neutral discourses of science and philosophy — the discourses of a male subject — have led to the threat of global nuclear destruction. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993; original 1984), Irigaray suggests that the patriarchal male subject is himself shaped by the loss of the maternal feminine which motivates a desire for mastery: Man's self-affect depends on the woman who has given him being and birth, who has born/e him, enveloped him, warmed him, fed him. Love of self would seemingly take the form of a long return to and through the other. A unique female other, who is forever lost and must be sought in many others, an infinite number of others. The distance for this return can be conquered by the transcendence of God. The (female) other who is sought and cherished may be assimilated to the unique god. The (female) other is mingled or confused with God or the gods. (Irigaray 1993: 60-1; original 1984) Irigaray takes this theme further in Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution (1994; original 1989) when she suggests that the desire for godlike mastery and transcendence has dire consequences for the world: Huge amounts of capital are allocated to the development of death machines in order to ensure peace, we are told. This warlike method of organising society is not self-evident. It has its m origin in patriarchy. It has a sex. But the age of technology has given weapons of war a power that exceeds the conflicts and risks taken among patriarchs. Women, children, all living things, including elemental matter, are drawn into the maelstrom. And death and destruction cannot be associated solely with war. They are part of the physical and mental aggression to which we are constantly subjected. What we need is an overall cultural transformation. Mankind [le peuple des homines] wages war everywhere all the time with a perfectly clear conscience. Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must eat to kill, must increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant stars what no longer exists here, must defend by any means the small patch of land they are exploiting here or over there. Men always go further, exploit further, seize more, without really knowing where they are going. Men seek what they think they need without considering who they are and how their identity is defined by what they do. To overcome this ignorance, I think that mankind needs those who are persons in their own right to help them understand and find their limits. Only women can play this role. Women are not genuinely responsible subjects in the patriarchal community. That is why it may be possible for them to interpret this culture in which they have less involvement and fewer interests than do men, and of which they are not themselves products to the point where they have been blinded by it. Given their relative exclusion from society, women may, from their outside perspective, reflect back a more objective image of society than can men. (Irigaray 1994: 4—5; original 1989) The destructive force of the patriarchal symbolic order makes all the more pressing Irigaray's project of creating a female imaginary and symbolic, specific to women, which might in its turn transform the male-defined symbolic order in the West, in which women figure only as lesser men. In this process, separatism becomes a strategy in the struggle for a nonpatriarchal society in which sexual difference is both voiced and valued: Let women tacitly go on strike, avoid men long enough to learn to defend their desire notably by their speech, let them discover the love of other women protected from that imperious choice of men which puts them in a position of rival goods, let them forge a social status which demands recognition, let them earn their living in order to leave behind their condition of prostitute — these are certainly indispensable steps in their effort to escape their proletarianization on the trade market. But if their goal is to reverse the existing order - even if that were possible - history would simply repeat itself and return to phallocratism, where neither women's sex, their imaginary, nor their language can exist. (1994: 106; original 1989)

### Case

#### They are an example of bad scholarship

#### ---Bataille’s sociological account of excess affirms a primitivism that decontextualizes events and ignores the importance of utility to such acts.

Wolin 1996

Richard, LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Constellations Volume 2, Number 3, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf>

Yet, in his celebratory discussions of sacrifice, potlatch, and so forth, Bataille fundamentally misconstrues the historical and contextual parameters of such ritual practices. One could even go so far as to say that, in a certain measure, Bataille’s understanding of these phenomena succumbs to a type of “primitivism”: he decontextualizes the cultural practices he analyzes in order the better to incorporate them within his own theoretical agenda of his own critique of modernity. Here, Bataille seeks nothing less than “an anthropology that will itself provide a living - and orgiastic – myth to overturn, through its experience on a collective level, ‘modern’ sterile bourgeois society . **”51** Bataille chooses to view sacrifice and gift-giving in the first instance as gratuitous, non-utilitarian, or, as he puts it, “having no ends beyond themselves” - but this is far from the case. While he is correct in characterizing such practices as unrelated to the production of wealth, they are very much oriented toward ***the reproduction*** of ***existing relations*** of ***power.*** The act of human sacrifice as practiced among the Aztecs redounds to the credit of the sacrificer(s): it reinforces existing relations of authority, viz., the authority of those who are empowered to commission a sacrifice (in this case, the priests and aristocracy). It provides those in authority with a quasi-divine power to preside over life and death. In this sense, it is misleading to claim that sacrifice has no end beyond itself. An analogous criticism may be made of Bataille’s discussion of potlatch - the public, demonstrative destruction of wealth - and gift-giving. Only those who possess great wealth can in reality afford to destroy it. Consequently, the option to engage in potlatch does not exist for the poorer strata of such societies.52 Acts of potlatch are no less implicated in the reproduction of an existing social hierarchy. At issue is the reinforcement of the social status or prestige of the one who destroys his or her wealth. In almost all cases, those who practice potlatch are drawn from the upper strata of society. Those who must witness the potlatch are in effect humiliated: they are vividly reminded of their lowly rank in the social order. The same, of course, is true of the practice of gift-giving. The gifts in question are not freely bestowed, as it were, with no ulterior end in view. Bataille seizes on the aspect of gift-giving that serves his purposes. For, strictly speaking, gift-giving is not an economic transaction. It is neither an act of barter, nor does it aim at the enhancement of social wealth. Instead, with the gift it is ***social relations*** among persons that are in the first instance at issue. But the ***types*** of social relations at stake are relations of power. When given in accordance with social ritual, they always come with strings attached: unless the gift can be returned in kind, its social function is to humiliate the recipient. In fact, the entire object of gift-giving as a social ritual is to derogate and shame the recipient by virtue of his or her inability to return a gift of equal value. Gift-giving, too, then must be classified as a ritual practice that is in no sense gratuitous or free. Far from being an end in itself, as Bataille claims, it is fully implicated in the production and reproduction of social power. Such insights are amply confirmed in the writings of Mauss as well as in those of other ethnographers. To quote Mauss: But the motives of such excessive gifts and reckless consumption, such mad losses and destruction of wealth, especially in these potlatch societies, are in no way disinterested. Between vassals and chiefs, between vassals and their henchmen, *the hierarchy* is *established by means of these gifts.* To give is to show one’s superiority, to show that one is something more and higher, that one is *magister.* To accept without returning or repaying more is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient, to become *mit~ister.’~*

#### ---The existence of the sun does not prove their argument --- Energy provides an ontological basis for grace and ethics not waste and squander.

**Irwin** 200**2**

Alexander, Saints of the impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the politics of the sacred, pg 69

Weil’s notes on e4conomics of psychic and physical energy use the term “force” in a manner initially less indebted to military metaphors than to natural science. “Here below in the sensible universe there are only two forces: gravity on the one hand, and on the other all the energies that permit us to counterbalance gravity, and which all […] proceed from the sun, that is to say from the same source as light” (*C3*, 187). However, scientific ideas of force concern Weil above all because they enable an understanding of spiritual realities. It is “literally true” that “solar energy descends into plants and thus into abnimals, in such a way that we can eat it after having killed it” (198-99). Yet this literal truth encloses a deeper and more important insight. It concretely symbolizes divine grace, God’s endless self-giving. “We cannot capture solar energy. It is the energy that spontaneously transforms itself and takes a form in which we can seize it. This is an act of grace” (199). Weil’s analysis provides an intriguing counterpoint to Georges Bataille’s glorification of solar self-squandering. In his article on Van Gogh and automutilation (as in numerous other texts), Bataille had presented the sun’s endless outpouring of energy as the archetype of sacred (useless, irrational, self-expending) behavior. Weil, too, sees in the sun’s activity a sacrificial gesture readable simultaneously as physical fact and moral-religious allegory. Yet Weil downplays the gratuitous quality of the sun’s self-giving that so fascinated Bataille. Instead, Weil emphasizes the practical benefits that accrue to earthly creatures through the sun’s pouring forth of warmth and light. For Weil, the sun’s radiance becomes not a metaphor for irrational, violent excess, but a sacramental symbol expressive of God’s love.

#### ---Embracing sacrifice as a refusal of transcendent meaning follows the logic of catholic appropriation of sacrificial practices. The affirmative’s idealism opens the door for fundamentalist violence.

Arnould 1996

Elisabeth, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Diacritics 26.2

Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment. The philosophical and Christian version of sacrifice is understood as the spiritual transformation of a sacrificial moment the finite nature of which it denounces even as it appropriates its power. The Bataillian version, on the contrary, insists upon this finite moment in order to escape the dialectical comedy that transforms sacrifice into an ideal process. Performed in the name of spiritual rebirth, the sacrifices of Plato and Christ, for instance, reappropriate death by transfiguring it as resurrection. Grotesque and replete with horrors, death in Bataille appears alone on a stage whose cruelty is neither explained nor redeemed through transfiguration. Thus, Bataille withholds nothing from the scene of sacrifice but lets it emerge in the fullness of its amorphous violence. He valorizes its sanguinary horror in order to denounce the dialectic idealization of a death nothing should domesticate. He exhibits it "as it is": opaque, silent, and without meaning. According to Nancy, however, the valorization itself remains caught in the sacrificial logic of the idealist tradition. For, he argues, only in light of its ontotheological conceptualization can sacrifice become at once the infinite process of dialectical sublation and the blood-spattered moment this process both negates and sublates, simultaneously [End Page 87] avers and contests. The Bataillian thesis, granting efficacy and truth (reality) to sacrificial cruelty, is irremediably linked to the processes of dialecticization and spiritualization through which the philosophical and Christian West appropriates the power of sacrifice. It is the cruel counterpart of its idealization. And if this conception gives to sacrificial death an importance proportionally opposite to that which it receives from the Christian and philosophical transfiguration--since the finite truth of death plays at present the role of the infinite truth of resurrection--it still does nothing but repeat its ontotheological scheme. For it also pretends to find, on the cruel stage of sacrifice, a singular and more "real" truth of death. The stage of the torment is, for Bataille, that place where death appears with the full strength of a nonmeaning that can be exposed only through the immolation of the sacrificial victim. If this is so, then should we not suppose that this immolation pretending to give us the "inappropriable" truth of death's rapture appropriates in its turn the excess of the "excessive" meaning of this rapture? Does it not transform its excess into an "excessive truth," to be sure a negative one, though no less absolute than the philosophical and spiritual truths to which it opposes itself? At the heart of modern theories of sacrifice is thus, as Nancy puts it, a "transappropriation of sacrifice" by itself, even when, as is the case for Bataille, this theory tries to overcome sacrifice's spiritual operation through an excessive and volatile negativity. As soon as sacrifice thinks itself as revelation, be it that of a spiritual beyond or its negative counterpart, it remains a sacrifice in the name of its own transcendence, a loophole to a finitude powerless to think itself in terms other than those of a revelation: the revelation of a clear or obscure god, symbol of resurrection or of death's blind horror. If one wants to think finitude according to a model different from that of its sacrificial appropriation, one should think "apart from" sacrifice. If finitude is, as Bataille has himself wanted to think, an "access without access to a moment of disappropriation," then we must also call it "unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].

#### ---Bataille’s celebration of violence for violence sake is a form of anthropological romanticism that surrenders the political to fascism.

Wolin 1996

Richard, LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Constellations Volume 2, Number 3, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf>

In the worldview of both Bataille and that of German young conservatives, war plays an essential, positive role. It serves as a means of dissolving the principium individuationis: the principle of bourgeois subjectivity, on which the homogeneous order of society - a world of loneliness and fragmentation - depends. For, according to Bataille, “the general movement of life is . . . accomplished beyond the demands of individual^."^^ It is in precisely this spirit that he celebrates the non-utilitarian nature of “combat” or “war” as a type of aestheticist end in itself: “Glory . . . expresses a movement of senseless frenzy, of measureless expenditure of energy, which the fervor of combat presupposes. Combat is glorious in that it is always beyond calculation at some moment.”33 For the same reasons, Bataille eulogizes those premodern “wamer societies in which ure, uncalculated violence and ostentatious forms of combat held sway.” For under such conditions, war was not made subservient to the vulgar ends of enterprise and accumulation, as is the case for modern-day imperialism, but served as a glorious end in itself. Yet, in the early 1930s, it was precisely this aestheticist celebration of “violence for violence’s sake,” or “war for war’s sake,” that Benjamin viewed as the essence of modem fascism. As he remarks in a well known passage : “Fiat arspereat mundus,” says fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. . . . Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which fascism is rendering ae~thetic.~’ In Bataille’s thought war serves as the harbinger of a cultural transfiguration in which the primacy of self-subsistent subjectivity would be replaced by the values of an “unavowable” or “ecstatic community”: that is, a community that would no longer be governed by the goals of a “visual culture” - transparency, self-identity, etc. - but instead, those of self-laceration, difference, and finitude. In fact, this Bataille-inspired program of an ecstatic community has been quite explicitly carried forth and explored in the political writings of Maurice Blanchot (La Communautk inavouable; 1983) and Jean-Luc Nancy (La Communautk dboeuvrke; 1985). Via his theory of “general economics” - which stands opposed to the “restricted,” rational-purposive orientation of a capitalist economy - Bataille, too, embraces a type of vitalism. In The Accursed Share, for example, he speaks confidently from the standpoint of “the exuberance of life,” of “the exuberance of living matter as a whole.”36 Yet, his is less a philosophical vitalism than that of a theorist of culture who allows himself to be guided by a certain anthropological romanticism: by a tendency to project anachronistically contemporary society’s need for wholeness and unity upon premodern forms of life that are on this account viewed in a quasi-utopian light. Bataille’s understanding of the prospects for a return of the sacred is relatively pluralistic. The revitalization of any one of a number of rites and occult practices that have been summarily banned by the rise of modernity’s “instrumentally rationalist culture” (Weber) will do. Thus, in Bataille’s theory of “expenditure” (dkpense), war is only one of a number of possibilities for radical cultural transgression; other possibilities include: luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality)” - all of these are, according to Bataille, “activities which, at least in primitive circumstances, have no end beyond themselve~.”~~ Yet, in addition to his endorsement of varieties of non-purposive ritual, Bataille is of sorts a disciple of negative theology. As a counterweight to modernity he is in favor of generalized profanation: any practice that furthers the ends of a “general” rather than “restricted economy” (where “economy” is anthropologically defined in terms of the general circulationof persons, goods, and symbols) will do. All instances of profanation that gratuitously disrupt the smooth functioning of productive consumption - the reign of the Tuuschprinzip - are eagerly welcomed. Hence, in Bataille’s work “the heterogeneous” (along with “sovereignty”) can best be defined ex negativo: as whatever stands opposed to or helps to undermine our modern cult of the homogeneous: contemporary capitalism and its anodyne cultural analogues (such as “art for art’s sake”), which know no wanton expenditure, but instead adhere to the bourgeois principle of equivalent exchange. However, as a result of the ethos of transgression that is propagated in Bataille’s work - a quasi-aestheticist valorization of transgression for transgression’s sake - one encounters serious normative lacunae. One might even go so far as to say, echoing Tony Judt, that aspects of Bataille’s thought are redolent of a more general and long-standing “vacuum at the heart of public ethics in France,” “the marked absence of a concern with public ethics or political morality.”38 I have already spoken of his work as an unsurpassable normative point of reference for much of post-structuralism. Here, “anti-normativism” itself becomes “normative,” insofar as rejection of the “norm” becomes itself a source of normativity. In recent years, as poststructuralists have begun meditating on the problem of how one would go about constituting a non-totalitarian political community - a communautk inavouable (Blanchot) or dksoeuvrke (J-L. Nancy), as it has been called - it is, unsurprisingly, to Bataille’s work that they have immediately turned.39 Yet, as Bernard-Henri LCvy has cautioned in relation to this avowedly illiberal, new “organicism” or “communitarianism”: Organicism. Naturalism. Refusal of universal values. Denial of values purely and simply. . . . It is on these bases, on this mute foundation, that one deploys a cover of horror that is more somber and infinitely more clamorous. . . . I will have attained my objective when I have succeeded in convincing that fascism is not in the first instance barbarism; that is it not essentially and to begin with the apocalypse; that it does not always and of necessity mean storms of iron and blood. Instead, it is in the first instance a type of society, a model of community, a manner of thinking and of organizing the social bond.40 It is precisely Bataille’s ecstatic model of community, his manner of “thinking and of organizing the social bond,” that I wish to call into question. It is a model that, fundamentally and undeniably, seeks to establish the normative basis of social action on an aesthetic foundation. As such its guiding ethos would be an aesthetics of transgression. Bataille’s ecstatic community would also be an aesthetic community: it would be a community in which the type of social action that would be valued above all would be action that yielded “no return,” action that - in the manner of art for art’s sake - had no end beyond itself. In the last analysis, the celebration of transgression for transgression’s sake remains unnuanced, unqualified, and uncritical. In lieu of a conceptual articulation of how one would begin to differentiate between, shall we say, salutary and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption, purely and simply. In essence, Bataille - and those who have followed in his footsteps - seeks to ground an ethics of postmodernity in an avant-garde cultural practice that draws heavily on precapitalist forms of social life, precisely those forms that have been scorned and tabooed by the process of modernization. Indeed, the very desideratum of an adequate “conceptual articulation” of Bataillesque concepts such as “sovereignty,” “heterogeneity,” “expenditure,” and so forth would amount to a contrudictio in adjecto. In Bataille’s sense, the very call for principled legitimation would stand convicted a priori of indebtedness to the logic of “productive consumption,” to the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and equivalent exchange. Such considerations return us to Habermas’s claim concerning the affinities between poststructuralism and the “young conservatives.” Both “transpose the spontaneous power of the imagination, the experience of self and affectivity, into the remote and the archaic; and in Manichean fashion, they counterpose to instrumental reason a principle only accessible via ‘evocation’: be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the Dionysian power of the poetic.” In other words, both “ground an intransigent antimodernism through a modernist attitude.”

#### ---The affirmative is in a double bind --- Either (a.) sacrifice is meaningless & there’s no impact or (b.) sacrifice has substance to open new forms of thought legitimizing genocide.

Minkoff 2007

C. Michael, “Existence is Sacrificeable, But It Is Not Sacrifice,” April 25, http://smartech.gatech.edu/dspace/bitstream/1853/14446/8/Michael%20Minkoff--LCC%204100--Animal\_Sacrifice.pdf

What Nancy admits is that “strictly speaking we know nothing decisive about the old sacrifice” and that “the Western economy of sacrifice has come to a close…it is closed by the decomposition of the sacrificial apparatus itself” (Nancy, 35). These confessions are significant because it indicates the fear that Nancy has of appropriating a symbol which has a remainder and a vector he cannot predict or control. What Bataille wanted from sacrifice was one thing, but Nancy fears that sacrifice carries its own valence. It is like the art that accedes to extinction, but suspends above it indefinitely. The force to accede to extinction is not guaranteed to suspend. The force that Bataille borrows from sacrifice is not guaranteed to behave in the way atheism dictates. Nancy reasserts that Western sacrifice always knew it sacrificed to nothing, but this latent knowledge makes the institution of sacrifice absurd, and Nancy is not willing to deny that sacrifice “sustained and gave meaning to billions of individual and collective existences” (Nancy, 35) What Nancy fears is this ignorance. He knows he does not understand the significance of the old sacrifice. If sacrifice was to no one and everyone knew it; why was and is it so universal and why have so many been tempted into believing its significance? But if one assumes that there is no one to whom one sacrifices, Bataille may not use sacrifice as the centerpiece of his philosophy because if sacrifice is not to anyone, it is not truly significant. If it is not significant or meaningful, it has no power. It becomes comedic. And it becomes massacre. That is why Nancy spends much of his time talking about the sacrifice of the Jews at Auschwitz. Without over-determining the significance, the sacrifice becomes a genocide or a holocaust. Bataille is trapped between two uncomfortable positions—let the blood continue to spill to make sacrifice real and significant and concrete, or deny the death the status of sacrifice, which in Bataille’s mind, would be to deny it realization. Nancy asks if Bataille’s “dialectical negativity expunges blood or whether, on the contrary, blood must ineluctably continue to spurt” (Nancy, 27). If Bataille spiritualizes sacrifice, it no longer has the power of real death, the concreteness of finiteness and the ability to rupture finitude. But if Bataille insists on the real death, he necessitates the constant spilling of blood in mimetic repetition until history is completed.

#### ---No link & turn --- Modern subjectivity makes sacrifice redundant and their obsession with combining secular society with premodern material violence is the foundation for Nazism.

Zizek 1996

Slavoj, The indivisible remainder: an essay on Schelling and related matters, pg 124-125

This notion of the modern, Cartesian subject *qua* the radical negativity of the double (self-relating) sacrifice also enables us to demarcate the paradoxical place of the theories of Georges Bataille, that is, of Bataille’s fascination with the ‘real,’ material sacrifice, with the different forms of holocaust and of the excessive destruction of (economic, social, etc.) reality. On the one hand, of course, Bataille’s topic is modern subjectivity, the radical negativity implied in the position of the pure transcendental subject. On the other hand, Bataille’s universe remains the pre-Newtonian universe of balanced circular movement or – to put it in a different way – his notion of subjectivity is definitely pre-Kantian: Bataille’s ‘subject’ is not yet the pure void (the transcendental point of self-relating negativity), but remains an *inner-worldly*, *positive force*. Within these co-ordinates, the negativity which characterizes the modern subject can express itself only in the guise of a violent destruction which throws the entire circuit of nature off the rails. It is as if, in a kind of unique short circuit, *Bataille* *projects the negativity of the modern subject backwards, into the ‘closed’ pre modern Aristotelian universe of balanced circular movement, within which this negativity can materialize itself only as an ‘irrational’, excessive, non-economical expenditure*. In short, what Bataille fails to take note of is that the modern (Cartesian) subject no longer needs to sacrifice goat’s intestines, his children, and so on, since *his very existence already entails the most radical (redoubled, self-relating) sacrifice, the sacrifice of the very kernel of his being*. Incidentally, this failure of Bataille also throws a new light on the sacrificial violence, the obsession with the ultimate twilight of the universe, at work in Nazism: in it, we also encounter the reinscription of the radical negativity characteristic of the modern subject into the closed ‘pagan’ universe in which the stability of the social order is guaranteed by some kind of repeated sacrificial gesture – what we encounter in the libidinal economy of Nazism is *the modern subjectivity perceived from the standpoint of the pre-modern ‘pagan’ universe.*

#### ---Productivity is a sovereign value --- The expression of human potential breaks free from the normative constraints of subjectivity in favor of new forms of emotional intensity.

Badhwar 2007

Neera K., Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, Friendship and Commercial Societies, Forthcoming in *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*, http://praxeology.net/guest-badhwar1.htm

None of this is to deny that when the means to an end is not a human being or a human relationship, and the end in question is morally permissible, the end is unqualifiedly more important than the means, since the value of the means derives from the value of the end. Hence, if economic production were only a means to the ends of survival, comfort, pleasure, personal relationships etc., then it could fairly be said to be lower on the scale of value than these ends. But there is no reason to think that production is only a means to these ends (although its role as a means is hardly negligible in the absence of a regular delivery of manna from heaven). To relegate it to a lower realm of human existence, as Schwarzenbach and other critics do, is to show a serious misunderstanding of its role in a good human life. People engage in economic production for many of the same sorts of reasons that they engage in intellectual or artistic production – proving theorems, writing treatises, making music - or, indeed, building friendships: for the sake of exercising their creative or productive powers in worthwhile enterprises. Although Fromm fails to appreciate this about economic production, he appreciates better than even some defenders of free markets the meaning and importance of productiveness as such. “Productiveness,” he states, “is man’s ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him” (1949: 84), and again, “[p]roductiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the `actor’; that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him” (86). When productiveness is understood as a positive expression of human potentiality and not simply as a means to the ends of survival, comfort, or wealth, we can appreciate the entrepreneurial and creative spirit that animates all worthwhile activities, including market activities. And then we can understand why, for instance, a philosophy Ph.D. would find satisfaction in the enterprise of producing skateboards “adorned with uplifting art.”[34] Worthwhile activity in any sphere exercises our imaginative, emotional, and intellectual powers to create things of worth and, thereby, engages and re-shapes our identity. This is at least one reason why the failure of a business enterprise can be as devastating as the failure of a long-term scientific enterprise - or of a long-term friendship. Seeing commercial activities as “poiesis” and friendship as “praxis” distorts the nature of both business enterprises and friendships.

## 2nc

### Overview

#### Excess can only be excessive when in presence of a limit, it is impossible to measure whether or not the aff has gone BEYOND the limit of the possible because they do not engage in the resolution. We will explicitly ALLOW extra topical action, this solves best because it allows an engagement excess without ignoring limits. That’s the first Stoekl card.

#### ---The affirmative fails to fail --- The minute any of their argument forms coherence it becomes worthless self-indulgence.

Mann 1999

Paul, *Masocriticism*, pg 67-69

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption’” can never become an explicit critical motive. At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye. Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. **Excess is not a project but a by-product of *any* discourse**; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory *squeal like a pig* before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no *knowledge* of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relationto the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or *depensives* in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss. Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies.

#### They conceded the second Stoekl card – USFG can do all these things it is mindlessly excessive.

### Fairness good

#### (A.) Dialogical division of ground is key to fair access to the debate space and a prerequisite to all educational benefits to debate.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

As referenced above, the resolution provides a basis for research and discussion. Using the resolution as a starting point, students will debate the same resolution dozens or hundreds of times each year on both the affirmative and negative. This practice, called switch-side debate, establishes the expectation that a student will defend and answer multiple sides of similar arguments throughout a debate season. As a result, this practice increases one’s intellectual flexibility and understanding of multiple sides of hundreds of issues. Galloway (2007), Harrigan (2008), and Mitchell (2010) add to this discussion. Galloway (2007) theorizes the benefits to communication through switch-side debate. In part due to the rules requiring both sides be heard for equal amounts of time combined with the etiquette of listening, flowing, and answering all of an opponent’s argument, debate forces structured dialogue. In such, demands for fairness surface. Galloway advances how demanding dialogical fairness “…takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced” (Galloway, 2007, p. 6). Underlying strategic calls for fairness, fairness of equitable debatable ground in switch-side debate demands recognizing a basic humanity in all persons involved. Viewing the first affirmative speech as the invitation to the rest of the debate, Galloway (2007) continues to articulate the academic benefits to switching sides. Theorizing the benefits of taking multiple sides of an issue, even sides of an issue someone does not agree with, Galloway concludes how debate encourages critical thought, meaningful exchange of ideas, and a better defense of one’s own thought since ideas need defending against opposing argumentation.

#### (B.) Fairness means you categorically disregard affirmative offense --- Absent equitable access to the debate space for all competitors; evaluations of affirmative truth claims are impossible. By shifting the point of argumentative clash away from the resolution the affirmative precludes pre-round research, argument development and in-depth debate.

#### (C.) Framework comes first --- The impossibility of objective knowledge means the political informs the basis for representations, discourse, epistemology and ontology; not the other way around.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997).

### Problem solving good

#### ---Problem-solving theory is necessary for solving oppression.

Jarvis 2000

D.S.L., Lecturer in IR at the University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenges of Postmodernism, pg. 129

On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate: Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

### Zwar

#### ---Outweighs --- Clash over predictable ground is the basis for all in round education and solves their offense because they can include their personal belief within a larger justification for policy action & make all their ‘energy production bad’ arguments when negative.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

As discussed previously, sources of political information matters to how politically pluralistic the general public is. Mutz (2007) and Mutz and Martin (2001) fear the public is selfselecting both the source of their news along with their peer groups preventing the airing and hearing of multiple sides of an argument. This study suggests debate has two supportive roles to help resolve these fears. First, to debate outsiders, the resolution may appear obscure, boring, or isolated from their daily lives. For debaters, however, they must embrace the resolution and soon come to realize a rich complexity of argumentative potential permitting students (or teams and squads) to choose areas of the topic that are intellectually intriguing, competitively beneficial, and/or personally rewarding. The resolution then requires switch-side debating – enabling a depth of argument unrivaled by other high school experiences. Benefits to switchside debates have been offered by Galloway (2007), Harrigan (2008), and Mitchell (2010). Speaking to the intellectual flexibility required of policy debaters, this study concurs how switch side debating enables a range and intensity of argument and how switch-side debating indirectly encourages students to find personal meaning in argumentation. Many debaters interviewed compared their experiences to other high school opportunities and identified a depth of argument in debate unparalleled by civics, government, student councils, other simulation activities, or various service learning opportunities. The competitive necessity to anticipate and research all sides of an argument prior to being in a competitive round encourages a thorough examination of relevant political literature. In a debate rounds, debaters must listen to all of another’s argument, answer the argument at its best intention, consider strategic compromise on argumentation, anticipate the competitive direction of the argument, and directly compare arguments against each other. This practice demands a practice of open political inquiry. As a result of the demand for open inquiry, students are challenged “…to rethink unsubstantiated claims or arguing for positions they personally do not hold, playing devil’s advocate to make sure the full range of positions are well represented or to challenge a too-simple formation that has not grappled with possible objections” (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, and Corngold, 2007, p. 74). Second, debaters must present multiple sides of an issue. This practice enables hearing legitimacy in opposing argumentation as debaters do not have the luxury to entirely self selecting arguments for presentation or for defense. Thus, debate releases an umbrella of intellectual ideas. Once the ideas are released, debaters can develop personal advocacies and identities through argument. Even after establishing argumentative preferences, students recognized their success was tied to an intellectual flexibility to respond to numerous arguments. This study confirms the work of Galloway (2007) by establishing debate as a dialogical imperative whereby planning, listening, and responding may help establish empathy through seeing the humanity and credibility in one another’s arguments.

### Fairness

#### Question of education

#### ---Resolution based policy debate is the only internal link to meaningful education --- Extend 1nc Mitchell evidence --- Starting with the federal government action creates a framework that incentivizes clear dialectical clash between competing ideologies while rooting those discussions in concrete policy changes. This enables a unique form of argumentative engagement; teaching debaters to simultaneously critically analyze theory & imagine impossible material change so to inform the construction of their own political identity.

#### ---This facilitates real world policy change --- Mitchell cites how the EPA contacted several college programs in 2008 and how their relentless process of critical policy analysis actually allowed policymakers to make changes previously thought impossible due to government bureaucracy & partisan bickering.

## 1nr

### OV

#### **extend weedon- absent the alternative nuclear war is inevitable**

#### **The impact is physical & mental annihilation of difference.**

Irigaray 1994 Luce,Thinking the difference: for a peaceful revolution,pg 4-7

What does it mean for our entire culture to be threatened with destruction? There are, of course, declared stakes connected with threats of war. According to the types of discourse whose economy is at issue here, such threats are the sole means of maintaining international equilibrium. I shall come back to this point. Huge amounts of capital are allocated to the development of death machines in order to ensure peace, we are told. This warlike method of organizing society is not self-evident. It has its origin in patriarchy. It has a sex. But the age of technology has given weapons of war a power that exceeds the conflicts and risks taken among patriarchs. Women, children, all living things, including elemental matter, are drawn into the maelstorm. And death and destruction cannot be associated solely with war. They are part of the physical and mental aggression to which we are constantly subjected. What we need is an overall **cultural transformation, not just a decision about war** *per se*. Patriarchal culture is based on sacrifice, crime and war. It is a culture that makes it men's duty or right to fight in order to feed themselves, to inhabit a place, and to defend their property. From time to time, patriarchy must make decision concerning war, but that is far from what is required to ensure a cultural transformation. Mankind [*le peuple des hommes*] wages war everywhere all the time with a perfectly clear conscience. Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must kill to eat, must increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant stars what no longer exists here, must defend by any means the small patch of land they are exploiting here or over there. Men always go further, exploit further, seize more, without really knowing where they are going. Men seek what they think they need without considering who they are and how their identity is defined by what they do. To overcome this ignorance, I think that mankind needs those who are persons in their own right to help them understand themselves and find their limits. Only women can play this role. Women are not genuinely responsible subjects in the patriarchal community. That is why it may be possible for them to interpret this culture in which they have less involvement and fewer interests than do men, and of which they are not themselves products to the point where they have been blinded by it. Given their relative exclusive from society, women may, from their outside perspective, reflect back a more objective image of society than can men. Moreover, in theory, women should not be in a hierarchical relationship to men. All other types of minorities potentially are. It is with a thoroughly patriarchal condescension, either unconscious or cynical, that politicians and theoreticians take an interest in them, while exploiting them, with every possible risk of the master-slave relationship being overturned. This dialectic – or absence thereof – is built into father-son relationships, and has been since the inception of patriarchy. It is doomed to failure as a means of liberation and peace because it is based on (1) *lines of descent* insufficiently counterbalanced by a horizontal relationship between the genders and (2) *exclusively male lines of descent* making any kind of dialectic between male and female ancestries and masculine and feminine genders impossible. The possibility of sex-specific cultural and political ethics is our best chance today. The world's economic and religious equilibrium is precarious. Moreover, the development of technology is subjecting our bodies to such trials that we are threatened with **physical and mental annihilation**, that our living conditions leave us no time to rest or think, whatever real leisure time we may have, and that we are continually overwhelmed, forgetful, distracted. Men's science is less concerned with prevention or the present than with curing. For objective reasons of accumulation of property, for reasons of the subjective economy of the male subject, it allows disorder and pollution to grow, while funding various types of curative medicine. Men's science helps destroy, then attempts to fix things up. But a body that has suffered is no longer the same. It bears the traces of physical and moral trauma, despair, desire for revenge, recurrent inertia. The entire male economy demonstrates a forgetting of life, a lack of recognition of debt to the mother, of maternal ancestry, of the women who do the work of producing and maintaining life. Tremendous vital resources are wasted for the sake of money. But what good is money if it is not used for life? Despite policies that encourage the birth rate for economic reasons, or sometimes for religious ones, destroying life seems to be as compulsory as giving life.

#### Alt means we solve the understanding of flesh better than the affirmative- absent acceptance of sexual difference man never understands the loss of flesh because he only sacrifices the female flesh.

#### We cannot make sense of human subjectivity absent realization of sexuate difference, aff advantages are incoherent calls to maintain a detrimental ontological relationship making the critique a logical prior question

**Jones 11** (Emma, a dissertation, Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy “SPEAKING AT THE LIMIT: THE ONTOLOGY OF LUCE IRIGARAY’S ETHICS, IN DIALOGUE WITH LACAN AND HEIDEGGER” https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/11542/Jones\_Emma\_Reed\_phd2011sp.pdf, Donnie)

I utilize the term “ethics” in several senses. On the one hand, I believe that Irigaray’s reformulation of subjectivity by way of relational ontology is “ethical” in the Aristotelian sense that Irigaray thinks the human being as one who must enact itself to the fullest of its potential, and in the most “excellent” or virtuous way. xvii The event of being as relation, of which I spoke earlier, does not simply announce what “is,” but rather calls upon the human subject to respond in and to this relation (as I elaborate in Chapters IV and V). Thus, on the other hand, this vision is also “ethical” in the sense that to become actualized as a subject is to recognize oneself as always already related to another, di erent subject—the sexuate other. As, I argue, Irigaray’s most recent works (in particular Sharing the World) explicitly show, this self-actualization of humanity is shared between two subjects who are mutually and continually formed and re-formed as a result of this process. Therefore **if the relation between the two is askew**—*if it is violent*, *dehumanizing, or* otherwise *detrimental*—**our very understanding of human subjectivity** **and all that goes with it is harmed.** This shared self-actualization process is the essence of the concept “relational limitation.” I illustrate this in Chapter V of the dissertation through my exploration of the figure of “place” in Irigaray’s writing. I speak there of place as a dialogical figure that encapsulates Irigaray’s ethical transformation of subjectivity. What it means to be a subject for Irigaray, I argue, is to perpetually move, in language, toward the “place” of the other and back into the “place” of the self, at once motivated and restricted by the “relational limit” that both connects and separates the two. The thinking of this limit, again, encompasses Irigaray’s reformulations of ontology, language, and ethics as interrelated and as shared. With regard to Irigaray’s explicitly formulated ethics of sexuate difference, however, some commentators have worried that, in focusing on the “relation” between sexuate subjects, Irigaray’s work is only applicable to intimate or sexual relations between men and women. This is the substance of Judith Butler’s critique of Irigaray, for instance, in the Diacritics interview, where she even quips that Irigaray’s work should be filed under “heterosexual studies.” However, as I hope my discussion of ontology above has already shown, when Irigaray speaks about the “relation” of sexuate subjects, she does not only mean a specific intimate relation between men and women. Rather, the relation takes place at the ontological level, such that the event of being is already an event of relation between-two, and the “subject” also comes to be re-defined as two: internally limited-by and perpetually moved-toward the sexuate other. As Gail Schwab (2007) notes (and as I explain further in Chapter V), we can thus draw a distinction between an “empirical” relation between the sexes and an “ontological” one. Schwab quotes Irigaray in To Be Two, who writes: “Certainly, I can decide to become woman while suspending my empirical relationship with the other gender [...] but [...] to be woman necessarily involves [...] **to be in relation with man, at least ontologically**.” (TBT: 34; Schwab, 32). Schwab interprets this quote to say that “[a]lthough generically, to be woman requires a relation to the other man, just as to be a man requires a relation to the other woman, becoming a woman at the level of the individual is not dependent upon a heterosexual love choice” (32). Thus, while the ethics of relationality proposed by Irigaray would certainly be applicable to empirical heterosexual love relations, it is certainly not limited to this sphere, and instead concerns the relation between male and female genres (the French term translated as “genders”) as a whole—a relation that, in turn, affects all of our empirical relations. Thus, as I will discuss in Chapter V, the ethical practice of dialogue as the enactment of a relational limit is applicable to all human relationships. Nonetheless, for Irigaray, **it is critical to transform the ontological relation of sexuate difference** (a transformation that, I argue, must be pursued through dialogues with all sexuate others) ***first and foremost*** if these relationships are to thrive. Stating that the definitions of sexuate subjects are intimately bound up with the status of an ontological relation thus does not mean that we can only actualize as sexuate subjects through entering into specific empirical relations with members of the “other” sex. Instead, it means that there is always an underlying ontological relation between “masculine” and “feminine” subjectivity as a whole. This underlying relation may be more or less violently skewed or repressed in a variety of ways, as Irigaray’s work attempts to reveal. And while this underlying relation certainly affects empirical relations between the sexes, the two are not interchangeable. Nonetheless, it is important to note the empirical effects that the repression or skewing of this ontological relation has. Indeed, from Irigaray’s point of view, we can view the oppression of women as the failure of an ethically-enabling relationality—the ongoing erasure of their subjective place as women. As I will discuss in Chapter V, this is manifest in such global problems as domestic violence and unequal division of labor between the sexes. These examples indeed remind us of the force of Irigaray’s vision, in that men and women, on the whole, do have to “share the world” together—**regardless of their individual, empirical relationships—and manifestly must learn to do so more ethically**. xviii

#### **Sexual difference is a prior question**

Casey 97

(Damien Casey Australian Catholic University, Brisbane “Maximus and Irigaray: Metaphysics and Difference” [http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/staffhome/dacasey/Maximus&Irigaray.pdf](http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/staffhome/dacasey/Maximus%26Irigaray.pdf), Donnie)

For Irigaray, however, the meaning and significance of sexual difference is not something established in the beginning as some norm to which we should comply. Rather it shows the way forward, inviting us to become co-creators in a manner that goes beyond simply procreation, which would be simply to reduce creation to its material basis. Irigaray’s insistence upon the priority of sexual difference is, in a sense, **strategic**. How can we approach the question of the other without considering the most basic of differences by which human society is structured? 11 Sexual difference then is exemplary of all difference. But to define the other by their biological difference is both to deny the other as an independent source of self understanding and to put obstacles on the path to the spiritualisation of matter, to deny that the flesh might become word.

### LINK

#### 4 LINKS

#### 1- SACRAFICE

#### Batialle’s basis of sacrifice is predicated upon the male experience- we don’t sacrifice ourselves; we sacrifice the female body to the male experience. It’s no coincidence that

#### Their Hansen & Stepputat 05 evidence says that man is in his natural state reveling in an uninhibited sexual experience-

). Sovereignty resides in every human being and shows itself in the desire to enjoy and revel in brief moments of careless freedom, in sexual ecstasy, in moments of simple nonanticipatory existence, when an individual experiences "the miraculous sensation of having the world at his disposal" (199). This was the original condition of man in "his non-alienated condition

#### Bataille always writes of women being raped as the sacrificial man, its because his entire theory is predicated upon a finding pleasure in a male experience.

#### their 1ac Stoekl evidence says that

“the standing reserve is there, at the ready; raw materials are there to be used for ~~Man’s~~ [Humanity’s] survival and comfort.”

#### That standing reserve IS the female body. Extend Roberts-Hughes - There is a threefold sacrifice of women. Woman is sacrificed for society to exist and for transgression to occur and in the sacred realm of transgression (in which there can only be totality and no difference.

#### 2- MUSCLE POWER

#### They argue for MUSCULAR energy predicated upon a masculine experience- silencing female perspectives. not only in 1ac CX but also in their Stoekl evidence. they argue that we need

Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then — muscle power and inanimate fuel power—so too there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy. The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” No intimacy

#### 3-TRANSGRESSION

#### Bataille’s gender neutral account of transgression ignores masculine bias --- Their challenge to utility gains intelligibility only though the destruction of passive feminine subjects. That’s **Surkis 1996**

#### Bataille’s theory of erotic transgression presumes a universal masculine subject

**Surkis, 1996.** (Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault**,** *Diacritics* 26.2 (1996) 18-30)

The vision of erotic transgression set forth in *Erotism* concentrates on the experience of the "discontinuous subject" in his attempt to transgress the limits of individual existence by leaping or falling into the realm of continuity or limitless being in order to access the zone of death. [2](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT2) For Bataille this experience of continuity should not be confused with absolute and final death; he stresses that "continuity is what we are after, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run" [18-19]. The experience of death in eroticism is, by definition, always only proximate- simultaneously rupturing and maintaining the limits of individual existence. Bataille insists: "At all costs we need to transcend [limits], but we should like to transcend them and maintain them simultaneously" [141]. The transgressive experience is thus organized and produced by the imposition of a limit always existing in relation to it, even and especially at the moment of its rupture. The sensation of transgression is conditioned by a cognizance of the taboo and is, as a result, fundamentally "duplicitous," performing "a reconciliation of what seems impossible to reconcile, respect for the law and violation of the law . . . " [36]. **[End Page 19]** Transgression thus *heightens* orcreatesanawareness of the law. As Bataille writes: "If we observe the taboo, if we submit to it, we are no longer conscious of it. But in the act of violating it we feel the anguish of mind without which the taboo could not exist . . . That experience leads to the completed transgression which, in maintaining the prohibition, maintains it in order to benefit by it [*pour en jouir*]" [38; *OC* 42]. Since the pleasures or *jouissance* of eroticism are intimately related to the injunctions that prohibit them, the subject must always be aware of the existence of the law in order to experience limitless being in the moment of transgression; he must be sensitive "to the anguish at the heart of the taboo no less great than the desire which leads him to infringe it" [38-39]. This is the fundamental structure of Bataille's transgression, and, as Carolyn Dean has argued, this paradoxical dynamic is integral to his understanding of the subject. Because his self-loss actually makes him aware of the law, it is "lived as the constituent moment of self-hood" [242; see also Hollier]. However, Dean questions the universal applicability of a subjectivity founded by its own dissolution. She argues that it presumes a "masculine" subject who initially possesses a position or self to transgress or lose. Dean suggests that, for Bataille, the reconciliation of "manhood" and castration are constitutive of his notion of the "virile" rather than incompatible with it. In effect, the "wholeness" of Bataille's virile man is, as she writes, "paradoxically linked to an experience of transgressing limits rather than of containment within boundaries that would demarcate his being." If this virility is repeatedly produced in and by self-dissolution of a masculine subject, Dean wonders where "women figure in this scheme of things**"** [244-45]. [3](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html#FOOT3) Upon reading *Erotism*, we find that images of women's self-loss are prominent in Bataille's theory of erotic transgression; they are instrumental to the enactment of masculine self-loss.

#### 4-LOSS

#### Bataille’s account of loss relies on essentialized gender divisions that collapse the political space necessary for true femininity.

Surkis 1996

Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault, *Diacritics*m Vol 26, No 2, Georges Bataille: an occasion for Misunderstanding, pg 18-30

Bataille's introductory discussion of the process by which individual discontinuity is ruptured-the mise en oeuvre of eroticism-relies on an initial, gendered difference between erotic partners. Bataille writes: The transition from the normal state to that of erotic desire presupposes a partial dissolution of the person as he exists in the realm of discontinuity .... In the process of dissolution, the masculine partner [partenaire masculin] has generally an active role, while the feminine part [partie f6minine] is passive. The passive, female side is essentially the one that is dissolved as a separate entity [en tant qu'etre continue]. But for the male partner the dissolution of the passive partner means one thing only: it is paving the way for a fusion where both are mingled, attaining at length the same degree of dissolution. [17; OC 23] A fundamental division is enacted here between the "masculine partner" and the "feminine part"; the feminine side is already lost as a subject, a partial object from the beginning. In order for the masculine side to lose himself, the passive, feminine side must be always already dissolved as a continuous being: her loss initiates his fall into continuity. In the meantime, the masculine partner is only "relatively dissolved," remaining "discontinuous" enough to derive meaning and sense from her imaged annihilation. The feminine dissolution is thus necessarily prior to the masculine, with his experience of continuity predicated on her prior and total self-loss. Bataille elaborates on what is "seen" by the masculine partner in this scenario, outlining how an "aura of death" is necessary in order to "denote" erotic passion. To whom is this passion denoted? The beloved is repeatedly inscribed as significant for the lover; the scenario functions within a specular economy in which her image of dissolution appears as a meaningful sign for him. Bataille writes: "Only in the violation, through death if need be, of the individual's solitariness can there appear that image of the beloved object which has for the lover the sense of all that is [qu'apparait cette image de l'e'tre aime qui a pour l'amant le sens de tout ce qui est]" [20-21; OC 26]. This image of the beloved is, paradoxically, transparent, a window onto a world of limitless being: "The beloved is for the lover the transparency of the world. Through the beloved appears... full and limitless being, which does not limit, which no longer limits personal discontinuity [l'etre plein et illimite, que ne limite, que ne limite plus la discontinuite personelle]" [21; OC 26]. Full and limitless being "appears" to the lover through the beloved's transparency-her present absence. This being is "glimpsed as a deliverance through the person of the perceived being [l'etre aperCue]" [21; OC 26]. Continuous being arises as a possibility only when seen through the transparency of the beloved; she renders limitlessness to the lover. This limitlessness is then always perceived by the lover; he remains "discontinuous" and distanced enough to sense her loss. It is unclear what the beloved ever "sees." Or rather, the point is precisely that the beloved sees nothing.

### A2 Alt Fails --- 2nc Feminism

#### ---The alternative is to view the debate space as a place to separate from patriarchal culture and practice feminine difference. Only this move can change thinking & facilitate the development of effective political strategies.

Bell 1993

Linda A., Professor of philosophy @ Georgia State University, Rethinking Ethics in the Midst of Violence: a Feminist Approach to Freedom, pg 63-64

Tactical separatism affirms separation as a limited strategy, as a temporary expedient, necessary if certain ends are to be achieved. Such separatism is regarded as absolutely unavoidable by most feminist theorists. Representative of these is Luce Irigaray when she states, For women to undertake tactical strikes, to keep themselves apart from men long enough to learn to defend their desire, especially through speech, to discover the love of other women while sheltered from men's imperious choices that put them in the position of rival commodities, to forge for themselves a social status that compels recognition, to earn their living in order to escape from the condition of prostitute...these are certainly indispensable stages in the escape from their proletarization on the exchange market. 29 Even more basically, as Marilyn Frye argues, the creation of separate spaces “somewhat sheltered from the prevailing winds of patriarchal culture” is necessary for an individual's sense of body and self: “[O]ne needs space to *practice* an erect posture; one cannot just will it to happen. To retrain one's body one needs physical freedom from what are, in the last analysis, physical forces misshaping it to the contours of the subordinate. Separation is necessary, too, “to avoid being demoralized.” As Sarah Hoagland says, at least separation dispels “the illusion that we are equal participants in these events, [thus] we can avoid claiming responsibility for something over which we have no control.” This seems particularly important to recognize in a society that has developed into a fine art the technique of distorting power relations by blaming the victim, the one who is relatively powerless. Separation may be necessary if one is to understand what is going on, since it offers “a way of pulling back from the existing conceptual framework, noting its patterns, and understanding their function regardless of the mythology espoused within the framework.” Perhaps, too, only with some pulling away from the systems of oppression surrounding us can we begin to free our thinking and our imaginations to devise practical strategies and alternatives.

### create community

#### the way you become a community and lose yourself keeps the male experience, while totally getting rid of the female

**Surkis, 1996.** (Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault**,** *Diacritics* 26.2 (1996) 18-30)

An analysis of the gendered positions inscribed in Bataille's theory of transgression calls into question the possibility and even viability of the total self-loss that is upheld as its goal. [11](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT11) This, it appears to me, is exactly why Foucault consistently effaces the role of gendered partners in eroticism. An account of the gendering of Bataille's transgression demonstrates how it remains within a specular and speculative economy in which the writing subject is always at a certain distance from what he "sees." While he might desire to totally lose himself in the loss of another, the writing subject always remains conscious enough of that loss to theorize. Bataille's transgression may thus be read against itself in [End Page 29] order to demonstrate that the "masculine" writing subject always maintains his position vis-à-vis a witnessed "feminine" loss, which explains why Foucault shies away from the consideration of gender. We therefore need to examine how transgression underwrites the theoretical/philosophical subject in the process of purportedly undermining it and hence to account for the writing subject's position rather than deny its continued existence. An interrogation of the gendering operative in transgression then raises a number of further questions concerning the radicality of gestures toward self-loss (a series of questions that, in his attempt to proclaim the disruptiveness of transgression, Foucault cannot afford to address). Does this desire for self-dissolution, which is founded on the "image" of another's loss, in fact strengthen or reinscribe the position of the "masculine" witness rather than radically disable it? An examination of the gendered dynamic of transgression raises the problem of *who* is really lost. Who benefits from the enactment of self-loss? Who witnesses and theorizes about the simultaneous appearance of the limit and its transgression? Who loses an eye?

### A2 Permutation --- 2nc Feminism

#### ---The permutation is the link --- Their attempt to reduce all perspectives to one neatly packaged advocacy is the foundation of sexual indifference.

Xu 1995

Ping, Irigaray's Mimicry and the Problem of Essentialism, Hypatia, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 76-89

At the beginning of her essay "Sexual Difference," Irigaray writes: "Sexual difference is one of the important questions of our age, if not in fact the burning issue. According to Heidegger, each age is preoccupied with one thing, and one alone. Sexual difference is probably that issue in our own age which could be our salvation on an intellectual level" (Irigaray 1991a, 165). For Irigaray, one of the reasons why an elaboration of sexual difference becomes necessary, even urgent, is the apparent failure of traditional feminism to resist being reabsorbed into the existing male-dominated order that is actually characterized by sexual indifference. Here lies the fundamental difference between Irigaray and Simone de Beauvoir, as Irigaray clearly indicates in her essay written for the occasion of the death of de Beauvoir (Irigaray 1992, 9-14). Why is traditional feminism so readily reabsorbed into the existing male- dominated order? For Irigaray, the answer is that the goal of traditional feminism has been to demand equality to men, thereby it has been complicit with the existing male-dominated order, which is characterized by "its power to reduce all others to the economy of the Same" and "its power to eradicate the difference between the sexes in systems that are self-representative of a 'masculine subject' " (Irigaray 1985a, 74). In this sense, traditional feminism represents what Irigaray calls "a direct feminine challenge" to the existing order, which means "demanding to speak as a (masculine), 'subject', that is, it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible that would maintain sexual indifference" (Irigaray 1991a, 124).

#### ---The combination of feminism and postmodernism cripples the alternative --- Abandons the oppressed in favor of middle-class indifference.

Bondi & Dornosh 1992

L., Department of Geography, University of Edinburgh, M. Department of Geography, Florida Atlantic University, Other figures in other places: on feminism, postmodernism and geography, Environment rmd Planning D: Society and Space, volumo 10, pnqoa 199-213

Thus, the apparent symmetry of the encounter outlined by Fraser and Nicholson (1988) conceals some important asymmetries likely to render the proposed marriage of feminism to postmodernism at least as unhappy as that earlier liaison between feminism and Marxism (Hartmann, 1979). Hartsock (1987, page 196) expresses doubts shared by many feminists: "Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at this moment in history, when so many groups are engaged in 'nationalisms' which involve redefinitions of the marginalized Others, that doubt arises in the academy about the nature of the 'subject', about the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about historical 'progress'. Why is it, exactly at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes 'problematic'? Just when we are forming our own theories about the world, uncertainty emerges about whether the world can be adequately theorized? Just when we are talking about the changes we want, ideas of progress and the possibility of 'meaningfully' organizing human society become suspect? And why is it only now that critiques are made of the will to power inherent in the effort to create theory?" Hartsock does not interpret postmodernism as a conspiracy consciously designed to undercut 'marginalized Others'. Nor does she defend totalizing discourses, whether advanced by dominant or subordinate groups\* Rather she traces through the texts of white, Western, middle-class, male theorists the imprint of the structural position from which they start. Although their moves to abandon the centre for the margins and to relinquish their previously assumed authority to speak for others are to be welcomed, the marginalized and subordinated have occupied different positions and must therefore make different moves. Attempts by postmodernists to define the ground on which these others move is unacceptable and hypocritical (see also Ricci, 1987). Hartsock's suspicions stem from a consideration of the context within which postmodernism is discussed, and the effect of that context on the writing and reading of specific texts. Most importantly, she foregrounds relations of power. From this perspective the postmodernist project, conceived by a dominant, powerful group attempting to 'deal with\* threats to their legitimacy, is simply not an appropriate starting place for feminists attempting to challenge the power relations of gender from a position of subordination, and to grapple with power differences (of class, \*race\ ethnicity) among women (Ramazanoglu, 1989; Spelman, 1990). The failure of postmodernism to deal adequately with questions of power, including its own and that of its chief advocates, alerts us to serious dangers in liaisons between feminism and postmodernism. Given the peripheral position of feminism within geography, together with the continuing subordination of women within its division of labour (Lee, L990; McDowell and Pcake, 1990), caution is particularly appropriate. In particular, we must resist moves to assimilate feminist geography within postmodernism.

# Round 6

## 1nc

### 1

#### ---The affirmative’s view of energy as interchangeable units collapses the political by obfuscating structures of consumption. Energy policy becomes a rigged game requiring the annihilation of the environment, poverty and exploitation of billions.

Hillyard et. al. 12

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012-Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

In sum, encouraging a rational debate about “energy security” necessitates understanding what is meant not only by the phrase, but also by its composite parts. The term “energy,” despite its apparent simplicity, presents particular challenges. During the past two centuries, the vernacular, varied, lower-case “energies” of commons regimes have been joined by a new, abstract, upper-case Energy evolved in industrialised societies. Exploring the difference between “energies” and Energy is crucial to understanding the international politics of “energy security”. Abstract, monolithic, seemingly limitless Energy is something that only became possible with fossil-fuelled productivism and the machines, networks and institutions that came with it. This Energy, like lowercase “energies”, can deliver the basic necessities of life, at least to some, lending a certain plausibility to politicians’ claims that their worries about “energy security” centre on keeping the lights on and homes warm. But its underlying logic is different. Upper-case Energy is a transformation and commensuration of specific energies into a general capacity to maximise the ability of human bodies to make stuff. As the First Law of Thermodynamics (developed at the same time as industrial capitalism) recognises, any form of energy can be transformed into others and used to do work (but cannot be created or destroyed). Just as the invention of an absolute Time independent of daylight variations and traditional holidays helped discipline early industrial workers into the regular rhythm of a long working day, so too the subsequent development of an abstract Energy was key to intensifying their productivity further and harnessing them to the pace of the machine. For this upper-case Energy, survival is incidental except insofar as it supports the production imperative. Whereas specific “energies” know their limits, of Energy there can never be too much. Other things being equal, the more there is, the more can be produced, and the more money business can make, without limit. Lower-case “energies” and Big-E Energy are not only different: they are also, in many senses, enemies to each other. In order that fragmented “energies” do not become an obstacle to the mobilisation of economic value, they have to be folded into abstract Energy under the care of dedicated disciplines and institutions (bureaucrats, engineers, statisticians, laboratories, economics departments, inventors, investors, armies). Obsessed with quantitative growth for growth’s sake, Energy tends to treat the right of all to a warm home (or a cool one in hotter climes), cooked food, electric light as a nuisance. It heralds a world that is not only unequal, but also unable to respect the common right to subsistence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of agrofuels, whose “interchangeability” with oil under the rubric of a unitary Energy makes routine the replacement of subsistence agriculture with industrial cropping aimed at fuelling cars and airplanes. It is also plain in India’s development plans, which call for US$100 billion to be spent on a burgeoning number of large Energy projects – coal, oil, hydropower and renewables – that will serve above all to boost the profits of industrialists but leave less than 2 per cent for the household use of the 700 million who lack modern services. And it can be seen in South Africa’s policy of providing some of the cheapest electricity in the world to smelting companies while many township residents are forced to pirate electricity illegally because the price is out of their reach. Well over a century into the era of electrification, more than a billion people, about one-quarter of the world’s population, have no access to electricity or other non-biotic forms of energy (and many will never have under fossil-fuelled capitalism). If fossil-fuelled capitalism has defined what we mean by energy, then merely to use the word uncritically is to make a commitment to certain assumptions about scarcity, foreclose certain alternatives and cover up some of the most important issues that need to be discussed. Paradoxically, having a serious discussion about “energy security” requires taking a therapeutic step back from the modern concept of Energy itself. For example, the seemingly innocent query “How can we have energy security in a post-fossil world?” is not so much a question as an ultimatum. The question implies that however we organise our societies in future, it will have to be on the model that fossil capitalism built, with its threats to the right to survive of both humans and nonhumans (and the associated threats to “security” itself, on a commons understanding). A more fruitful question would be: “Is the world that is defined (in part) by the modern concept of Energy the world that we want?” It is just such questions that policymakers and social movements must ask when initiating any discussion of energy security.

#### ---The impact is extinction --- Collapse of politics proper risks hyper-industrial Armageddon.

Illich 1974

Ivan, Austrian philosopher, Roman Catholic priest, and "maverick social critic" of the institutions of contemporary western culture, *Energy and Equity*, http://worldstreets.wordpress.com/2010/09/29/energy-and-equity-ivan-illich/

I will argue here that technocracy must prevail as soon as the ratio of mechanical power to metabolic energy oversteps a definite, identifiable threshold. The order of magnitude within which this threshold lies is largely independent of the level of technology applied, yet its very existence has slipped into the blind-spot of social imagination in both rich and medium-rich countries. Both the United States and Mexico have passed the critical divide. In both countries, further energy inputs increase inequality, inefficiency, and personal impotence. Although one country has a per capita income of $500 and the other, one of nearly $5,000, huge vested interest in an industrial infrastructure prods both of them to further escalate the use of energy. As a result, both North American and Mexican ideologues put the label of “energy crisis” on their frustration, and both countries are blinded to the fact that the threat of social breakdown is due neither to a shortage of fuel nor to the wasteful, polluting, and irrational use of available wattage, but to the attempt of industries to gorge society with energy quanta that inevitably degrade, deprive, and frustrate most people. A people can be just as dangerously overpowered by the wattage of its tools as by the caloric content of its foods, but it is much harder to confess to a national overindulgence in wattage than to a sickening diet. The per capita wattage that is critical for social well-being lies within an order of magnitude which is far above the horsepower known to four-fifths of humanity and far below the power commanded by any Volkswagen driver. It eludes the underconsumer and the overconsumer alike. Neither is willing to face the facts. For the primitive, the elimination of slavery and drudgery depends on the introduction of appropriate modern technology, and for the rich, the avoidance of an even more horrible degradation depends on the effective recognition of a threshold in energy consumption beyond which technical processes begin to dictate social relations. Calories are both biologically and socially healthy only as long as they stay within the narrow range that separates enough from too much. The so-called energy crisis is, then, a politically ambiguous issue. Public interest in the quantity of power and in the distribution of controls over the use of energy can lead in two opposite directions. On the one hand, questions can be posed that would open the way to political reconstruction by unblocking the search for a postindustrial, labor-intensive, low-energy and high-equity economy. On the other hand, hysterical concern with machine fodder can reinforce the present escalation of capital-intensive institutional growth, and carry us past the last turnoff from a hyperindustrial Armageddon. Political reconstruction presupposes the recognition of the fact that there exist critical per capita quanta beyond which energy can no longer be controlled by political process. A universal social straitjacket will be the inevitable outcome of ecological restraints on total energy use imposed by industrial-minded planners bent on keeping industrial production at some hypothetical maximum.

#### ---The alternative is to repoliticize energy politics; shifting the focus from perfecting structures of oppression to debating the desirability of existing energy structures in the first place.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Live Earth concerts, waving the banner of climate change and urging the world's leaders to take immediate and serious action, were beamed across the airwaves from 8 major cities on 8 July 2007, watched by an estimated record number of 3 billion people. Cheered on by Al Gore and riding on the popular success of his unsettling ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ documentary, the concerts — exquisite expressions of contemporary spectacularized city life — re-enforced the consensual view that nature, the climate and the environment are in clear and present danger, threatening the life and sustainability of all the world's peoples, in particular the poorer ones, and whipping up a moral crusade for a more energy-selective and carbon-sparse code of socio-economic conduct. It is of course ironic that these concerts took the urban as their stage, while it is exactly the socio-metabolic functioning of cities that requires gigantic energy resources to sustain their socio-metabolic processes, while pumping an accelerating volume of CO2 into the atmosphere (Swyngedouw, 2006). Cities produce 80% of the world's greenhouse gases, express often the most pervasive forms of socio-environmental injustices and are central to producing more sustainable environmental futures (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Sze, 2006; Doucet, 2007). Indeed, the environmental question has become one that mobilizes and galvanizes political energies, and around which a political consensus has emerged, one that has literally ‘naturalized the political’ (see Debruyne, 2007: 2). Indeed, a scientific consensus, most vividly illustrated by the successive Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, fused with a pervasive apocalyptic imaginary, and combined with asserting the intrinsic value of a nature that has to be retro-fitted to regain a ‘sustainable’ configuration, has taken hold (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Environmental politics is a politics legitimated by a scientific consensus which, in turn, translates into a political consensus. The world is in clear and present danger and urgent, sustained and consensual action is required. This is a politics that ‘legitimizes itself by means of a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge’ (Žižek, 2006c: 188) or, in other words, it is a politics reduced to the administration and management of processes whose parameters are defined by consensual socio-scientific knowledges. This reduction of the political to the policing of environmental change, so I shall argue, evacuates if not forecloses the properly political and becomes part and parcel of the consolidation of a postpolitical and postdemocratic polity. The depoliticized contradictions of such postpolitical environmentalism exploded with acute force in 2008, when energy prices, and in particular oil, spiralled upwards to quadruple in a few months' time. Irrespective of the reasons behind this spectacular rise in oil prices (whether driven by extremely profitable financial speculation in the futures markets after the speculative land-bubble had imploded or by a combination of peak-oil conditions and rising demand of China and India, or a combination of both, remains disputed), the implications in terms of urban environmental justice became clear quickly. Hailed by some environmentalists as finally opening a window to bring oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions down, poor people around the world suddenly saw food prices spiral out of reach, food crops replaced by bio-fuels, access to energy curtailed and the cost of moving around going up. While seemingly offering an opening towards a more sustainable postcarbon society, the contradictory effects rapidly came to the boil. Urban riots in Haiti, Mexico, Burkina Faso, Indonesia, China and elsewhere signalled that the environment is indeed a deeply political matter, one cut through by all manner of social antagonisms, radical disputes and profound disagreements. In recent years, urban research has become increasingly concerned with the social, political and economic implications of the techno-political and socio-scientific consensus that the present unsustainable and unjust environmental conditions require a transformation of the way urban life is organized. This special issue testifies to this concern and, in particular, to the socially highly uneven consequences of both the increasingly unsustainable environmental practices and the feeble attempts to ‘rectify’ the problem, to retrofit a nature that science suggests is out of synch with its own internal balancing act. A flurry of writing in recent years has begun to interrogate the close relationship between urban processes and environmental transformations (see Bickerstaff et al., 2009, this issue, for a review). Social environmental research has by now convincingly argued and demonstrated that physical-ecological processes are not independent from socio-economic and cultural processes. While such political and socio-ecological perspectives were originally primarily concerned with the degradation of ‘natural’ conditions (like soil erosion, deforestation, climate change or resource depletion), recent work has increasingly concentrated on the pivotal role of the urban in political ecological processes (see, e.g., Bell et al., 1998; Braun and Castree, 1998; Forsyth, 2002; Robbins, 2004; Castree, 2005; Heynen et al., 2005; 2007). Prompted by David Harvey's counter-intuitive comment that there is nothing unnatural about New York City, urban political ecologists insisted that urban environments, like any other socio-physical assemblage, are produced through combined social and ecological processes that shape particular socio-geographical conditions and manufacture the architecture of the socio-metabolic circulations and transformations that shape everyday urban life (Harvey, 1996). Neil Smith's (1984) ‘production of nature’ thesis has been expanded and reformulated in an attempt to let ecological processes re-enter our perspectives on nature and on the city (see, e.g., Gandy, 2003; Desfor and Keil, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004; Kaika, 2005). In In the Nature of Cities, a range of urban political ecologists argued indeed that cities are produced socio-metabolic assemblages and their analyses insisted on the ‘produced’ character of urban environments, including the distribution of social roles and positions, the socio-ecological flows of materials and the metabolic re-working of socio-physical processes into the fabric of what is defined as a city (Heynen et al., 2005). In short, urban environmental conditions are seen as dynamic, socio-physical, power-laden and co-evolutionary1 constructions. Uneven consequences of socio-environmental change, the distribution of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, and the rhizomatic networks that relate local urban ecological transformations with distant socio-ecological processes are now commonly understood as combined social and physical entanglements. Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997). Second, I shall argue that the particular staging of the environmental problem and its modes of management signals and helps to consolidate a postpolitical condition, one that evacuates the properly political from the plane of immanence that underpins any political intervention. The consolidation of an urban postpolitical arrangement runs, so I argue, parallel to the rise of a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics and technocratic environmental management. In the third part, I maintain that this postpolitical consensual police order revolves decidedly around embracing a populist gesture, one that annuls democracy and must, of necessity, lead to an ultra-politics of violent disavowal, radical closure and, ultimately, to the tyrannies of violence and of foreclosure of any real spaces of engagement. However, the disappearance of the political in a postpolitical arrangement leaves all manner of traces that allow for the resurfacing of the properly political. Indeed, the incoherencies of the contemporary urban ordering, the excesses and the gaps that are left in the interstices of the postpolitical urban order permit thinking through if not materially widening and occupying genuine political urban spaces. This will be the theme of the final section. I shall conclude that re-centring the political is a necessary condition for tackling questions of urban environmental justice and for creating different, but egalibertarian, socio-ecological urban assemblages. In Disagreement, Jacques Rancière revisits the Aristotelian foundations of political theory and considers whether the political can still be thought of in an environment in which a postpolitical consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policymaking’, to managerial consensual governing. This reduction of the political to the ‘mode of governing’ is particularly prevalent in environmental practices. From the environmental justice movement that urges the elites to rectify environmental ‘wrongs’ on the basis of a Rawlsian equal distribution of goods and bads (see also Beck, 1992), to ecological modernization perspectives that insist on the possibility of a technological-managerial conduct that can marry ecological sustainability with economic ‘progress’ (Harvey, 1996) and the scientific consensus that urges the adoption of a particular set of management and accounting rules to mitigate imminent catastrophic environmental disaster, general agreement exists, shared by a broad range of often unlikely allies, about the need to develop a more sustainable, and just, socio-ecological practice, one that operates fully within the contours of the existing social order (Swyngedouw, 2007a). Rancière's political philosophical mission, in contrast, is to re-centre the ‘political’ as distinct from ‘policy’ (what he calls ‘the police’) and to ask whether the properly political can be thought of and, if so, what constitutes a proper political gesture. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (le police), ‘the political’ (le politique) and ‘politics’ (la politique). For him, the political ‘turns on equality as its principle’ and is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding ‘the part for those who have no-part’ (Rancière, 2001: 6); politics disrupts the police order, ‘a refusal to observe the “place” allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)’ (Robson, 2005: 5). Indeed, as Dikeç maintains, the central premise of Rancière's politics is ‘the contingency of any established order of governance with its distributions of functions, people, and places’ (Dikeç, 2007: Chapter 2: 3). Politics, then, is the arena where the principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’. Equality is thereby axiomatically given and presupposed rather than an idealized-normative condition to move towards (Badiou, 1992; 2005a; Lévy et al., 2007): ‘Everyone can occupy the space of politics, if they decide to so' (Badiou, cited in Hallward, 2003a: 225). In democracy, the place of power is indeed structurally empty (Lefort, 1994) and equality is presupposed. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; it opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality. Equality is, therefore, not a sociologically verifiable concept or procedure that permits opening a policy arena which will remedy the observed inequalities, but the ontologically given condition of democracy. Justice, from this perspective, disappears from the terrain of the moral and enters the space of the political under the name of equality. For Etienne Balibar (Balibar, 1993), for example, the unconditional premise for justice and emancipation resides in the fusion of equality and liberty (what he names as ‘égaliberté’), the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç, 2001). Egaliberté stands, thus, for the universal and collective process of emancipation on which the very promise of political democracy is founded. What is central to Balibar's and Rancière's vision is that neither freedom nor equality are offered, granted or distributed, they can only be conquered. The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify injustices, inequalities or unfreedoms, but about the enunciation of the right to égaliberté; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in a police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. Put simply, politics (or a properly political sequence) arises when, in the name of equality, those who are not equally included in the existing socio-political order, demand their ‘right to equality’, a demand that both calls the political into being, renders visible and exposes the ‘wrongs’ of the police order: this is the place and time of politics when the staging and articulation of an egalitarian demand exposes the lack, the superfluous, inscribed in the order of the given situation (Arsenjuk, 2005). This existing order of things or the police order is, in Rancière's words, ‘a partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2001: 8). The police refers to ‘all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions’ (Rancière, 1994: 173). It suggests ‘an established order of governance with everyone in their “proper” place in the seemingly natural order of things’ (Dikeç, 2005: 174). The partition of the sensible, the police order, ‘renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised . . . This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space . . . It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience’ (Rancière, 2000a: 13–14). The police is ‘not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social’ (Rancière, 2001: 8) and refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations: The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise (Rancière, 1998: 29). It is important to recognize that ‘the police’ includes a multitude of activities and processes, is full of conflict and tension, never totally closed and embraces not only the traditional notion of the state and state functions and activities, but also the ‘assumed spontaneity of social relations’ (Dikeç, 2007: 18). In sum: The police, therefore, is both a principle of distribution and an apparatus of administration, which relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution — distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on — and the normalization of this distribution (ibid.: 19). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, ‘a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed’ (Rancière, 1998: 29). As such, the ‘police’ is rather close to Foucault's notion of governmentality, the conduct of conduct, the mode of assigning location, relations and distributions, or what Alain Badiou refers to as ‘the state of the situation’ (Badiou, 2005a). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: ‘The essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by “the police”, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces’ (Rancière, 2000b: 124). Of course, saturation is never realized; a sutured society is impossible as there will always be a constituted lack or surplus (Dikeç, 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess that constitutes the possibility of and that calls the political into being. If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, ‘a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority’ (Hallward, 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of ‘floating subjects that deregulate all representations of places and portions’ (Rancière, 1998: 99–100): In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it (Rancière, 2003a: 201). Politics proper arises then when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, ‘when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part’ (Rancière, 1998: 11). ‘Politics in general . . . is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 2003b: 3). The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the police order claim the right to speak, acquire speech. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms and voids that constitute the police order and tests the principle of equality. The proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustice, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Such procedure brings into being a new symbolic ordering, one that transgresses the limitations of police symbolization. Therefore, a proper environmental politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; it demands equality in the right to produce proper and properly democratic socio-physical environments. Democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative: Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise (Rancière, 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (ibid.: 33) . . . revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time (Rancière, 2006: 13). The space of the political is to ‘disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole’ (Rancière, 2001). And, of course, politics is about the production of spaces, the making of environments and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: The principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in one’ (ibid.: Thesis 8). It occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière, 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no specific place: ‘Politics “takes place” in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on’ (Rancière, 2003c: 7); it is the disruption of the police order. It can arise anywhere and everywhere. [S]pace becomes political in that it . . . becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests (Dikeç, 2005: 172).

### 2

A. Resolved means to make a firm decision

[Allwords.com](http://Allwords.com/) 2003

http://www.allwords.com/query.php?SearchType=3&Keyword=Resolved&goquery=Find+it%21&Language=ENG

1. To decide firmly or to determine to do it.

Form: resolve on something (usually)

Form: resolve to do something

#### that’s allwords.com 3

#### B. They are not a firm decision, they don’t specify which branch or branches of the federal government enact the plan. Cross examination or 2AC clarification is Inadequate. The plan text is the only clear statement, it’s crucial to pre-round preparation and negative strategizing.

#### C. Voting Issue

1. Ground & Clash: They destroy our ability to run solvency arguments and disads to actions by particular branches. Lack of specification means they can permute away agent counterplans.

2. Debatability: The desirability of a specific course of action depends on who is enacting it. A policy which might be desirable if undertaken by the President might be undesirable if undertaken by Congress.

3. Allows Affirmative Conditionality: Allowing the aff multiple potential agents is in effect allowing them multiple plans.

### 3

#### Text:

#### The United States President should enter into prior and binding consultation with the United States Congress over the substantial reduction of leasing restrictions on natural gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf. The President should offer to support the substantial reduction of leasing restrictions on natural gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, if Congress agrees to invest 90 percent of federal revenues from the resulting production into clean energy research and development.

#### The counterplan solves the case and avoids politics-

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

After "Drill, Baby, Drill," Obama Should Embrace Another GOP Energy Plan

http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/after\_drill\_baby\_drill\_obama\_s

So while the expansion of offshore drilling may seem like we're taking a step back from a future free from oil, investing the royalty revenues in clean tech RD&D could amount to a big leap forward in the transition to a clean energy economy by securing a revenue source for clean tech that is not tied to embattled efforts to establish a carbon price -- all while beginning the urgent work of securing America's clean tech competitiveness and ensuring our energy security. Nearly the entire Republican caucus, not to mention a handful of Democrats, are already on record voting for this concept in the August 2008 vote on the New Energy Reform Act, introduced by the so-called Gang of 10 during the height of the oil price spikes in 2008. If offshore drilling is to move forward over the next few years, the Obama Administration and Congressional Democrats should waste no time in embracing this clean energy investment plan.

#### turns the case---the counterplan is key to energy diversification and security

[Jenkins](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Jesse-Jenkins) [and Borofsky](http://thebreakthrough.org/people/profile/Yael-Borofsky)-Breakthrough Institute-4/10

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After all, we simply cannot drill our way to energy security. The New York Times reports that at current rates of consumption, estimates show that there could be as much as a three-year supply of oil and around a two-year supply of natural gas in the OCS areas. That's not exactly a long-term 'fix' for an oil-addicted nation, which is why Obama noted Wednesday in his speech at Andrews Air Force Base that offshore drilling is meant merely to aid in the "transition to cleaner energy sources;" drilling is no alternative. We can, however, invest and invent our way to freedom from oil. That's where (somewhat ironically!) the Republicans 'all of the above' energy plan, AKA the "American Energy Act," has a leg up on the President -- at least for now. Under the GOP proposal, put forth by House Republicans in June 2009, 90% of the federal share "of the revenues created by OCS exploration would go to a renewable energy trust fund to pay for a variety of renewable, alternative and advanced energy programs." This "American Renewable and Alternative Energy Trust Fund" would be dedicated to efforts accelerating the development of clean energy technologies that can truly help end America's oil addiction. If the federal government retained 75% of the royalty revenues from new OCS and Alaskan Coastal Plain production, this formula could represent an infusion of over $110 billion for critical clean energy investments over the next twenty years.

#### Renewable transition solves extinction from climate change and great power war

Klarevas 09

[Louis Klarevas, Professor for Center for Global Affairs at New York University, “Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy\_b\_393223.html]

As national leaders from around the world are gathering in Copenhagen, Denmark, to attend the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the time is ripe to re-assess America's current energy policies - but within the larger framework of how a new approach on the environment will stave off global warming and shore up American primacy. By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on innovation to help the world escape the coming environmental meltdown. Developing the key technologies that will save the planet from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, secur[e]ing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check. The bottom-line is that the U.S. needs to become green energy dominant as opposed to black energy independent - and the best approach for achieving this is to promote a national strategy of greengemony.

### 4

#### Obama pushing immigration reform first even with fiscal issues and it will pass – GOP electoral incentives

Stien and Foley 1/2/13 (\*Sam, Political Reporter at the Huffington Post, based in Washington, D.C. Previously he has worked for Newsweek magazine, the New York Daily News and the investigative journalism group Center for Public Integrity. He has a masters from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and is a graduate of Dartmouth College, \*Elise, reporter for the Huffington Post in Washington,

D.C. She previously worked at The Washington Independent., “Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html>)

WASHINGTON -- Despite a bruising fiscal cliff battle that managed to set the stage for an even more heated showdown that will likely take place in a matter of months, President Barack Obama is planning to move full steam ahead with the rest of his domestic policy agenda. An Obama administration official said the president plans to push for immigration reform this January. The official, who spoke about legislative plans only on condition of anonymity, said that coming standoffs over deficit reduction are unlikely to drain momentum from other priorities. The White House plans to push forward quickly, not just on immigration reform but gun control laws as well. The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said. Advocates have vowed to keep pushing for reform. As part of their efforts, they plan to remind Republican members of Congress about their presidential nominee's defeat among Latino and Asian voters, a majority of whom support a fix to the immigration system. "They can procrastinate as long as they want, but they're going to have a serious day of reckoning next election cycle," said Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy and advocacy at the Center for American Progress. "We're going to have a lot of near-death experiences with this issue, but I'm pretty confident it's never going to go completely to a flatline." Good news for immigration advocates may have come Tuesday night, when Boehner broke the so-called "Hastert Rule" and allowed the fiscal cliff bill to come for a vote without support from a majority of his Republican conference. Given opposition to immigration reform by many Tea Party Republicans, the proof that Boehner is willing to bypass them on major legislation is a good sign, the Democratic aide said. "If something is of such importance that the GOP establishment [is] telling Boehner, 'You must do this. You need to get this off the table soon,'" the Democratic aide said, the speaker could break the Hastert Rule again. "He already did it with this fiscal issue, so I would not be surprised if when it came down to it he puts up a bill that he just allows to go through with a combination of Democratic and Republican votes, without worrying about a majority of the majority," the aide continued. Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-immigration reform group America's Voice, also said he thinks the House could pass an immigration bill in the same way it did last night, relying on support from both parties. He's hopeful that the fiscal cliff fight could even make them happy to work out legislation in a more standard way. "I never thought I'd say this, but after bruising battles over the future of the American and world economy, the chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya,'" Sharry said.

#### Plan drains capital

Morgan Stanley 11/7/12 (“Post-2012 Election Look At Lame-Duck Session and 2013” http://www.morganstanleyfa.com/public/projectfiles/697ac6e3-64d3-4f8e-a026-2c81e2149e95.pdf)

With an “all of the above” strategy for achieving energy independence, Congress and the administration could move forward on policy that seeks expanded domestic energy production focused on all energy related resources, from conventional sources such as oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear power, to renewable sources focused on wind, solar, geothermal, and other renewable energy projects. At the same time, achieving consensus will remain difficult. Wide ideological differences still exist, especially regarding the efficacy of focusing resources on the development of renewable versus traditional energy sources. Moreover, related issues such as the exportation of domestic energy sources, clean energy standards for utilities, and overall environmental protection will remain as obstacles to the success of any energy-related legislative effort.

#### Obama’s political capital is key to reform passage

Dade 12/7/12 (Corey, staffwriter for NPR, “Black, Latino Groups: It's Our Turn, Mr. President” <http://www.npr.org/2012/12/05/166573082/black-latino-groups-its-our-turn-mr-president>)

Spending 'Political Capital' For Latinos, the November election has sparked momentum for their top issue, immigration. Congressional Republicans have since embraced immigration reform as a priority. Bipartisan talks are under way in the House on legislation that could be introduced early next year. Obama has said Congress should "seize the moment," yet Latino leaders insist that voters have given the president a mandate to lead the effort. Some Latino leaders believe Obama should have fought more aggressively to push the DREAM Act through Congress in 2010. (The bill would have established a path to citizenship for young people brought to the United States as children who attend college or serve in the military.) Latinos also criticized the Obama administration, before it changed its policy, for deporting a record 1.1 million people in three years. "Not only the president but others have said in the past, 'How much political capital do we need to spend on this issue?' Everybody understands now that you need to spend all of it," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill. "With the same vigor and energy that Latino people voted for this president, he should do this."

#### Immigration reform key to solve clean tech U.S.-China co-operation – fosters business relationships

Herman, “why immigrants can drive the green economy” 2010

Raymond Spencer, an Australian-born entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future--and a gusto for investing after founding a high-technology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. "I have investments in maybe 10 start-ups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a 'green' theme," he said. "And it's interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants." It should come as no surprise that immigrants will help drive the green revolution. America's young scientists and engineers, especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, the leading expert on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that much of the clean-technology talent lies overseas, in nations that began pursuing alternative energy sources decades ago. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly half of the all scientists and engineers with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Expanding our own clean-tech industry will require working closely with foreign nations and foreign-born scientists, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His lab's efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab, for example, were stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers. "We can't get researchers over here," Arvizu, the son of a once-undocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his voice tinged with dismay. "It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach." Dr. Zhao Gang, the Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. "The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy development," he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what's the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fast-paced world of green-tech development. "We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork," he said.

#### Key to solve reactionary Chinese oil policy – destabilizes Asia.

Herberg 2010

Mikkal E, Senior Research Fellow for International Energy Pacific Council on International Policy, China’s “Energy Rise”, the U.S., and the New Geopolitics of Energy http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=159

Beijing’s sense of weakness and vulnerability has fueled this “go-out” policy and has been very much about ownership and physical control of barrels rather than just access. Mistrust of global energy markets remains deeply ingrained amid a concern that the market alone cannot be counted on to provide reliable oil supplies at reasonable prices. This is reinforced by the belief that these markets are dominated by the U.S., which is out to exploit China’s energy weakness in its efforts to ‘contain’ China. U.S. strategic power in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy’s control over critical energy transport sea lanes, and what is perceived to be the power of the U.S. in the global oil industry and institutions, foster a perception in Beijing that the U.S. exerts a dominating influence on global oil prices and flows. Strident rhetoric in the U.S. during the 2005 CNOOC-Unocal episode reinforced the perception that the U.S. seeks to undermine China’s access to secure supplies and that it sees energy as an arena of strategic competition. All these factors have combined to give a strongly mercantilist impulse to China’s energy security drive and rhetoric and a decidedly strategic approach that has fueled a sharpening image of China Energy Inc. among other major oil importing countries and the oil industry. Regional or multilateral approaches to energy security based on collaboration to ensure open access to oil supplies, boosting investment in new oil supplies, and regional or multilateral cooperation on sharing emergency oil stocks, for example, have been low on Beijing’s agenda. All these attributes have contributed to a more politicized, competitive, and zerosum environment towards control over energy supplies, particularly in Asia where the atmosphere of competition over control of oil supplies is reinforcing strategic rivalries among China, Japan, India, and South Korea. In fairness, other Asian oil importers, as well as the U.S., have strongly fueled and fed this atmosphere of energy nationalism. The U.S. has contributed to this atmosphere with the constant drumbeat of nationalistic rhetoric coming from Congress, the Pentagon, and conservative think tanks about China’s energy strategy. Japan, India, and South Korea have all stepped up their energy diplomacy, rhetoric, and support for the national oil companies and have sharply raised their targets for acquiring “equity” oil.

#### Most likely scenario for nuclear escalation

Nye et al., Professor @ Harvard, 2K

[Joseph S. Nye, Professor Emeritus @ The John F. Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard University, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Michael J. Green, Advisor & Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Associate Professor @ The Walsh School of Foreign Service, Kurt M. Campbell, Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Edward J. Lincoln, Fellow @ The Brookings Institution, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” The Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 11th 2000, http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibei-anpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf]

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy.

### 5

#### Text

#### The United States Federal Government should increase restrictions on natural gas production by increasing the minimum bond amount to $60,000 per lease. The United States federal government should allow increased production on Outer Continental Shelf for producers that meet the bond requirement.

Increased bonding requirements for natural gas production essential to reducing risk of environmental catastrophe

Davis-Professor of Economic Analysis, Berkeley-6/12

Modernizing Bonding Requirements for Natural Gas Producers

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20bonds%20davis/06\_bonds\_davis

Hydraulic fracturing and other recent technological advances have dramatically increased the availability of natural gas. After peaking in 2008, U.S. natural gas prices have fallen dramatically and industry analysts are forecasting that prices will remain low for the next several decades. This increase in the supply of natural gas has broad implications for energy markets in the United States and abroad. Energy is a key input in virtually all sectors of the economy, and inexpensive natural gas is good for growth. Natural gas is also less carbon-intensive than other fossil fuels, leading some to describe the fuel as the “blue bridge to a green future.” At the same time, these new forms of natural gas production raise a number of potential environmental concerns. Hydraulic fracturing requires injecting large quantities of water, sand, and chemicals at high pressure into horizontally drilled wells. Environmental groups are concerned, in particular, about potential contamination of groundwater and about the increased scope for large-volume surface spills. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other organizations are working to better understand the potential risks to human health and the environment, but it will be years before comprehensive analyses are available. Although the scope for environmental damages is still poorly understood, it is not too early to examine the incentives produced by current policies. Currently, misaligned incentives lead natural gas producers to underinvest in environmental protection. Revenues from drilling are realized immediately. Environmental damages, however, may not become evident immediately. And by the time damages are well understood, producers may no longer exist or may no longer have the resources to finance necessary cleanups or to compensate those who have been affected. The tort system is designed to recover damages in these cases. However, bankruptcy laws limit producers’ liability significantly. This is particularly true with natural gas producers because the industry is composed primarily of small and medium-sized companies. In the United States there are hundreds of natural gas producers, none with more than a small share of the total market. Consequently, the tort system does not work as well as a deterrent as it does in many other industries. Policymakers have long been aware of this misalignment of incentives. Since the 1920s, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has required that natural gas producers operating on public lands post a bond prior to drilling. Many states have bonding requirements that exceed the minimum federal requirements. These funds are used to clean up sites when accidents occur, and to guarantee that the producer adequately reclaims the drilling site after production is completed. This approach makes sense, but current requirements are unreasonably low to counter these risks. The current minimum bond amount—$10,000 per lease—was set in 1960 and has never been updated for inflation. This amount is not enough to pay even for routine site reclamation expenses. One of the aims of this proposal is to increase the minimum bond amount to $60,000 per lease to adjust for inflation. This minimum bond amount would be indexed permanently to inflation, preventing the real value of bonds from eroding over time. States would, of course, continue to be able to impose bonding requirements that exceed the federal minimum. Additional evidence supports further increasing minimum bond amounts above that implied by the inflation adjustment. Advanced drilling techniques involve larger and riskier drilling operations than the shallow vertical wells for which the legislation was originally designed. And the large quantity of chemically treated water used in hydraulic fracturing introduces new risks that are simply not present in traditional drilling. Determining the correct minimum bond amount is a challenging problem. Presently, the empirical evidence on potential environmental damages is extremely limited, and as better information becomes available, it will be important to revisit these minimum bond amounts with a view toward further increases. This proposal would also eliminate provisions that allow companies to meet their bonding requirements by posting a single “blanket” bond. These provisions decrease significantly the average bond amount per well, and have often led to situations in which the available bond was insufficient to pay for necessary cleanups at multiple sites. This is particularly problematic for old wells. Natural gas production declines quickly after a well is first constructed, but most wells continue to produce at least a small amount for many years or even decades. It is important to ensure that funds are available to reclaim these sites even if the original drilling companies have long since disappeared. Bonding requirements effectively complement traditional regulation by ensuring that standards are followed, even when it is impossible to assign regulators on the ground at all drilling sites. Bonding is particularly well-suited for addressing low probability, high-cost environmental risks such as surface spills and blowouts. For other types of environmental concerns such as local pollutants from road traffic and methane emissions, policymakers should continue to focus on traditional regulation as the primary policy tool. Strengthening bonding requirements would help motivate producers to work hard to avoid environmental damages. A producer that makes choices that minimize risks to the environment gets this bond back with interest. A producer that makes choices that lead to environmental damages does not. This is a market-based solution for a market failure—a balanced approach that supports the continued growth of this valuable energy resource, while also forcing producers to become responsible for their choices and how they impact the environment.

#### Extinction

Diner 94[Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps of US Army, David N., Military Law Review, Winter, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161]

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [\*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [\*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### Warming

#### Icecore extractions prove warming is fake

Idso 11 (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. (cidso@co2science.org), is lead author of Climate Change Reconsidered, published by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC). An earlier version of this article appeared on the NIPCC Web site. Subscriptions to the NIPCC email distribution list are free of charge and can be ordered at <http://www.nipccreport.org/about/emailsignupform.html>. “ Arctic Study Finds No Recent Warming” <http://www.heartland.org/full/29549/Arctic_Study_Finds_No_Recent_Warming.html>)

Climate alarmists contend the earth's near-surface air temperatures of the past decade were unprecedentedly high relative to the warmth of the entire past millennium, due primarily to human carbon dioxide emissions. They also claim this warming has been most strongly expressed throughout the Arctic, which they often describe as the planet's "canary in a coal mine," for the planet as a whole. Working with an ice core that retrieved from the Akademii Nauk (AN) ice cap (~80°31'N, 94°49'E) of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago (which is located in the central Russian Arctic between the Kara and Laptev Seas), scientists used oxygen isotopes to reconstruct temperatures covering the period 1883-1998. After confirming “good correlations and similarities” between their oxygen isotope data and 15 temperature stations distributed throughout the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic, the scientists reported the oxygen isotope data “show pronounced 20th-century temperature changes, with a strong rise about 1920 and the absolute temperature maximum in the 1930s," the scientists reported. Accordingly, **the data show there was no net warming of the Atlantic and Eurasian sub-Arctic over the entire last 80 years of the 20th century**. The findings, published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Glaciology*, cast doubt on alarmist assertions of alarming recent global temperature rise given the Arctic is expected to be the first place on the planet to exhibit anthropogenic-induced global warming, and is expected to exhibit that warming more strongly than other regions of the globe.

#### they can keep up current production and prices, their evidence is industry drama, well productivity and less bottlenecks prove

Zeits, citing the EIA, 9/3 (Richard Zeits is an Energy industry consultant and investment analyst. His background includes fourteen years as investment banker, portfolio manager and senior investment analyst with bulge bracket firms in New York. Zeits Energy Analytics provide custom industry research, market intelligence, investment analyses and transaction advisory services to investment professionals and industry practitioners. “Latest EIA Data Shows Resilient U.S. Natural Gas Production” http://seekingalpha.com/article/842541-latest-eia-data-shows-resilient-u-s-natural-gas-production)

On Friday, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) released natural gas production statistics for the month of June and revised statistics for May. The report will again disappoint those analysts and industry insiders who have predicted an imminent drop off in US natural gas supply in response to the dramatic decline in gas prices during the first half of the year. In defiance of the sub-$2 NYMEX natural gas lows registered in April and continued steep decline in gas-directed rig count, the Lower 48 States' natural gas production remained essentially unchanged in May and June. The Lower 48 production declined in June from May by an almost negligible 0.18 Bcf/d or 0.2%. The production shut-ins in the Gulf of Mexico due to Tropical Storm Debby largely accounted for the decline. The revised May data shows a slight increase in production from April. The Lower 48 natural gas production remained essentially flat from November last year through June (the latest data available). I argued in my earlier note that the natural gas industry is producing at levels exceeding demand, which is manifest in the strong build-up of storage levels and very high backlog of drilled wells waiting on completion or pipeline connection. The flat production figures indicate that the supply/demand balance was still not achieved in June, despite the highly unattractive economics of the dry gas drilling. The report highlights the continued trend of the Marcellus shale production gradually displacing volumes from less economic regions. The Other States gross withdrawals (the key growth behind which is the Marcellus shale) increased by a remarkable 1.9 Bcf/d during the seven-month period from November last year to June this year. The June numbers indicate that the growth trend continued unabated (Other States gross withdrawals increased by 120 MMcf/d in June and 400 MMcf/d in May).What may come as a surprise is the distinct decline trend in the Wyoming production (which includes the prolific Pinedale and Jonah fields). The Pinedale has been broadly perceived in the industry and among investors as one of the lowest cost fields in the United States. Recent decisions by Ultra Petroleum Corp. (UPL), one of the larger operators in the Pinedale, to significantly reduce its completions activity in the Pinedale may cast doubt on the cost of supply economics from the field relative to other regions. A month ago, I argued in several of my notes that the strong drop off in the natural gas rig count does not readily translate in the decline in the natural gas production. Several factors are contributing: A significant backlog of curtailed or shut in production from earlier in the year that will need to find its way to the market once the injection season is over. Two companies alone, Chesapeake Energy Corporation (CHK) and Encana Corporation (ECA), had estimated combined gross operated production of 1.3-1.4 Bcf/d shut in or curtailed during the first half of the year. Chesapeake has guided that it intends to reverse its production curtailments during the next two quarters, which should lead to its natural gas production peaking before the end of the year at a level that is 12% higher than the company's average production during Q2. A significant inventory of wells waiting on completions or pipeline connections. Some of the backlog is explained by the infrastructure constraints in the growing producing areas such as the Marcellus and the Eagle Ford. As the bottlenecks are being resolved, the backlog wells will gradually come online. Most notably, the excess well inventory also reflects deliberate decisions by operators to defer well completions and tie-ins until the expected price recovery in the second half of the year, effectively creating "rig-independent" supply. Improving well performance and rig productivity. As operators focus on drilling only the very best dry gas wells due to the depressed price environment, production per rig is increasing. Productivity gains from the high-graded rig fleet and pad drilling are another important contributing factor. Rapid growth of liquids-rich and associated gas volumes. The rate of growth from this important source of natural gas supply appears to be underestimated by many Wall Street analysts and industry insiders, same way the volume growth from the Haynesville shale and the Marcellus shale was grossly underestimated just two or three years ago. Looking forward, all these factors will contribute to a delayed and shallower decline in the US natural gas production than may appear. As a result, natural gas prices will likely remain vulnerable to corrections until the massive production backlog from various sources is absorbed. These fundamentals have implications for natural gas producer stocks that as a group appear to price in a meaningful recovery in natural gas prices. While in the longer run a return to more economic natural gas price levels is inevitable, the recovery may not be as imminent as often predicted. This fundamental dynamic is most relevant to stocks with natural gas focus and high financial leverage.

#### They have to replace virtually every coal plant in the globe- and this card is from 2009

Kirsch ‘9 (Steve Kirsch, Entrepreneur and philanthropist, “Climate Bill Ignores Our Biggest Clean Energy Source”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/climate-bill-ignores-our_b_221796.html>, June 27, 2009)

Do you think our country's energy policy is in good hands now that the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) climate bill has passed the House? I'm very worried and I think you should be too. Experts fret about balancing energy, environment, and the economy. But there is a way to have all three at the same time if we are willing to take a fresh look at an old technology. And that great solution is nowhere to be found in the ACES bill. First, let's start by assuming science of global warming is correct. We'll see later that we'd want to do exactly the same thing even if we didn't believe in global warming at all. To stop global warming, we must virtually eliminate the use of coal worldwide Dr. James Hansen, one of our nation's leading experts on global warming, is very clear about the necessary attributes of any solution: we must stop building new coal plants immediately and start retiring existing coal plants worldwide. If we cannot virtually eliminate coal worldwide within a couple of decades, then the sum total of all of our other efforts to reduce our carbon footprint will be about as effective as rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

No extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### No impact – recent data proves CO2 escapes

Taylor 11 (James, is a senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News. “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/>)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict.

Exporting LNG increases emissions and causes catastrophic warming and extinction

Romm 12 (Joe Romm – PhD from MIT, Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, previously assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy. “Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Bad For The Climate,” Jun 18, 2012 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/06/18/500954/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-is-bad-for-the-climate/>)

The surge in U.S. production of shale gas is creating a surge in permit requests to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. That’s because the glut of U.S. gas has dropped domestic prices sharply below global price levels. But if avoiding catastrophic climate change is your goal, then spending huge sums on even conventional natural gas infrastructure is not the answer, as a recent International Energy Agency report made clear: The speciﬁc emissions from a gas-ﬁred power plant will be higher than average global CO2 intensity in electricity generation by 2025, raising questions around the long-term viability of some gas infrastructure investment if climate change objectives are to be met. And liquefying natural gas is an energy intensive and leaky process. When you factor in shipping overseas, you get an energy penalty of 20% or more. The extra greenhouse gas emissions can equal 30% or more of combustion emissions, according to a 2009 Reference Report by the Joint Research Centreof the European Commission, Liquefied Natural Gas for Europe – Some Important Issues for Consideration. Such extra emissions all but eliminate whatever small, short-term benefit there might be of building billion-dollar export terminals and other LNG infrastructure, which in any case will last many decades, long after the electric grid will not benefit from replacing coal with gas. Furthermore, the U.S. Energy Information Administration concluded in a 2012 report on natural gas exports done for DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy that such exports would also increase domestic greenhouse gas emissions: [W]hen also accounting for emissions related to natural gas used in the liquefaction process, additional exports increase CO2 levels under all cases and export scenarios, particularly in the earlier years of the projection period. Asserting any net benefit for the importer requires assuming the new gas replaces only coal — and isn’t used for, say, natural gas vehicles, which are worse for the climate or that it doesn’t replace new renewables. If even a modest fraction of the imported LNG displaces renewables, it renders the entire expenditure for LNG counterproductive from day one. Remember, a major new 2012 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences study on “technology warming potentials” (TWPs) found that a big switch from coal to gas would only reduce TWP by about 25% over the first three decades (see “Natural Gas Is A Bridge To Nowhere Absent A Carbon Price AND Strong Standards To Reduce Methane Leakage“). And that is based on “EPA’s latest estimate of the amount of CH4 released because of leaks and venting in the natural gas network between production wells and the local distribution network” of 2.4%. Many experts believe the leakage rate is higher than 2.4%, particularly for shale gas. Also, recent air sampling by NOAA over Colorado found 4% methane leakage, more than double industry claims. A different 2012 study by climatologist Ken Caldeira and tech guru Nathan Myhrvold finds basically no benefit in the switch whatsoever — see You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power. So spending vast sums of money to export natural gas from this country is a bad idea for the climate. A new paper published last week by Brooking’s Hamilton Project, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” asserts a different conclusion, primarily because it ignores all of the issues discussed above. Indeed, the paper rather amazingly asserts “Natural gas, though, has the same climate consequences whether it is burned in the United States, Europe, or Asia,” which would be true for exported U.S. gas only if we could use magic to take the U.S. shale gas and put it into European or Asian gas-fired power plants. In the real world, it takes a massive amount of energy and greenhouse gas emissions to get gas from here to those markets, as is well known in the climate policy arena. BOTTOM LINE: Investing billions of dollars in new shale gas infrastructure for domestic use is, at best, of limited value for a short period of time if we put in place both a CO2 price and regulations to minimize methane leakage. Exporting gas vitiates even that limited value and so investing billions in LNG infrastructure is, at best, a waste of resources better utilized for deploying truly low-carbon energy. At worst, it helps accelerates the world past the 2°C warming threshold into Terra incognita — a planet of amplifying feedbacks and multiple simultaneous catastrophic impacts.

**Takes a decade to scale up exports**

**Romm, 12** – Climate Progress editor, Ph.D. in physics from MIT

(Joe, American Progress fellow, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy, "Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Still Bad For The Climate — And A Very Poor Long-Term Investment," Think Progress, 8-16-12, thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/16/699601/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-bad-for-climate-poor-long-term-investment/?mobile=nc, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

The NY Times piece actually makes this odd argument on behalf of LNG exports: “It will take **years** before any export terminals are up and running — in the meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen safeguards so that gas is extracted safely.” But this is yet another reason why LNG exports make no sense. Why would we want to start massive exports of natural gas around the **end of this decade**, with costly new infrastructure that until mid-century?

#### The aff can’t solve exports because of trade barriers

Dlouhy 7/16/12 (Jennifer A., staffwriter, “Natural gas glut a dilemma for Obama” http://www.chron.com/business/article/Natural-gas-glut-a-dilemma-for-Obama-3706576.php)

WASHINGTON - The drilling boom that has led to a glut of natural gas and sent prices to 10-year lows is causing a quandary for the Obama administration, which is struggling to decide whether - and how much - the U.S. should share the bounty with foreign countries. Although the Energy Department recently approved Houston-based Cheniere Energy's plans to begin exporting liquefied natural gas from its Sabine Pass terminal in southwest Louisiana, the government has put off verdicts on similar applications from at least seven other companies. Administration officials say they'll make those decisions after they get the results of a study commissioned by the Energy Department on how allowing companies to sell U.S.-produced natural gas overseas would affect prices for American consumers. The study is due out this summer. "We want analysis to drive decisions," White House energy adviser Heather Zichal said at a recent forum. The administration supports domestic natural gas and isn't opposed to exports, she said, but also is committed to "protecting American consumers and making sure we're sending the right signal to industry and the manufacturing sector." The dilemma is politically treacherous in an election year and struggling economy. Although the United States already exports some natural gas - mostly by pipelines to Mexico and Canada - the flurry of proposals to liquefy natural gas for tanker shipment and sell it to foreign consumers would mean a big jump in exports. Applications filed with the Energy Department could put the United States on track to export about 16 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas each day - nearly a quarter of U.S. daily production in 2011. But few expect all of those proposals to win federal approval, and it could be years before construction is finished on even those projects that win the green light. Experts at IHS CERA say the realistic potential market for exports from the U.S. and Canada is 4 billion to 5 billion cubic feet per day by 2020. An Energy Information Administration report released in January concluded that exporting natural gas would cause prices to climb in the U.S. According to the agency, consumers' electricity bills would increase by 1 percent to 3 percent from 2015 to 2035 and industrial prices would climb 9 percent to 28 percent. Unlike crude, which is a globally traded commodity, natural gas is traded on non-integrated markets, resulting in huge price variations in different places. The prospect of selling natural gas in Asian and European markets at five times its price in the U.S. is enough to make most domestic producers giddy. Energy companies and analysts have argued that current U.S. natural gas prices are unsustainable. It closed Friday at $2.874 per million British thermal units in trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The opposing argument is that exports could cause prices to spike, sending electricity bills upward and jeopardizing a resurgence in domestic manufacturing tied to abundant, cheap natural gas. Manufacturers that use natural gas to fuel their plants and as a building block to make other products were hit hard over the past two decades by volatile swings in prices, which last peaked over $15 in 2005. Because any position risks alienating important constituencies - energy producers and manufacturers as well as voters - few elected officials are pushing the issue.

### Exports

#### US exports undercut Israel – lock in.

Wurmser and Baron 2012

David Wurmser, Ph.D. was a senior advisor on the Middle East to Cheney, Jonathan M. Baron held senior staff positions with members of the congressional leadership and is the founder and president of Baron Public Affairs, Israel's Strategic Energy Opportunity Calls For Exports, September 27 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/09/27/israels-strategic-energy-opportunity-calls-for-exports/

Third, Israel’s offshore natural gas represents a strategically vital resource that must be exploited with great care. Aspects of the Levant Basin in the equivalent of Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone present challenging geology in deep water. Limiting exports risks restricting interested parties to less proven operators, as more experienced international companies prioritize competing opportunities in Asia, Africa, and other regions offering superior terms. The unintended result could be a higher rate of production accidents, with devastating consequences for both near-term development and the public confidence required for a stable and constructive tax and regulatory framework. Fourth, an informed debate should recognize the possibility that a decision now to restrict exports could be difficult to reverse. Natural gas supply agreements often are measured in decades, and the world may be entering an extended period of increased natural gas production. Several trends – U.S. exports of unconventional natural gas, the application of the same unconventional natural gas production techniques to China, and the major offshore discoveries referenced above – mean that a delay in bringing exports to market could find Israel in a world where the supply requirements of energy importers have been met. This fate would undermine the rational for additional private-sector investment, resulting in fewer discoveries and smaller total proven reserves. To be certain, Israel’s natural gas export policy must provide a supply buffer that accounts for the country’s demanding energy security requirements. One approach would peg the reserve volume to the time required in an emergency to transition the economy from natural gas to a substitute fuel. Under this policy, a strategic reserve equivalent to approximately 10-to-12 years of demand would be adequate in the unlikely event Israel were forced to make such a shift. As Israel’s natural gas consumption grows, the total volume that accounts for the 10-to-12 years of demand would increase accordingly. Rather than basing the volume of reserves on an arbitrary time horizon, this concept would mitigate risk without driving away the investment Israel needs to leverage the enormous promise of abundant offshore energy. The government of Israel bears a heavy responsibility in designing a natural resource strategy that safeguards the nation’s energy security in the coming decades. Natural gas export levels that allow producers to achieve attractive returns would increase the abundance and reliability of supply, as well as help unlock considerable macroeconomic and geopolitical advantages.

#### Exports are key to Israeli energy security and Greek EEZ. Solves Cyprus war.

Beranek 2011

Martin, FrontPageMag columnist and former engineer, Israel’s Energy Future, December 20 2011 http://frontpagemag.com/2011/martin-beranek/israels-energy-future/2/

Energy has always been the weak link in Israel’s thriving economy. Decades of digging and drilling yielded practically no hydrocarbons at all. Israel was forced to spend 5% of its GDP buying fuel from suppliers that did not have its interests at heart, and were often unreliable. At one point for instance, Israel purchased 40% of its natural gas from Egypt. But the pipeline across the Sinai has been bombed so many times there was often not enough time between explosions to get the gas flowing again. Post-Mubarak Egypt desperately needs the money to replace lost tourism revenue, but hatred of Israel trumps all. The first brightening of this bleak picture came in 1998, when offshore drilling in Israel’s Mediterranean waters got under way. In 2000, a consortium led by Noble Energy of Houston struck commercial quantities of natural gas off the southern coast, west of Ashdod. By 2004, the Mari B field was in full production, with reserves of nearly 1 trillion cubic feet of gas. This remains the only currently producing offshore well in Israel. But Noble Energy was convinced there must be bigger reserves waiting in deeper waters, and in 2009, diligent exploration paid off in a big way. The Tamar field, with 9 trillion cubic feet of gas, was the biggest offshore gas field found anywhere in the world that year. And the next year, Noble Energy struck it even richer with the 16 trillion cubic foot Leviathan field, further west of Haifa. That was the biggest offshore find of the decade. Together, these discoveries opened up entirely new possibilities. The Tamar field, with enough gas to supply all of Israel’s needs for decades, offered energy security, and the Leviathan field offered energy for export and billions of dollars a year in potential revenues. Gas is scheduled to start flowing from Tamar in 2013 and from Leviathan in 2016. With the same consortium operating Mari B and Tamar and Leviathan, the Israeli government was very concerned about giving one group of companies a monopoly over its offshore gas. This monopoly has now been broken by other companies who’ve found rich pickings in the sea off central Israel. A three-dimensional seismographic survey of the Myra and Sarah fields northwest of Netanya and southeast of Leviathan has revealed 6.5 trillion cubic feet of gas waiting to be developed by a consortium led by the Israel Land Development Company. Modiin Energy has a controlling interest in the Gabriella field in shallow water not far west of Tel Aviv, with an estimated 3.56 trillion cubic feet of gas, and the Yam Hadera field west of Hadera, with an estimated 1.4 trillion cubic feet. Adira Energy, a Canadian company, is developing the Yitzhak field southwest of Netanya, with an estimated 989 billion cubic feet. And ATP Oil & Gas of Houston has partnered with Isramco Negev to develop the Shimshon field, with a best estimate of 2.3 trillion cubic feet. Of course, Nobel Energy hasn’t rested on its laurels after Leviathan. It has identified 12 more prospects with 20 trillion cubic feet of potential gas in the territory covered by its licenses. And all of the fields mentioned have substantial quantities of oil waiting to be developed as well. The best estimate for the Gabriella field alone is 277 million barrels of oil. Getting the most out of all these discoveries will take not just technical expertise and money, but strategic thinking and sound diplomacy as well. And that is what Israel has been practicing, with Greece and Cyprus in particular. Israel has carefully cultivated its relations with Greece since early in 2010. Progress began with an unlikely but warm personal relationship between Prime Ministers Netanyahu and Papandreou. It intensified after Turkish-Israeli relations fell into a deep-freeze following the Mavi Marmara incident, and after the scope of the Leviathan discovery became clear. Face-to-face meetings between officials in Athens and Jerusalem, business and tourism delegations, sharing of intelligence, and joint exercises between the Israeli and Greek air forces all bore fruit when the Greek Coast Guard brought the 2011 version of the Gaza flotilla to a complete halt, and Israel tirelessly lobbied the EU to extend a helping hand to Greece in the face of its financial crisis. Greece is ideally situated to serve as a hub for distributing Israeli gas to Europe, particularly since Turkey has rejected any notion of letting pipelines from Israel cross its territory. In return for giving Israel access to this market, Greece will earn much-needed revenue. Athens has yet to demarcate its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean, largely because Turkey has threatened war whenever it tried to do so. There are believed to be big, unexplored reserves of oil and gas east of the mainland and south of Crete. With Israel firmly in its corner keeping Turkey at bay, Greece has a powerful motivation to finally declare its EEZ and fully develop those resources, taking advantage of the Israeli experience in extracting hydrocarbons from the same Mediterranean environment. This mutually beneficial relationship is so compelling that it has survived the fall of the Papandreou government. The first official from the coalition unity government headed by Lucas Papademos to visit Israel was the Energy Minister. Giorgos Papakonstantinou, and he came eager to talk about Israeli gas and Greece. It’s worth noting that not long ago, Athens was the font of some of the most vehement hostility to Israel in all of Europe. Pipelines from Israeli gas fields to Greece will pass through Cyprus, and here too, Israel has been busy polishing relations and facing down Turks. The formation that contains the Leviathan field extends into Cypriot waters, and Noble Energy is busily drilling there now. Ankara has insisted that Turkish-occupied North Cyprus must take a share of any gas from Greek Cypriot waters, and threatened to send its navy to block the drilling. But Israel maintained a strong naval presence nearby, and the US, EU, and Russia, none of whom recognize Turkish Cyprus, all affirmed the right of Greek Cypriots to develop their resources. After getting carried away with bellicose rhetoric, the Erdogan government found itself completely isolated. Drilling south of Cyprus has proceeded since late September without incident. The administration of Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias has discussed a security alliance with Israel, and the Israeli air force has carried out exercises over Cypriot airspace. Cypriots in general are eagerly embracing closer ties with Israel and the prosperity coming their way with the development of gas fields, pipelines, and gas liquefaction plants. The Arab Spring has turned into winter, with Syria a slaughterhouse, tourists in Egypt fleeing chaos and Salafists, and Islamists taking power everywhere, even in Tunisia. Meanwhile, the elements of a Jewish Spring are being quietly put into place – energy security, a new strategic position as an energy exporter, dramatically improved relations with Greece and Cyprus, the prospect of better relations with every country that will buy Israeli gas, and the satisfaction of seeing hostile countries punish themselves in their attempts to punish Israel.

#### Spreads to the Middle East

Gerolymatos, Director of the Research Institute on Southwestern Europe at Simon Fraser University, 1997 (The Aegean Sea after the Cold War, pg. 58)

The speed of modern communications and fast reaction time of advanced weapons systems means that any crisis in the Aegean or Cyprus has a strong probability of degenerating into a full-scale conflict by accident. It is not inconceivable that a Greek-Turkish war could invite a Syrian attack against Turkey and expand the conflict beyond the Aegean or Cyprus. The defeat of Turkey, even on a limited scale, would also cause internal unrest and bring that country close to a muslim fundamentalist social and political regime. Under these conditions, and taking into account the escalating arms race between Greece and Turkey, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean is tenuous at best, and could easily and quickly become a theatre of war that could spread to the Middle East.

#### The plan reduces US gas imports and frees up the global market – allows Europe to lessen its dependence on Russian gas

Jaffe & O’Sullivan 12 – Amy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, and Meghan L. O'Sullivan is the Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard University. “The Geopolitics of Natural Gas,” July, http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-HKSGeopoliticsOfNaturalGas-073012.pdf

Knowledge of the shale gas resource is not new. Geologists have known about the existence of¶ shale formations for years but accessing those resources was long held to be an issue of technology and cost. In the past decade, innovations have yielded substantial cost reductions,¶ making shale gas production a commercial reality. In fact, shale gas production in the United¶ States has increased from virtually nothing in 2000 to more than 10 billion cubic feet per day¶ (bcfd) in 2010. Rising North America shale gas supplies have significantly reduced US requirements for imported LNG and contributed to lower US domestic natural gas prices. The natural gas supply picture in North America will have a ripple effect around the globe that will¶ expand over time, not only through displacement of supplies in global trade but also by fostering a growing interest in shale resource potential in other parts of the world.¶ The importance of the commercialization of shale cannot be understated from a geopolitical,¶ environmental, or market development perspective. Given the assumption that known shale gas resources will be developed according to their commercial viability in North America and¶ elsewhere, the reference scenario projects shale gas production could more than quadruple over the next two decades, accounting for over 50 percent of total US natural gas production by the early 2030s. Still, the countries of the former Soviet Union will collectively be the largest¶ supplier of natural gas (conventional and unconventional) by 2040, with North America a close second. The reference case anticipates the strongest supply of shale gas will be in North America, where the recoverable shale resource comprises more than a quarter of the world’s 4,024 trillion cubic feet (Tct) and is rivaled in size only by the shale plays in Asia and Oceania.¶ These supply trends will have a significant impact on gas trade flows. Not only will the United¶ States be able to avoid growth in LNG imports for the next three decades, but the reference case projects that North America will export 720 million cubic feet per day of LNG by 2030. Australia will rival Qatar as the world’s largest LNG exporter by 2030. Qatar and Australia will remain the largest LNG exporters through 2040, collectively accounting for about 40 percent of global LNG exports.¶ LNG supplies whose development was anchored to the belief that the United States would be a¶ premium market will continue to be diverted. In the reference case, the US market remains the lowest priced major market region in the world throughout the model time horizon. Many US terminals once expected to be actively utilized will remain relatively empty. During the period from 2013 to 2015, US terminals see some growth as new volumes from Australian LNG development push African LNG cargoes to the US market—a trend exacerbated by growth in LNG supply from West Africa in the 2014-2015 period.¶ The reference case projects that consumers in Europe will receive a double benefit from the rise in global gas supply. Not only will Europe increasingly find alternatives to Russian pipeline¶ supplies, but these alternative supplies will exert pressure on the status quo of indexing gas sales to a premium marker determined by the price of petroleum products. In fact, Russia has already had to accept lower prices for its natural gas and is now allowing a portion of its sales in Europe to be indexed to spot natural gas markets, or regional market hubs, rather than oil prices. This change in pricing terms signals a major paradigm shift.¶ Yet as Europe moves to gas-on-gas pricing, global marker prices in the reference scenario fail to converge through 2040. Europe’s price premium will hover at more than $1 above Henry Hub prices, even as Europe develops its own shale resource and diversifies sources of supply.¶ Shale gas eventually makes up 20 percent of European market. European shale gas production¶ begins in earnest in 2020s, and approaches 20 percent of the total market by 2040. LNG import growth is the second fastest growing source of European supply. The availability of shale gas under the reference case means that Caspian flows will not make economic sense as a competing supply to Europe. The Nabucco pipeline project, for example, is not constructed until lower-cost Iraqi gas is able to flow into the line.

#### natural gas dependency is key to Russia-EU cooperation and Russian growth.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

Media reporting and Western security discourse lend to portray Russia as the aggressor in its energy relations, increasingly able to convert its hydrocarbon supply lo Europe into economic and political capital. Likewise, many Western scholarly works and analytical reports suggest that Europe is dangerously dependent on Russia.1 Some NATO members have even urged the creation of an "energy NATO" or suggested that the alliance define a shutoff of energy by Russia as an attack justifying the invocation of Article V on collective defense.1 Part of this perception has to do with the way Russia is pursuing business interests in Europe, a policy once described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as "energy supremacy."1 Russia's tactics regarding the pricing of gas to its Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) customers and related shutoffs of gas and oil transiting Belarus and Ukraine to Europe, as well as its subsequent championing of transit options that bolster its near monopoly of gas supplies to Europe, concern many end users Moreover, Russia's continued recalcitrance toward ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its recent effort to limit foreign investment in upstream ventures, such as Kovykta and Sakhalin, are viewed by some as unwarranted, given its demands for access to markets in Europe.\* However, as alarming as these recent developments have been for Europe and the US, the warnings emphasizing an encroaching Russian energy giant do not consider the strong interdependency between Russia and Europe that benefit both parties. This interdependency will remain well into the future, creating conditions that favor cooperation over confrontation. While it is recognized that in the near-term, Russia will remain Europe's single most important source of hydrocarbons, particularly for natural gas, Russia's share of the European market will decline over time, increasing Russia's dependency on Europe. Already, the quality of the relationship makes Europe indispensable to Russia in terms of overall trade volumes The European Union <EU) in 2005 accounted for some 56 percent of Russia's exports and around 45 percent of its imports, with Russia's exports to the EU generally being confined to oil and natural gas. Around two-thirds of Russian gas and oil exports currently go to EU member states, the rest to other European countries and the CIS states. These exports have been critical to Russia's welfare, as one-third of all Russian GDP growth over the recent period has come from the natural resources sector, with taxation of oil and gas providing almost 50 percent of federal government fiscal revenue.5 Moreover, Russia's dependence on hydrocarbon exports is likely to grow, as Russia has failed to invest its energy profits in sectors that would ensure long-term, sustainable economic development. This lack of investment could especially hurt the development of Russia's hydrocarbon sector, as the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts require energy investment at around €800 billion by 2030. In order to meet this requirement, Russia would have to supplement domestic funds by encouraging more foreign investment through a revised legal framework that provides secure property rights for the assets of foreign companies operating in Russia.6 Meanwhile, as European states are making moves to diversify their hydrocarbon resources, Russia appears to be less active in securing alternative markets beyond the West. Europe is strengthening relations with African producers, developing liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets, and moving toward greater use of renewable resources. Russia, on the other hand, continues to make business arrangements to construct more pipelines linking its oil and gas fields westwards, obtain rights for the use of gas storage sites in Europe, and sign long-term purchase guarantees with European customers. These plans are taking priority over the construction of pipelines to Asia, investment in upstream gas sector projects, and construction of the infrastructure required for exporting LNG globally. Given these developments, Russia will remain a major player in the European market in the foreseeable future, accounting for roughly a quarter of EU hydrocarbon consumption or 40 percent of imports. Nevertheless, even with the Russian energy sector concentrated on the European market, it will not be able to meet European demand for gas, which is forecast to grow 70 percent by 2030,' The disjuncture between, on the one hand, the actual interdependency between Russia and Europe and, on the other hand, the portrayal of Russia as the aggressor and Europe as the dependent actor, may be more the result of semantics than of facts. Since the early 2000s, the Russian government has tended to understand the context of its energy business in Europe better than Europeans understand Russia. Russia has done a good job of playing a weak hand by engaging with individual European states and their mostly nationally-owned companies to create a series of business arrangements that suit the interests of both sides. Today, Russian and European energy companies are creating joint stock companies, constructing oil and gas pipelines within the EU, investing in hubs and storage facilities, refineries, and terminals, and swapping Russian sales to customers on Europe's market for European exploration and technology in upstream projects in the Russian Far East. This has created a visible map of Russian state-owned assets dotted across Europe and North Africa.1 It is this visual that concerns many in Europe and America and contributes to calls for less dependency on Russia.

#### Relations are key to stabilize Belarus.

Trenin 2011

Dmitri, Deputy Director Carnegie Moscow Center, Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood, Centre for European Reform Essays, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay\_russia\_trenin\_sept05-2151.pdf

Of all the countries in the common neighbourhood, Belarus harbours the most risks for the EU-Russia relationship. The EU seeks to boycott the regime of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, which it considers illegitimate. The EU has thus imposed a visa ban on Belarusian top officials and excluded the country from the E N P. As Belarus has become more authoritarian, the EU has looked to Russia to exert some positive influence on its smaller neighbour. But the Kremlin has been reluctant to move against Lukashenka, who has styled himself as the only truly pro-Russian leader in the region. In the last two years, the situation has grown increasingly tense. Exploiting widespread insecurity after the September 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, Lukashenka managed to win a re f e rendum on whether he should be allowed to run for a third term as president – in dire c t violation of the laws he had himself promulgated. Since then, Belarus has been a constant irritant in Russia’s relations with the EU – as well as with the US. President George Bush has called Belarus the “last dictatorship in Europe”; and Secre t a ry of State Condoleezza Rice has met with exiled leaders of the Belarusian opposition. Tensions are likely to rise further ahead of the presidential poll scheduled for September 2006. Putin has been lukewarm at best about plans for a Russian-Belarusian union that were devised by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin is said to detest Lukashenka personally, and he realises that the Minsk leader is not only a liability for Russia-US relations but also, and more importantly, a key obstacle to furthering Russian economic interests in Belarus. Nevertheless, Lukashenka remains a close, if difficult ally. The Kremlin’s half-hearted attempts to make him dance to Russia’s tune have failed. As long as the Kremlin remains indecisive about what to do, Lukashenka can continue to make mischief at Moscow’s expense. For example, he defies the attempts of Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, to make Belarus pay for gas deliveries at world prices. He effectively bars private Russian investment in Belarus. He drags his feet on accepting the Russian rouble as the currency for the long-planned Russo-Belarusian union. He censors or bans the Russian media in his country. And he can still wangle support and subsidies from Moscow. The Kremlin is afraid that turning against Lukashenka will result in ‘losing Belarus’ to the West. As Moscow insiders say: “Lukashenka is a bastard, but at least he’s our bastard.” The Kremlin’s call Both Moscow and the EU would be well advised not to underestimate Lukashenka’s political skills and his instincts for survival. Despite his dictatorial practices, Lukashenka remains popular with around one-third of the electorate, and he retains strongholds in rural areas. The political opposition may have western sympathies, but it remains weak, divided and marginalised. Lukashenka periodically shakes up the country’s elites, to keep potential opponents or challengers at bay and to prevent opposition forces from consolidating. The regime has destroyed the country’s big businesses and bullied smaller ones into passivity or submission. In such an environment, anti-Lukashenka and pro-democracy rallies would hardly threaten the regime. Rather, they would give Lukashenka an opportunity to condemn them as the work of western agitators. If opposition demonstrators (or the police agents provocateurs among them) engaged in acts of violence, Lukashenka would have a pretext to use force against them. Any bloodshed in the streets of Minsk would present Putin with a tricky choice: should he condemn Russia’s only ‘true ally’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States and risk seeing it become another ‘Ukraine’ (pro-Western, anti-Russian)? Or should he politically support Lukashenka, as he supported Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov, during recent disturbances there? There are, of course, big geopolitical differences between Belarus and Uzbekistan, so the consequences of Putin’s actions would be very different. The EU cares little about Uzbekistan, but disagreements over Belarus could chill, even freeze, EU-Russia relations. Such disagreements could shape the attitudes of Europe’s publics and elites towards Russia. And they could influence the Russian authorities’ domestic policies and their general attitude to ‘western influence’ in Russia.

#### ---Belarusian instability draws in the U.S., Russia, and goes nuclear.

Carpenter 1997

Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense Policy @ Cato Institute, “NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 1: The Border between Poland and Belarus”, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 44, 9-16, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb044.pdf

The Powder Keg on the Polish-Belarusian Border Admitting Poland to NATO involves two related dangers. One is that Poland's highly unstable neighbor may suffer the fate of other states with repressive political systems and moribund economies: a violent convulsion. We havewitnessed that development in such places as Somalia, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Zaire. It shouldbe noted that, in every case, the chaos created serious problems for neighboring states. If fighting erupted in Belarus--and the ingredients are all in place for a conflagration--it is highly unlikely that Poland would remain unaffected. Yet there would be multiple risks to NATO if it took action to stabilize its new member's eastern border. In addition to the prospect of being sucked into a Bosnia-style morass, there would be the danger of a confrontation with Russia. Belarus is a weakened Russia's last strategic ally in Europe. Russian leaders would undoubtedly be alarmed by any NATO military initiatives involving Belarus, whether those actions were for the purpose of containment or the more ambitious objective of nation building. Moscow's reluctant acquiescence in the first round of NATO enlargement was conditioned on what Russian officials considered solemn promises in the Founding Act. One crucial provision states that NATO "reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moscow might well view the deployment of NATO troops in eastern Poland to deal with instability in Belarus as a violation of that pledge. Yet if the alliance failed to act, Poland (and the other new members) would have reason to question the credibility of the security commitments they had been given. Even the possibility of the United States' becoming entangled in a political and military quagmire on the frontier between Poland and Belarus should be ample reason for the Senate to reject the administration's plan to enlarge NATO. The danger that such a development could result in a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia reinforces that point. If expansion is approved, the United States risks being blindsided by a conflict that advocates of NATO enlargement never anticipated and that would have no relevance to the security interests of the American people.

## 2nc

### Warming

#### Nuclear war outweighs – no adaptation.

Starr 2008

Steven, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Director of Clinical Laboratory Science Program, University of Missouri-Columbia, Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Bulletin 28 April 2008, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin-28/catastrophic-climatic-consequences-nuclear-conflict

Climatic changes resulting from nuclear conflict would occur many thousands of times faster – and thus would likely be far more catastrophic – than the climatic changes predicted as a result of global warming.40 The rapidity of the war-induced changes, appearing in a matter of days and weeks, would allow human populations and the whole plant and animal kingdoms no time to adapt. It is worth noting that the same methods and climate models used to predict global warming were used in these studies to predict global cooling resulting from nuclear war. These climate models have proved highly successful in describing the cooling effects of volcanic clouds during extensive U.S. evaluations and in international intercomparisons performed as part of the Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.41 Predicted drops in average global temperatures caused by small, moderate, and large nuclear conflicts are contrasted with the effects of global warming during the last century in Figure 4 and with average surface air temperatures during the last 1,000 years in Figure 5. There are, of course, other important considerations which must be made when estimating the overall environmental and ecological impacts of nuclear war. These must include the release of enormous amounts of radioactive fallout, pyrotoxins, and toxic industrial chemicals into the ecosystems. A decade after the conflict, when the smoke begins to clear, there will also be massive increases in the amount of deadly ultraviolet light which will reach the surface of the Earth as a result of ozone depletion. All these by-products of nuclear war must be taken into account when comparing the danger of nuclear conflict to other potential dangers now confronting humanity and life on Earth. Conclusions We cannot allow our political and military leaders to continue to ignore the potential cataclysmic climatic and environmental consequences posed by the use of nuclear weapons. Civilization remains at risk from nuclear winter despite a three-fold reduction in global nuclear arsenals during the last 20 years. This is due in part to the fact that nuclear arms control agreements have focused primarily on the dismantlement of delivery systems and have failed to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads. Future negotiations must consider all the potential effects of the total number of nuclear weapons in the nuclear arsenals.44 The U.S. and Russia must recognize the senselessness of continued planning for a nuclear first-strike which, if launched, would make the whole world including their own country uninhabitable. As a first step, they should end their preparations for the pre-emptive use of their nuclear arsenals, stand-down their high-alert strategic nuclear forces, and eliminate the standard operating procedure of launch-on-warning.45 It is essential that all the nuclear weapon states be convinced of the need to honor their commitments under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to “act in good faith” to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. As long as they ignore this commitment and maintain nuclear weaponry as the cornerstone of their military forces, they confer validity to the false idea that nuclear weapons provide security to those who possess them, and thus encourage non-nuclear weapon states to follow in their footsteps. The unalterable conclusion is that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. Nuclear weapons must be seen not only as instruments of mass murder, but as instruments of global annihilation which put all humanity and civilization under a common threat of destruction.

#### Prefer our authors –

#### A subpoint – confirmation bias

Hoffman 2012

Doug L., adjunct Professor of Computer Science at Hendrix College and the University of Central Arkansas, focus in modeling of complex systems, New Climate Models Fall Short, 5-29-2012, The Resilient Earth, http://theresilientearth.com/?q=content/new-climate-models-fall-short

Lastly, I would like to mention an interesting piece of commentary that appeared in Nature in the same issue as the Tollefson report. In “Beware the creeping cracks of bias,” Daniel Sarewitz, co-director of the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University, talks about one of those subjects that is usually taboo in scientific circles: the threat to science by researcher's own bias. Sarewitz issued this blunt warning: “Alarming cracks are starting to penetrate deep into the scientific edifice. They threaten the status of science and its value to society. And they cannot be blamed on the usual suspects — inadequate funding, misconduct, political interference, an illiterate public. Their cause is bias, and the threat they pose goes to the heart of research.” Though Sarewitz is specifically concerned with biomedical research, his warning should be taken as a general one. All areas of scientific endeavor can be affected by peer pressure, by group think, by consensus. When an idea becomes generally accepted, there is a natural tendency for the scientific community to respond positively to new results that reinforce current thinking. Conversely, papers that present a negative result, attacking or diminishing the currently held theory, often find a cold welcome and may not be published at all. Bias is natural and pervasive, and antithetical to good science. Here is how Sarewitz describes it: How can we explain such pervasive bias? Like a magnetic field that pulls iron filings into alignment, a powerful cultural belief is aligning multiple sources of scientific bias in the same direction. The belief is that progress in science means the continual production of positive findings. All involved benefit from positive results, and from the appearance of progress. Scientists are rewarded both intellectually and professionally, science administrators are empowered and the public desire for a better world is answered. The lack of incentives to report negative results, replicate experiments or recognize inconsistencies, ambiguities and uncertainties is widely appreciated — but the necessary cultural change is incredibly difficult to achieve. The presence of bias in the global warming debate should be obvious to the most casual of observers. The paucity of published articles that contradict the existing paradigm, the reliance on “consensus” when arguing for the accepted dogma and the ad hominin attacks on scientists bold enough to decry the AGW party line all highlight the bias of the climate science community. Yet as we have seen above there are still gaping holes in our knowledge of Earth's climate system. The old models have been shown to be inadequate and the new ones are not in agreement—unsurprising given that aerosol effects are only crudely estimated and we still do not understand the carbon cycle in sufficient detail. All of this confronts climate science with some fundamental questions. “In the end, the climate community must confront a basic question about models,” reports Tollefson. Michael Winton, a modeler at the GFD puts it more succinctly: “If you made a model and it matched the observations perfectly, would you claim success?” What can be said for a model that matches recent climate fluctuation accurately but does so for the wrong reasons? More fundamentally, how do you know what the right answer is? As we have seen in the past, the right answer is decided by “consensus,” which is to say by the bias and expectations of the clique of climate scientists. “A biased scientific result is no different from a useless one,” states Sarewitz, “neither can be turned into a real-world application.” Yet that is precisely what the IPCC modelers are claiming, that we should accept the uncertain output of incomplete models, created to satisfy the bias of the greater climate science community, as a factual representation of the Earth system. Starting in 2013, the IPCC will strive to achieve consensus, basically the same consensus they promoted in the previous report, but all they will be doing is codifying the bias of a group of scientists with no real answers.

#### B subpoint – incentives and intimidation

Allegre et al 2012

Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva. No Need to Panic About Global Warming, Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html>

A candidate for public office in any contemporary democracy may have to consider what, if anything, to do about "global warming." Candidates should understand that the oft-repeated claim that nearly all scientists demand that something dramatic be done to stop global warming is not true. In fact, a large and growing number of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are needed. In September, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ivar Giaever, a supporter of President Obama in the last election, publicly resigned from the American Physical Society (APS) with a letter that begins: "I did not renew [my membership] because I cannot live with the [APS policy] statement: 'The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earth's physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now.' In the APS it is OK to discuss whether the mass of the proton changes over time and how a multi-universe behaves, but the evidence of global warming is incontrovertible?" In spite of a multidecade international campaign to enforce the message that increasing amounts of the "pollutant" carbon dioxide will destroy civilization, large numbers of scientists, many very prominent, share the opinions of Dr. Giaever. And the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year. The reason is a collection of stubborn scientific facts. Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. This is known to the warming establishment, as one can see from the 2009 "Climategate" email of climate scientist Kevin Trenberth: "The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't." But the warming is only missing if one believes computer models where so-called feedbacks involving water vapor and clouds greatly amplify the small effect of CO2. The lack of warming for more than a decade—indeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projections—suggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much warming additional CO2 can cause. Faced with this embarrassment, those promoting alarm have shifted their drumbeat from warming to weather extremes, to enable anything unusual that happens in our chaotic climate to be ascribed to CO2. The fact is that CO2 is not a pollutant. CO2 is a colorless and odorless gas, exhaled at high concentrations by each of us, and a key component of the biosphere's life cycle. Plants do so much better with more CO2 that greenhouse operators often increase the CO2 concentrations by factors of three or four to get better growth. This is no surprise since plants and animals evolved when CO2 concentrations were about 10 times larger than they are today. Better plant varieties, chemical fertilizers and agricultural management contributed to the great increase in agricultural yields of the past century, but part of the increase almost certainly came from additional CO2 in the atmosphere. Although the number of publicly dissenting scientists is growing, many young scientists furtively say that while they also have serious doubts about the global-warming message, they are afraid to speak up for fear of not being promoted—or worse. They have good reason to worry. In 2003, Dr. Chris de Freitas, the editor of the journal Climate Research, dared to publish a peer-reviewed article with the politically incorrect (but factually correct) conclusion that the recent warming is not unusual in the context of climate changes over the past thousand years. The international warming establishment quickly mounted a determined campaign to have Dr. de Freitas removed from his editorial job and fired from his university position. Fortunately, Dr. de Freitas was able to keep his university job. This is not the way science is supposed to work, but we have seen it before—for example, in the frightening period when Trofim Lysenko hijacked biology in the Soviet Union. Soviet biologists who revealed that they believed in genes, which Lysenko maintained were a bourgeois fiction, were fired from their jobs. Many were sent to the gulag and some were condemned to death. Why is there so much passion about global warming, and why has the issue become so vexing that the American Physical Society, from which Dr. Giaever resigned a few months ago, refused the seemingly reasonable request by many of its members to remove the word "incontrovertible" from its description of a scientific issue? There are several reasons, but a good place to start is the old question "cui bono?" Or the modern update, "Follow the money." Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them. Speaking for many scientists and engineers who have looked carefully and independently at the science of climate, we have a message to any candidate for public office: There is no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to "decarbonize" the world's economy. Even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive greenhouse-gas control policies are not justified economically. A recent study of a wide variety of policy options by Yale economist William Nordhaus showed that nearly the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is achieved for a policy that allows 50 more years of economic growth unimpeded by greenhouse gas controls. This would be especially beneficial to the less-developed parts of the world that would like to share some of the same advantages of material well-being, health and life expectancy that the fully developed parts of the world enjoy now. Many other policy responses would have a negative return on investment. And it is likely that more CO2 and the modest warming that may come with it will be an overall benefit to the planet.

#### C subpoint – peer review fails.

Eisen 2011

Michael, Associate Professor of Genetics, Genomics and Development @ UC Berkeley, Peer review is f\*\*\*ed up – let’s fix it, 10-28-2011, it is NOT junk, http://www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=694

Peer review is ostensibly one of the central pillars of modern science. A paper is not taken seriously by other scientists unless it is published in a “peer reviewed” journal. Jobs, grants and tenure are parceled out, in no small part, on the basis of lists of “peer reviewed” papers. The public has been trained to accept as established truth any science that has gone through the gauntlet of “peer review”. And any attempt to upend, reform or even tinker with it is regarded as an apostasy. But the truth is that peer review as practiced in the 21st century biomedical research poisons science. It is conservative, cumbersome, capricious and intrusive. It slows down the communication of new ideas and discoveries, while failing to accomplish most of what it purports to do. And, worst of all, the mythical veneer of peer review has created the perception that a handful of journals stand as gatekeepers of success in science, ceding undue power to them, and thereby stifling innovation in scientific communication. This has to stop. In honor of Open Access Week, I am going to lay out what is wrong with peer review, how its persistence in its current form harms science, scientists and the public, and how we can restructure peer review to everyone’s benefit. [These ideas have emerged from over a decades worth of conspiring on this topic with Pat Brown, as well as myriad discussions with Harold Varmus, David Lipman, Vitek Tracz, my brother Jonathan, Gerry Rubin, Sean Eddy, other board members and staff at PLoS, and various and sundry people at meeting bars]. Peer review and its problems To understand what’s wrong with peer review, you have to understand at least the basics of how it works. When a scientist has a result they want to share with their colleagues they write a paper and submit it to one of nearly 10,000 biomedical research journals. The choice of journal is governed by many factors, but most scientists try to get their papers into the highest profile journal that covers their field and will accept it. Authors with the highest aspirations for their work send it to one of the wide circulation general science journals Science and Nature, or to a handful of high impact field-specific journals. In my field, molecular genetics/genomics, this would be Cell and PLoS Biology (a journal we started in 2003 to provide an open access alterative to these other three). In more clinical fields this would be something like the New England Journal of Medicine. [I want to make it clear that I am not endorsing these choices, just describing what people do]. When any of these top-tier journals receive a paper, it is evaluated by a professional editor (usually a Ph.D. scientist) who makes an initial judgment as to its suitability for their journal. They’re not trying to determine if the paper is technically sound – they are trying to figure out if the work described represents a sufficiently significant advance to warrant one of the coveted spots in their journal. If they think it might, they send the paper to 3 or 4 scientists – usually, but not always lab heads – who are knowledgeable about the subject at hand, and ask them to read and comment on the manuscript. The reviewers are asked to comment on several things: The technical merits of the paper: are the methods sounds, the experiments reproducible, the data believable, the proper controls included, the conclusions justified – that is, is it a valid work of science. The presentation: is the writing understandable, are the figures clear, is relevant earlier work properly cited. Are the results and conclusions of the paper sufficiently important for the journal for which it is being reviewed. For most journals, the reviewers address these questions in a freeform review, which they send to the editor, who weighs their various comments to arrive at a decision. Reviews come in essentially three flavors: Outright acceptance (rare), outright rejection (common for high tier journals), and rejection with the option to address the reviewers’ objections and resubmit. Often the editors and reviewers demand a series of additional experiments that might lead them to accept an otherwise unacceptable paper. Papers that are rejected have to go through the process over again at another journal. There are too many things that are wrong with this process, but I want to focus on two here: 1) The process takes a really long time. In my experience, the first round of reviews rarely takes less than a month, and often take a lot longer, with papers sitting on reviewers’ desks the primary rate-limiting step. But even more time consuming is what happens after the initial round of review, when papers have to be rewritten, often with new data collected and analyses done. For typical papers from my lab it takes 6 to 9 months from initial submission to publication. The scientific enterprise is all about building on the results of others – but this can’t be done if the results of others are languishing in the hands of reviewers, or suffering through multiple rounds of peer review. There can be little doubt that this delay slows down scientific discovery and the introduction to the public of new ways to diagnose and treat disease [this is something Pat Brown and I have talked about trying to quantify, but I don't have anything yet]. Of course this might be worth it if this manifestation of peer review were an essential part of the scientific enterprise that somehow made the ultimate product better, in spite of – of even because of – the delays. But this leads to: 2) The system is not very good at what it purports to do. The values that people primarily ascribe to peer review are maintaining the integrity of the scientific literature by preventing the publication of flawed science; filtering of the mass of papers into to identify those one should read; and providing a system for evaluating the contribution of individual scientists for hiring, funding and promotion. But it doesn’t actually do any of these things effectively. The kind of flawed science that people are most worried about are deceptive or fraudulent papers, especially those dealing with clinical topics. And while I am sure that some egregious papers are prevented from being published by peer review, the reality is that with 10,000 or so journals out there, most papers that are not obviously flawed will ultimately get published if the authors are sufficiently persistent. The peer reviewed literature is filled with all manner of crappy papers – especially in more clinical fields. And even the supposedly more rigorous standards of the elite journals fail to prevent flawed papers from being published (witness the recent Arsenic paper published by Science). So, while it might be a nice idea to imagine peer review as some kind of defender of scientific integrity – it isn’t. And even if you believed that peer review could do this – several aspects of the current system make it more difficult. First, the focus on the importance of a paper in the publishing decision often deemphasizes technical issues. And, more importantly, the current system relies on three reviewers judging the technical merits of a paper under a fairly strict time constraint – conditions that are not ideally suited to recognize anything but the most obvious flaws. In my experience the most important technical flaws are uncovered after papers are published. And yet, because we have a system that places so much emphasis on where a paper is published, we have no effective way to annotate previously published papers that turn out to be wrong: once a Nature paper, always a Nature paper. And as for classification, does anyone really think that assigning every paper to one journal, organized in a loose and chaotic hierarchy of topics and importance, is really the best way to help people browse the literature? It made some sense when journals had to be printed and mailed – but with virtually all dissemination of the literature now done electronically, this system no longer makes any sense whatsoever. While some people still read journals cover to cover – most people now find papers by searching for them in PubMed, Google Scholar or the equivalent. While the classification into journals has some value, it certainly doesn’t justify the delays in publication that it currently requires. I could go on about the problems with our current peer review system, but I’m 1,500 words into this thing and I want to stop kvetching about the problem and get to the solution.

### Unq

---Technology already exist to solve warming-deployment key, 1nc evidence cites the IPCC, here is more

Romm-Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress-9/26/11

World’s Engineers: “The Technology Needed to Cut the World’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 85% by 2050 Already Exists”

<http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/09/26/329233/world%E2%80%99s-engineers-technology-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions-exists/>

The technology needed to cut the world’s greenhouse gas emissions by 85% by 2050 already exists, according to a joint statement by eleven of the world’s largest engineering organisations…. The statement says that generating electricity from wind, waves and the sun, growing biofuels sustainably, zero emissions transport, low carbon buildings and energy efficiency technologies have all been demonstrated. However they are not being developed for wide-scale use fast enough and there is a desperate need for financial and legislative support from governments around the world if they are to fulfil their potential. That’s the news release from the UK’s Institution of Mechanical Engineers (IME), one of the 11 signatory groups. The groups explicitly call for a peak in global emissions in 2020 and an intensive effort to train workers for green technology jobs.

---Aggressive deployment of existing technology key to emissions reductions---deployment will create innovation.

Romm-Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress-10/31/11

<http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/10/31/356735/revkin-sheen-report-debunks-anti-deployment-climate-strategy/>

Back in May, a major study, California’s Energy Future — the View to 2050, was released by an independent state science and technology advisory panel. It had two central findings: California can achieve emissions roughly 60% below 1990 levels with technology we largely know about today if such technology is rapidly deployed at rates that are aggressive but feasible. We could further reduce 2050 greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels with significant innovation and advancements in multiple technologies that eliminate emissions from fuels. All of these solutions would require intensive and sustained investment in new technologies plus innovation to bridge from the laboratory to reliable operating systems in relatively short timeframes. This report is an incredibly strong endorsement of the “deploy, deploy, deploy, research & develop, deploy, deploy, deploy,” strategy that I and others have been advocating. In fact, the report explicitly states that failing to adopt “Aggressive efficiency measures for buildings, industry and transportation” and “Aggressive electrification to avoid fossil fuel use” would “significantly increase the 2050 emissions.” Amazingly, Revkin asserts the exact opposite in “A Reality Check on Ambitious Climate Targets.” Certainly misreporting on energy and climate in the NY Times is legion, as we’ve seen. But Andy Revkin’s latest head-exploding post easily wins the “Charlie Sheen” award. A leading journalist and climate expert, Robert Collier, debunked Revkin’s “real spinning of the report” — see “Sticking the long knives into energy efficiency” (reposted below). It’s worth spending some time on this because the report’s actual conclusions and implications are very important to understand. I have long asserted that it is not possible to make a positive contribution to the climate debate if you don’t spell out what your emissions or temperature target (or range) is. Revkin’s post proves that conclusively, as I will show.

 Revkin’s glass-is-one-tenth-empty caption: “An analysis finds that California will not meet its climate target for 2050 even with a wartime-scale push on energy efficiency and installing non-polluting technologies like these solar panels in a housing subdivision in Rocklin.” Revkin claims in his post: Given that California is a best-case scenario\* compared to other states (and, of course, countries) far more dependent on coal, Long’s piece and the underlying report pose a strong challenge to those calling for a “deploy, deploy, deploy” approach to cutting climate risks. This is a link to – and swipe at — me, needless to say. Blunder number one is for Revkin to assert the report challenges the aggressive deployment strategy for meeting ambitious climate targets. Quite the reverse. The report makes clear that without aggressive deployment, the target can’t possibly be reached. Revkin added the asterisk (\*) because, buried way, way at the bottom of his post is this Postcript, In a Twitter reaction, Alan Nogee, the former clean-energy program director for the Union of Concerned Scientists, noted that California’s lack of coal dependence makes it more a worst case than a best case, because it doesn’t have a lot of coal emissions that might be relatively easily displaced. Duh. Rather than an asterisk, Revkin should simply remove his misleading error. The fact is that California has been pushing efficiency and low-carbon electricity aggressively since the 1970s. It is considerably more efficient in its use of energy than almost every other state. For a long time now the CO2 intensity of its electricity (CO2/Mwh) has been nearly half that of the rest of the nation. So obviously the rest of the country — which is far more coal-intensive and inefficient — has considerably more low-hanging fruit for emissions reductions. That’s blunder two. Blunder three is really the most amazing and amusing. Revkin appears to be unaware that a 60% reduction vs. 1990 levels is the target that the IPCC believes the rich countries (Annex I) should adopt if the goal is to stabilize at 550 ppm CO2-eq. I discussed the science underlying this at length two years ago. Here’s the key chart from the full Working Group III report (Box 13.7, page 776): Now 550 ppm CO2-equivalent is about 450 ppm CO2 (because of the warming from the other greenhouse gases), and it means ultimately stabilizing at 3°C (5.4°F) above preindustrial levels using the “best estimate” of climate sensitivity — see the IPCC’s Synthesis Report “Summary for Policymakers” (Table SPM.6). Of course, Revkin continues to this day to only endorse his vague R&D-focused “energy quest” and criticize those of us (including the National Academy of Sciences) who push for strong emissions reductions starting now. Since Revkin refuses to tell us what level of concentrations he thinks the world should aim for – even a broad range, say 450 ppm to 550 ppm — he retains the luxury of attacking those who are willing to state what their target is while maintaining a faux high ground that they are being politically unrealistic while he can pretend his essentially do-nothing do-little\* strategy is scientifically or morally viable, which it ain’t. That said, based on his new post, Revkin apparently thinks the target should be stronger than 550 ppm CO2-eq. After all, it’s quite clear from the California report, which he does not dispute, that we should be able to meet the 60% below 1990 levels target by aggressively deploying existing technology. And yet Revkin says the report is a strong challenge to those of us who believe our climate strategy should be based on aggressive deployment. So apparently that target is too weak for Revkin since you only need the major technology advances for the stronger target. On the other hand, it’s hard to believe that he supports the 450 ppm CO2-eq target, which is roughly stabilization at 2°C given the IPCC’s best estimate for climate sensitivity. He has spent so much time criticizing me and others who do lay out strategies to meet that target (and yes, those strategies include more R&D — everybody but the hard-core libertarians and fossil fuel types support more clean energy R&D). Moreover, if Revkin does believe in the stronger target, his post makes even less sense. He would be implying that because we can only go most of the way with existing technology therefore we MUST NOT START aggressive deployment until we have every piece of technology available. Otherwise, why not start aggressive deployment now? Obviously, the report he cites doesn’t take that absurd view since it would mean a staggeringly greater amount of emissions in the near term — which means we would need even more breakthroughs and an incomprehensibly fast rate of deployment. There just is no logic underlying Revkin’s post or his critique of aggresive deployment. The bottom line is that by failing to spell out what target or range he supports, Revkin’s critique of aggressive deployment implodes. Indeed, it backfires. It proves he cannot make a positive contribution to the debate until he spells out his climate target. For the record, I do not know a single environmentalist who would not gladly agree to a bill requiring a nation-wide 2050 GHG target of a 60% reduction below 1990 levels — with aggressive deployment plus R&D and a reevaluation of the target every 10 years based on advances in science and technology. Revkin seems painfully unaware of the fact that one of the best way to get major technology advances — if not the best way — is by deployment, not R&D (as I’ve explained many times, see “The breakthrough technology illusion“) and in any case the two aren’t mutually exclusive. Finally, it bears repeating that, as we learned in 2009, “The world will have to spend an extra $500 billion to cut carbon emissions for each year it delays implementing a major assault on global warming, the International Energy Agency said on Tuesday.” Aggressive deployment (along with more R&D) is the only cost-effective strategy if you want to avoid catastrophic global warming. Here is Collier’s must-read piece: Sticking the long knives into energy efficiency A new, authoritative study has concluded that California can reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent from 1990 levels by 2050 using technologies that already exist or are in demonstration. By nearly any measure, that’s good news. It shows that serious action on global warming is feasible right now and does not require futuristic technological breakthroughs that might never come to fruition.

### At renewable shift

**Takes a decade to scale up exports**

**Romm, 12** – Climate Progress editor, Ph.D. in physics from MIT

(Joe, American Progress fellow, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy, "Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Is Still Bad For The Climate — And A Very Poor Long-Term Investment," Think Progress, 8-16-12, thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/16/699601/exporting-liquefied-natural-gas-lng-bad-for-climate-poor-long-term-investment/?mobile=nc, accessed 8-16-12, mss)

The NY Times piece actually makes this odd argument on behalf of LNG exports: “It will take **years** before any export terminals are up and running — in the meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen safeguards so that gas is extracted safely.” But this is yet another reason why LNG exports make no sense. Why would we want to start massive exports of natural gas around the **end of this decade**, with costly new infrastructure that until mid-century?

#### There’s a tradeoff – sunk costs and investment.

Bramleys 2011

Matthew, Director of Research, Pembina Institute and PhD in theoretical chemistry from Cambridge, former Director of Pembina’s Climate Change Program, Is Natural Gas a Climate Change Solution for Canada?, <http://www.davidsuzuki.org/publications/downloads/2011/DSF-Pembina-NatGas-web.pdf>

An issue that is not fully addressed in the scenarios developed in economic modelling studies, or in other proposals that focus on meeting near- or medium-term GHG targets, is the risk that if new infrastructure continues to be built for the production and use of natural gas without CCS, it may become a barrier to meeting long-term GHG objectives. For example, as noted in Section 1.4, replacement of coal by natural gas in electricity generation could potentially make a significant contribution to meeting the near-term national GHG target to which the U.S. has committed (17 per cent below the 2005 level by 2020). But would the owners of new gas-fired power plants built in the next few years willingly cease to operate them – or accept the costs of converting them to CCS – soon after 2020, as the U.S. pushed for deeper GHG reductions? Even if gas-fired power plants need operate only for 20 years or so to justify their relatively low capital costs, their owners will nonetheless want them to generate revenues for as long as possible. Recent comments by the IEA’s Chief Economist, Fatih Birol, lend weight to this concern: Birol warns that efforts to tackle climate change through renewable energy are under threat from the unconventional gas revolution, and notes that the shale gas boom in the U.S. has contributed to a sharp drop in investment in renewable energy. 224 As noted earlier (see Table 10), the IEA’s “450 scenario” does not significantly expand gas-fired electricity generation capacity in the U.S. but focuses instead on a long-term expansion of renewable electricity. However, in the near term it falls short of the U.S. GHG target for 2020. 225 There are two further reasons to be reticent about building new infrastructure for the production and use of natural gas without CCS, even when economic models indicate that it is consistent with ambitious GHG reduction scenarios. First, modelling scenarios are generally based on a carbon price that starts low and steadily increases. But it can be argued that a more economically rational way to address climate change would be to adopt a fixed “budget” for total emissions between now and a distant year such as 2050, and then set the carbon price accordingly. (This could notionally be implemented using a cap-and-trade system with a single multi-decade compliance period.) Under this approach the carbon price would be high from the outset – and it could well rule out any new investments in natural gas combustion without CCS. Second, recent science indicates that even at relatively low atmospheric GHG concentrations, the impacts of climate change may be much more severe than previously thought. 226 This suggests that governments need to do all they reasonably can to avoid any new sources of GHG emissions. 227

#### No – coal switch and liquefication means an increase in CO2.

EIA 2012

Energy Information Administration, Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets, January 2012, http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe\_lng.pdf

On average from 2015 to 2035 under Reference case conditions, decreased natural gas consumption as a result of added exports are countered proportionately by increased coal consumption (72 percent), increased liquid fuel consumption (8 percent), other increased consumption, such as from renewable generation sources (9 percent), and decreases in total consumption (11 percent). In the earlier years, the amount of natural gas to coal switching is greater, and coal plays a more dominant role in replacing the decreased levels of natural gas consumption, which also tend to be greater in the earlier years. Switching from natural gas to coal is less significant in later years, partially as a result of a greater proportion of switching into renewable generation. As a result decreased natural gas consumption from added exports more directly results in decreased total energy consumption via the end-use consumer cutting back energy use in response to higher prices. This basic pattern similarly occurs under the Low Shale EUR and High Economic Growth cases – less switching from natural gas into coal and more into renewable than under Reference case conditions, as well as greater decreases in total energy consumption as a result of added exports. While lower domestic natural gas deliveries resulting from added exports reduce natural gas related CO2 emissions, the increased use of coal in the electric sector generally results in a net increase in overall CO2 emissions. The exceptions occur in environments when renewables are better able to compete against natural gas and coal. However, when also accounting for emissions related to natural gas used in the liquefaction process, additional exports increase CO2 levels under all cases and export scenarios, particularly in the earlier years of the projection period. Table 2 displays the cumulative CO2 emissions levels from 2015 to 2035 in all cases and scenarios, with the change relative to the associated baseline case.

#### Doesn’t raise prices – new investment.

BOUDREAUX 2012

Donald J. Boudreaux is a professor of economics at George Mason University, Let America’s Gas Industry Boom, December 16 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/let\_america\_gas\_industry\_boom\_tp8U0EtNyDPRHvtiobMw0J

The argument that exporting gas would lead to significantly higher energy prices at home suffers two notable flaws. First, it’s overstated. Charles Ebinger, director of the Brookings Energy Security Initiative, recently released a study showing that allowing natural-gas exports would have a “very minimal” impact on domestic prices. The consulting firm Deloitte projects that allowing exports would cause a 20-year price increase of just 1.7 percent. This isn’t surprising. With their market spanning the globe rather than merely the United States, American producers would build larger-scale and more efficient production facilities, as well as invest more in exploration and cutting-edge research. These “supply-side” effects would push gas prices downward.

### Israel

#### Israel will approve exports soon but US LNG derails it.

Simpkins 2012

Jason, Editor in Chief of Oil and Energy Daily, December 3 2012, The Clock is Ticking on Israel’s Game-Changing Gas Find, http://www.oilandenergydaily.com/2012/12/03/the-clock-is-ticking-on-israels-game-changing-gas-find/

With Woodside’s technology and know-how, Israel could soon find itself exporting as much as 18 trillion cubic feet of gas. The Israeli government simply has to finalize its decision to move forward with LNG exports, allowing Noble and its partners to decide on an LNG export terminal. To that end, the group has two options. First, Noble is looking to build a $5 billion LNG plant in either Israel or Cyprus. It’s more likely to be in Cyprus, which has already approved the construction of an LNG plant on its southern shore. A second option would be a floating LNG terminal – a $3 billion vessel that would anchor close to the natural gas field and liquefy the product onsite. South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering has already agreed to build one for Tamar, and Gazprom has agreed to buy the gas. Either way, Israel and the consortium must act quickly. In addition to producing and liquefying the gas, Noble and its partners must obtain long-term LNG purchase agreements. That means they’ll have to compete with other gas fields worldwide. And with the U.S. shale boom creating a huge gas glut at home, competition is heating up. Of course, with the United States dragging its feet on approving gas exports, Israel is ahead of the game. But it won’t be long before the U.S. wakes up and realizes the potential of its own natural gas bounty. Woodside CEO Peter Coleman expects the United States to export as much as 50 million metric tons of the fuel by 2025, while other analysts put that figure closer to 100 million. Still, if Israel and its partners act fast, they’ll be dealing with Europe and reaping the rewards in less than a decade. And “the chase” continues.

#### It’s a question of sequencing – long term contracts. Means the US pushes out Israel but not the other way around.

Korporaal 2012

Glenda, The Australian, Cost risks for LNG producers as rivals ramp up, December 7 2012, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/cost-risks-for-lng-producers-as-rivals-ramp-up/story-e6frg9of-1226531673145

As Coleman deals with the rising cost of doing business in Australia he is also aware of the increasing sources of competitive gas coming on stream globally. Since taking over as Woodside chief executive in May last year, Coleman has moved to diversify the company's interests, which have so far been heavily centred on Western Australia. In May, when Financial Services Minister Bill Shorten visited Israel, he was asked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for Australian assistance in developing Israel's offshore natural gas industry. Some six weeks ago Coleman visited Israel to meet the Prime Minister and other executives in the Israel oil and gas industry. The result was this week's announcement that Woodside would take a 30 per cent interest in the Leviathan gasfield in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Israel, paying an upfront fee of almost $700 million. Coleman said the deal was "a significant step towards realising Woodside's ambition to secure world-class growth opportunities". Getting foreign interest in developing Israel's offshore gas fields has not been easy given the potential for it to affect an investing company's ties with Middle Eastern countries, and other possible security issues. Resource-poor Israel as a gas producer and a potential exporter? Who knew? Woodside is also looking at the potential of other opportunities in Myanmar, the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Cyprus and the US. Australia has always been in a competitive situation as an LNG exporter, particularly against countries in the Middle East, but the US energy boom has dramatically changed the supply equation again. As costs are rising here, buyers in the future could be looking to choose from an increasing array of suppliers. The US is cutting back on its oil imports and has allowed one company, Cheniere Energy, a licence to export LNG from the Gulf of Mexico. Its terminal, which is being converted from an LNG importing terminal to one that can handle exports, is expected to begin exporting from 2015. The US Department of Energy is now considering whether to approve more permits from companies wanting to export gas. US energy expert Karen Harbert, who is visiting Australia this week for a conference yesterday on energy security hosted by the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, expects that a decision could come within months, if not weeks. The outlook for LNG exporters such as Woodside could hang on how much the DoE decides to open up the export market. In contrast to Australia, which freely allows commodity exports, gas exports in the US are restricted. Gas exports are a sensitive political issue with the general view that most of the supply should be kept for the domestic market. Harbert, who runs the Institute for 21st Century Energy, an arm of the Washington-based US Chamber of Commerce, believes that the DoE will allow more gas exports but it will be far from open slather. She argues that US gas exports will not really compete with those from Australia on the basis that "there is enough opportunity for everyone". But the prospect of the US becoming a gas exporter is already having an impact on world gas prices and expectations of future prices. Asked about the potential impact of US gas exports on the Australian LNG market at the conference yesterday, Drew Clarke, the secretary of the federal Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, pointed out that existing LNG projects in Australia are going ahead on the basis of contracts already locked in with buyers. But he said the real issue could be how it affected future investments in new projects here. "If North America - the US and Canada - starts exporting gas to the Pacific basin it will change the market dynamics and Australian producers will have to respond to that," he said. The world energy supply situation is changing at a time when costs in Australia are rising. The implications for a country which has been riding on the back of its energy and resource exports for so long could be profound.

#### ---Middle East instability causes nuclear war --- A variety of factors make traditional deterrence models inapplicable.

Russell 2009

James A., senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Spring, http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Greek oil solves their debt crisis but need Israeli protection.

Engdahl 2012

F. William, Visiting Professor in Economics at Beijing University of Chemical Technology, author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics in the New World Order, Rising Energy Tensions in the Aegean—Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, http://www.4thmedia.org/2012/03/06/rising-energy-tensions-in-the-aegean%E2%80%94greece-turkey-cyprus-syria/

According to one Greek analyst, Aristotle Vassilakis, “surveys already done that have measured the amount of natural gas estimate it to reach some nine trillion dollars.” [3] Even if only a fraction of that is available, it would transform the finances of Greece and the entire region. Tulane University oil expert David Hynes told an audience in Athens recently that Greece could potentially solve its entire public debt crisis through development of its new-found gas and oil. He conservatively estimates that exploitation of the reserves already discovered could bring the country more than €302 billion over 25 years. The Greek government instead has just been forced to agree to huge government layoffs, wage cuts and pension cuts to get access to a second EU and IMF loan that will only drive the country deeper into an economic decline. [4] Notably, the IMF and EU governments, among them Germany, demand instead that Greece sell off its valuable ports and public companies, among them of course, Greek state oil companies, to reduce state debt. Under the best of conditions the asset selloffs would bring the country perhaps €50 billion.[5] Plans call for the Greek state-owned natural gas company, DEPA, to privatize 65% of its shares to reduce debt.[6] Buyers would likely come from outside the country, as few Greek companies are in a position in the crisis to take it. One significant problem, aside from the fact the IMF demands Greece selloff its public oil interests, is the fact that Greece has not declared a deeper exclusive economic zone like most other countries which drill for oil. There was seen little need until now. An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) gives a state special mineral rights in its declared waters under the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force in November 1994. Under UNCLOS III, a nation can claim an EEZ of 200 nautical miles from its coastline.[7] Turkey has previously stated it would consider it an act of war if Greece drilled further into the Aegean. [8] Until now that did not seem to have serious economic consequences, as no oil or gas reserves were known. Now it’s an entirely different ballgame. Evangelos Kouloumbis, former Greek Industry Minister recently stated that Greece could cover “50% its needs with the oil to be found in offshore fields in the Aegean Sea, and the only obstacle to that is the Turkish opposition for an eventual Greek exploitation.”[9]

### Belarus

#### Relations are key to stabilize Belarus.

Trenin 2011

Dmitri, Deputy Director Carnegie Moscow Center, Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood, Centre for European Reform Essays, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay\_russia\_trenin\_sept05-2151.pdf

Of all the countries in the common neighbourhood, Belarus harbours the most risks for the EU-Russia relationship. The EU seeks to boycott the regime of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, which it considers illegitimate. The EU has thus imposed a visa ban on Belarusian top officials and excluded the country from the E N P. As Belarus has become more authoritarian, the EU has looked to Russia to exert some positive influence on its smaller neighbour. But the Kremlin has been reluctant to move against Lukashenka, who has styled himself as the only truly pro-Russian leader in the region. In the last two years, the situation has grown increasingly tense. Exploiting widespread insecurity after the September 2004 Beslan hostage crisis, Lukashenka managed to win a re f e rendum on whether he should be allowed to run for a third term as president – in dire c t violation of the laws he had himself promulgated. Since then, Belarus has been a constant irritant in Russia’s relations with the EU – as well as with the US. President George Bush has called Belarus the “last dictatorship in Europe”; and Secre t a ry of State Condoleezza Rice has met with exiled leaders of the Belarusian opposition. Tensions are likely to rise further ahead of the presidential poll scheduled for September 2006. Putin has been lukewarm at best about plans for a Russian-Belarusian union that were devised by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin is said to detest Lukashenka personally, and he realises that the Minsk leader is not only a liability for Russia-US relations but also, and more importantly, a key obstacle to furthering Russian economic interests in Belarus. Nevertheless, Lukashenka remains a close, if difficult ally. The Kremlin’s half-hearted attempts to make him dance to Russia’s tune have failed. As long as the Kremlin remains indecisive about what to do, Lukashenka can continue to make mischief at Moscow’s expense. For example, he defies the attempts of Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, to make Belarus pay for gas deliveries at world prices. He effectively bars private Russian investment in Belarus. He drags his feet on accepting the Russian rouble as the currency for the long-planned Russo-Belarusian union. He censors or bans the Russian media in his country. And he can still wangle support and subsidies from Moscow. The Kremlin is afraid that turning against Lukashenka will result in ‘losing Belarus’ to the West. As Moscow insiders say: “Lukashenka is a bastard, but at least he’s our bastard.” The Kremlin’s call Both Moscow and the EU would be well advised not to underestimate Lukashenka’s political skills and his instincts for survival. Despite his dictatorial practices, Lukashenka remains popular with around one-third of the electorate, and he retains strongholds in rural areas. The political opposition may have western sympathies, but it remains weak, divided and marginalised. Lukashenka periodically shakes up the country’s elites, to keep potential opponents or challengers at bay and to prevent opposition forces from consolidating. The regime has destroyed the country’s big businesses and bullied smaller ones into passivity or submission. In such an environment, anti-Lukashenka and pro-democracy rallies would hardly threaten the regime. Rather, they would give Lukashenka an opportunity to condemn them as the work of western agitators. If opposition demonstrators (or the police agents provocateurs among them) engaged in acts of violence, Lukashenka would have a pretext to use force against them. Any bloodshed in the streets of Minsk would present Putin with a tricky choice: should he condemn Russia’s only ‘true ally’ in the Commonwealth of Independent States and risk seeing it become another ‘Ukraine’ (pro-Western, anti-Russian)? Or should he politically support Lukashenka, as he supported Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov, during recent disturbances there? There are, of course, big geopolitical differences between Belarus and Uzbekistan, so the consequences of Putin’s actions would be very different. The EU cares little about Uzbekistan, but disagreements over Belarus could chill, even freeze, EU-Russia relations. Such disagreements could shape the attitudes of Europe’s publics and elites towards Russia. And they could influence the Russian authorities’ domestic policies and their general attitude to ‘western influence’ in Russia.

#### ---Belarusian instability draws in the U.S., Russia, and goes nuclear.

Carpenter 1997

Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense Policy @ Cato Institute, “NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 1: The Border between Poland and Belarus”, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 44, 9-16, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb044.pdf

The Powder Keg on the Polish-Belarusian Border Admitting Poland to NATO involves two related dangers. One is that Poland's highly unstable neighbor may suffer the fate of other states with repressive political systems and moribund economies: a violent convulsion. We havewitnessed that development in such places as Somalia, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Zaire. It shouldbe noted that, in every case, the chaos created serious problems for neighboring states. If fighting erupted in Belarus--and the ingredients are all in place for a conflagration--it is highly unlikely that Poland would remain unaffected. Yet there would be multiple risks to NATO if it took action to stabilize its new member's eastern border. In addition to the prospect of being sucked into a Bosnia-style morass, there would be the danger of a confrontation with Russia. Belarus is a weakened Russia's last strategic ally in Europe. Russian leaders would undoubtedly be alarmed by any NATO military initiatives involving Belarus, whether those actions were for the purpose of containment or the more ambitious objective of nation building. Moscow's reluctant acquiescence in the first round of NATO enlargement was conditioned on what Russian officials considered solemn promises in the Founding Act. One crucial provision states that NATO "reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Moscow might well view the deployment of NATO troops in eastern Poland to deal with instability in Belarus as a violation of that pledge. Yet if the alliance failed to act, Poland (and the other new members) would have reason to question the credibility of the security commitments they had been given. Even the possibility of the United States' becoming entangled in a political and military quagmire on the frontier between Poland and Belarus should be ample reason for the Senate to reject the administration's plan to enlarge NATO. The danger that such a development could result in a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia reinforces that point. If expansion is approved, the United States risks being blindsided by a conflict that advocates of NATO enlargement never anticipated and that would have no relevance to the security interests of the American people.

### Russia turn

#### Framing issue – Russia will be unable to meet future demand which limits their leverage. 1NC Closson evidence indicates EU demand will increase by SEVENTY PERCENT but Russia’s resource sector can’t produce that output. BUT Russia is still dependent on the EU in this scenario, means we get all our turns but they get none of their impacts.

#### Won’t be used as a weapon – Russian interests and review processes.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

Proponents of partnership argue that Russian investments in the European market will require Russian businesses to act in a more transparent, accountable, and responsible manner. As Russian companies integrate their up-, mid-, and downstream business, they are more likely to be responsible suppliers to European customers, given that disruptions would directly hurt their interests. Among those espousing partnership arc European bureaucrats working on the EU Russia Energy Dialogue and European energy company directors cooperating with Russia in joint projects, such as E.ON Ruhrgas, EN1, Total, and Statoil.40 Other advocates of this approach are Russian energy analysts who document the objectives of Russian state-owned energy companies investing in Europe, such as Gazprom." It is a fact that as Russian companies invest in European assets, Ihcy are increasingly bound by European law and regulations. Furthermore, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy and Transport has announced that projects such as Nord Stream will be subject to review. These measures, it is argued, should ensure that Russia's investments in the EU's common economic space advance Europe's energy security objectives, while also strengthening the interdependent relationship based on a mutually acceptable legal framework.

#### No risk of their turns – weak Russia is more aggressive and interdependence gives the EU leverage.

Closson 2008

Stacy, Visiting Professor at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Russia’s key customer: Europe. http://www.rect.muni.cz/summerschool/International\_Security/Module%203/Closson\_89\_108.pdf

The second possibility for Russia's future in the European energy market is the prospect, of confrontation. Russia could operate in a non-transparent and sometimes challenging manner, deterring investments in its internal markets, monopolizing investments in the CIS, and using various points of leverage to assert itself more forcefully in Europe's energy sector. Those who believe that this trend will dominate future relations warn that Russia will gain a firm foothold in domestic EU politics as a result of many of the European states' dependency on Russian gas supplies." Some believe that Russia is planning to take over internal generation facilities and distribution networks in Europe, linking them to the larger supply networks, thus dominating a chain that would eventually put Russia in a politically advantageous position. There is much speculation as to the potential for Russia to. for example, gain an unofficial, yet significant veto on issues by threatening to halt oil and gas supplies to European states.51 Contentious issues at the moment include the installation of a missile defense system in Central Europe (Poland and the Czech Republic), the support of many European states for the independence of Kosovo, and NATO expansion into the former Soviet space (Georgia and Ukraine). On the other hand, confrontation could result from a weakened Russia. Should the EU remain Russia's primary market, it could be in a stronger position in the future to apply more effective sanctions against Russia in the case of a major disagreement.\*4 Conversely, some analysts predict that Russia's energy sector will be unable to sustain current levels of development, state enterprises will stagnate, and new fields will not be brought on-stream in time to meet both growing domestic and European demand." The growth rate of added value in the extractive industries sector for hydrocarbons slowed from 7.9 percent in 2(HM to 1.9 percent in 2005.56 In 2005, Gazprom registered only a 0.5 percent increase in the volume of extracted gas as compared to the previous year, despite its absorption of minor independent gas producers." The same trends held steady through 2007. Should Gazprom be unable to meet supply commitments to Europe, then European gas companies could eliminate the take-or-pay conditions in their contracts with Russia, meaning that they would no longer agree to pay for a fixed amount of gas even when a lesser amount is actually used. This, in turn, would threaten Gazprom's ability to borrow for future development projects.51

## 1nr

### Education

#### Agent specification is a uniquely important issue on energy policy topics

Annual Review of Energy 76

<http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435>

Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy Annual Review of Energy

Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976)

DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

The ultimate effectiveness of any policy is largely dependent on the individual efficacy and coordination of the agents or agencies that implement it. There are ample illustrations of the truth of this premise in the recent attempts by the Administration and Congress to formulate and implement a national energy policy, as a result, that policy, irrespective of any intrinsic soundness, could inevitably become trapped in a quagmire of regulatory policies and practices. The difficulties that energy policymakers in the United States have experienced in 1974 and 1975 arc in many respects symptomatic of the very problem that they have intended to resolve—the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated national energy policy. Decisions concerning energy supply and general policy that have been made over the years have contributed to the creation of areas of special concern and interest, institutionalized them, and nourished them through dedicated sponsorship by either the Congress, the Executive Branch, the independent federal agencies, or industry. The difficulties that stymied congressional consideration and executive implementation of an effective energy policy in 1974 and the first half of 1975 mirror this state of affairs.

### A2: CP illegitimate

#### ---Bonding is a core piece of the environmental restriction structure that regulates natural gas production

Davis-Professor of Economic Analysis, Berkeley-6/12

Modernizing Bonding Requirements for Natural Gas Producers

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20bonds%20davis/06\_bonds\_davis

Bonding requirements complement traditional regulation. Natural gas producers are subject to a wide range of environmental regulations. According to the American Petroleum Institute (2010): “A comprehensive set of federal, state, and local laws addresses every aspect of exploration and production operations. These include well design, location, spacing, operation, water and waste management and disposal, air emissions, wildlife protection, surface impacts, and health and safety.” In addition, natural gas producers are subject to the Clean Water Act, which regulates surface water discharges and reinjections of water into underground wells. Since the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, policymakers have understood that bonding requirements can help ensure enforcement of existing regulations. The regulations describe, for example, how drilling sites must be reclaimed when production has been completed. Regulations outline what needs to be done, but the bond helps ensure that resources are available to pay for it, even if the producer no longer exists or does not have the necessary financial resources. Bonding also helps with enforcement more broadly. Regulating natural gas producers is challenging because production is geographically dispersed at thousands of sites in more than a dozen states. To have regulators at each location would be prohibitively expensive. 14 Hydraulic fracturing is also highly technical, requiring expert regulators. Regulators could be on a drilling site twenty-four hours a day, but if they do not understand engineering, well construction, and groundwater protection, they are going to be of little use. Moreover, there continues to be rapid technological innovation, so regulators need constant training to keep up with the industry. And if an engineer knows enough to be a good regulator, he or she will be highly valued by producers, and thus command high salaries.The Hamilton Project • Brookings 23 In addition to complementing existing regulation and industry self-policing, bonding requirements help mitigate environmental damages, even when the risks are poorly understood. Every drilling site has unique challenges and issues, and to expect regulators to correctly anticipate all possible environmental risks is unrealistic. Hydraulic fracturing techniques are evolving rapidly—even enumerating the different potential risks is challenging, let alone drafting effective regulations for all dimensions of well construction and production. What a bond does is put gas producers at the center. Producers are in a much better position than regulators to understand the potential environmental risks of particular projects.

### 2NC Must Read-Turns the Case

Increased bond requirements is critical to shoring up support for natural gas production---stops proliferation of state bans and builds support for increased markets like exports and vehicles. Also avoids politics.

Davis-Professor of Economic Analysis, Berkeley-6/12

Modernizing Bonding Requirements for Natural Gas Producers

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20bonds%20davis/06\_bonds\_davis

The immense supply of natural gas made possible by hydraulic fracturing is an enormous boon to the United States. Just when it seemed the United States would be crippled under mounting energy costs into the distant future, technological innovations opened up the natural gas equivalent of Saudi Arabia right under our feet. The challenge for policymakers is how to allow the continued development of these valuable resources while ensuring environmentally safe drilling. The purpose of bonding requirements is to force producers to take potential environmental damages into account when making decisions. Bonds provide a source of funds for cleanups when necessary, but, more importantly, bonds provide an incentive for producers to avoid environmental damages altogether. This approach makes a great deal of sense, but the legislation has not been updated in more than fifty years. Minimum bond amounts are woefully inadequate, particularly given the risks associated with advanced drilling techniques. This proposal outlines concrete steps to take to modernize bonding requirements. Minimum bond amounts would be increased substantially for drilling on federal lands, and states would be encouraged to adopt similar minimum bond amounts for non-federal lands. In addition, provisions that now allow companies to meet requirements with blanket bonds would be eliminated, preventing average bond amounts per well from falling to unreasonably low levels. Much is at stake both for the environment and for the economy. For natural gas producers, this proposal represents a much preferred alternative to the drilling moratoria that have been enacted, for example, in the state of New York. Supporting stronger bonding requirements would demonstrate the industry’s commitment to environmental protection, and reduce the risk of more states taking steps to ban hydraulic fracturing altogether. Stronger bonding requirements also could help broaden the market for natural gas. There has been much discussion, for example, about increasing the use of natural gas in transportation, and about constructing liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals for exporting natural gas. Much of the reticence among policymakers goes back to environmental risks, and these concerns can be reduced by committing to stronger bonding requirements.

### A2: Cost/Solvency Deficit

Solvency deficit is tiny---increase is bond requirement is still small compared to size of natural gas market.

Davis-Professor of Economic Analysis, Berkeley-6/12

Modernizing Bonding Requirements for Natural Gas Producers

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20bonds%20davis/06\_bonds\_davis

Current minimum bond amounts are too low to ensure adequate environmental protection. Minimum bond amounts were set in nominal dollars and have never been adjusted for inflation. During this period the price of everything has gone up, including the price of environmental cleanups. A $10,000 bond per lease is not enough even to pay for routine site reclamation expenses (GAO 2010a, Mitchell and Casman 2011) and is negligible compared to the costs that are incurred when accidents happen. This proposal would increase the minimum bond amount to adjust for inflation. Since the minimum dollar amount was set more than fifty years ago, prices have increased about sixfold (see Figure 6). Adjusting for inflation, the minimum bond amount would increase to $60,000. With approximately five wells per lease, about $12,000 per well is still a relatively modest bond. This amount would then be permanently indexed against inflation to ensure that the value does not decrease over time. The increase would take effect for new wells only, and the minimum bond amount would remain the same throughout the life of a well. Thus, for example, a gas producer would not be required to post additional assets to existing bonds even if the real value of those bonds falls over time. Increasing minimum bond amounts to account for inflation is an important first step to protecting the environment from potential damages. A strong argument could be made, moreover, for further increasing minimum bond amounts above $60,000. As discussed above, hydraulic fracturing is riskier than the traditional techniques for which this legislation was designed. Hydraulic fracturing requires injecting large quantities of chemically treated water into the wellbore, which increases the probability of damaging surface spills. These wells also tend to be at higher depths where gas is under higher pressure, thus increasing the chances of groundwater contamination, blowouts, and other types of problems. Of course, some states already have substantially higher minimum bond amounts than what is being proposed. New York State, for example, has a maximum potential bond amount per deep well of $250,000, the highest listed for any state, in addition to stringent water-use restrictions which effectively have created a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing. The only state that has an explicit moratorium is Vermont, which instituted legislation banning hydraulic fracturing in May 2012, although Vermont has few if any known reserves (Gram 2012). Consequently, a strong argument can be made for imposing a minimum bond amount higher than $60,000 per lease for wells constructed using hydraulic fracturing. Determining what the correct minimum bond amount would be, is difficult. These drilling techniques are evolving rapidly so the empirical evidence on the economic and environmental costs of the potential environmental damages is limited. Moreover the optimal bond amount depends not only on the dollar value of potential damages but also on the probability with which different outcomes occur. Reliable estimates of these probabilities, and how these probabilities would change under different bond amounts, are not available. This uncertainty strengthens the case for increasing minimum bond amounts. Given that the environmental risks from hydraulic fracturing are so poorly understood, larger bonds could be viewed as a conservative approach to policy-making as more information is collected. At a minimum, the increased use of hydraulic fracturing means that this is a particularly opportune time to update these amounts for inflation. Doubling required minimum bond amounts relative to the minimum for traditional wells, for example, would probably make sense given the higher level of environmental risks and higher expected costs of reclaiming these well sites. The purpose of strengthening bonding requirements is to mitigate, not completely fix, the misalignment of incentives. Even after adjusting for inflation, the bonds would be small compared to the environmental costs from a severe accident. Widespread groundwater contamination, for example, could impose hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, for which a $60,000 bond would be woefully inadequate. States would, as we discuss below, be encouraged to consider bond amounts that exceed federal minimums. This would benefit, in particular, states where natural gas drilling brings large environmental risks. In setting minimum bond amounts, it is important to recognize that to completely eliminate the misalignment of incentives would require companies to post a very large bond, imposing substantial costs on natural gas producers. For example, requiring producers to post a $1 billion bond would segment the market, effectively excluding all small and medium-sized producers. Even just adjusting for inflation, however, would improve incentives for good environmental management. Increasing the liability of gas producers, even modestly, would help induce them to make better choices, and updating minimum bond amounts would help ensure that natural gas producers reclaim drilling sites after production is completed. Increasing minimum bond amounts would have only a small impact on the natural gas market. There are approximately 18,000 natural gas development wells drilled per year in the United States. At $12,000 per well, this would be $216 million going into bonds annually. But keep in mind that the natural gas market is very large. Total U.S. domestic production in 2010 was 26.9 trillion cubic feet. At $3 per cubic foot, this is an $81 billion market annually. Total domestic production from unconventional sources was 12.8 trillion cubic feet, so at $3 per thousand cubic feet, this is $38 billion annually. 7 The “Costs and Benefits” section below provides additional context.

### A2: Perm-Do Both/Do the CP

#### ---The Counterplan doesn’t reduce restrictions

#### A. It adds a restriction in the form of a lease stipulation

Bureau of Ocean Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 10

<http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/stips/stip_ovr.html>

Lease Stipulations

Lease stipulations are legally binding requirements that are made a part of every oil and gas lease document as and if appropriate. They are developed and implemented on a sale by sale basis and are applied to individual leases based on specific instructions in the applicable Final Notice of Sale Package. Stipulations place restrictions and operating requirements on lessees. This may involve protection of environmentally sensitive organisms or communities that exist in the area covered by the lease, conflicts with other uses such as military operations, LNG or sand extraction. Stipulations change from sale to sale as new information about species and communities is obtained. The specific language of a stipulation is developed in consultation with other interested State and Federal agencies

#### Moreover, it is an access restriction

EIA 1

U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Mid-Term Prospects for Natural Gas Supply

<http://205.254.135.7/oiaf/servicerpt/natgas/chapter2.html>

Reducing Federal access restrictions in the Rocky Mountains and OCS is expected to increase the available resource base by 87 trillion cubic feet, which would expand the available lower 48 resource base from 1,190 to 1,277 trillion cubic feet, a 7-percent increase. Reducing Federal access restrictions does not imply that all land restrictions would be removed. An estimated 62.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources would remain unavailable for development, for example, in National Parks, National Monuments, and wilderness and roadless areas, as well as areas currently precluded by the effect of statutes and regulations. Onshore Resources Of the natural gas resources yet to be developed in the onshore United States, those subject to Federal access restrictions are located primarily in the Rocky Mountain region.54 The Rocky Mountain region contains approximately 37 percent (293 trillion cubic feet) of the remaining unproved technically recoverable natural gas resources in the lower 48 onshore United States (Figure 10).55,56 In the onshore, only the Gulf Coast Region at 24 percent approaches in magnitude this region’s endowment. Most of the Rocky Mountain resources, however, need to be subjected to a significant degree of stimulation (e.g., hydraulic fracturing) or other “unconventional” production techniques in order to attain sufficiently economic levels of production. These unconventional natural gas resources consist of three basic types: gas in low permeability sandstones (tight sands), gas in low permeability shales (gas shales), and gas in coal formations (coalbed methane). Tight sands account for 65 percent of the unproved natural gas resources in the Rocky Mountains. The rest of the Rocky Mountain unconventional resources, 16 percent of the region’s total resources, are mostly coalbed methane and a small amount of gas shales. The remaining 19 percent of total unproved resources in the Rocky Mountain Region are conventional natural gas resources, primarily in higher permeability sandstone or carbonate reservoirs.

The 293.3 trillion cubic feet of unproved Rocky Mountain natural gas resources are subject to a variety of access restrictions (Table 4). Of that amount, 33.6 trillion cubic feet is officially off limits to either drilling or surface occupancy (No Access - Legal). Included in this category are those areas where drilling is precluded by statute (e.g., national parks and wilderness areas) and by administrative decree (e.g., “wilderness re-inventoried areas” and “roadless areas”). Also included are those areas of a lease where surface occupancy is prohibited by stipulation to protect identified resources such as the habitats of endangered species of plants and animals. An additional 57.7 trillion cubic feet of the resources are judged to be currently de facto off limits57 because of the prohibitive effect of compliance with environmental and pipeline regulations created under such laws as the National Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Air Quality Act, and the Clean Water Act58 (No Access - De Facto). Of the 202 trillion cubic feet of resources that are accessible, 50.8 trillion cubic feet are located in areas where Federal lease stipulations affect the costs and timing of development (Access - Lease Stipulated). The lease stipulations are set by either the U.S. Bureau of Land Management or the U.S. Forest Service. The remaining 151.2 trillion cubic feet of unproved Rocky Mountain natural gas resources are located either on Federal land without lease stipulations or on private land and are fully accessible subject to standard lease terms with no lease stipulations (Access - Standard Lease Terms). These 151.2 trillion cubic feet of resources are currently available for development.

#### B. severs reduce-reduce means to diminish in size i.e. net reduction

Merriam-Webster’s dictionary 2010, Britannica Online

Reduce: to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number

#### C. Severance is illegitimate-in a world where the affirmative can pick and choose which parts of the plan to advocate, no counterplan would compete.

#### ---The conditional nature of the counterplan competes

#### A. The plan removes restrictions on energy production-the counterplan does not mandate a reduction in restrictions. Access to production is contingent on the increased bond requirement.

#### B. substantial reduction implies real or tangible reduction-the permutation is a conditional not substantive reduction.

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996 (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substantially)

1 a : of or relating to substance b : not illusory : having merit substantial constitutional claim> c : having importance or significance : MATERIAL substantial step had not been taken toward commission of the crime —W. Railroad LaFave and A. W. Scott, Junior>

2 : considerable in quantity : significantly great substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter —U.S. Code> —compare DE MINIMIS — sub•stan•ti•al•i•ty /-"stan-chE-'a-l&-tE/ noun — sub•stan•tial•ly adverb

#### C. should is mandatory

A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Bryan A Garner, scholar of the English Language, March 2001

Should. Oddly, should, like may, q.v., is sometimes used to create mandatory standards, as in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. In that code, in which “[t]he canons...establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated,” six of the seven canons begin, “A Judge should...” See ought (b) & shall.

### CP K2 Solve environment

Weak regulation of deepwater oil and gas production is a major risk to overall ocean health and biodiversity

Hull-LLM University of Florida-11 29 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1

ARTICLE: Crude Injustice in the Gulf: Why Categorical Exclusions for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico Are Inconsistent with U.S. and International Ocean Law and Policy

D. Deepwater Environments-The Last Frontier

 Deepwater environments are critically important to the healthy functioning of the world's oceans. Historically, however, environmental concern over marine resources has focused on the coastal waters - near shore areas less than 200 meters deep - where most commercially important marine species are found. 49 This area comprises less than 5% of the world's oceans, and its health and productivity depend on the remaining 95% of the deepwater ocean. 50 In fact, a large fraction of biodiversity and biomass production in coastal areas is directly linked to and dependent upon deep sea ecosystems. 51 Although relatively little is known about inhabitants of deep sea environment, those organisms studied to date show common traits of slow growth, late maturity, slow reproduction, long life (200 years in some cases), and low productivity. 52 These traits have important implications for the sustainable management and use of deep-sea resources. 53 Absent effective management strategies, deepwater species and their associated ecosystems can quickly be depleted below sustainable levels. 54 UNEP recommended that governments incorporate precautionary approaches to manage deepwater environments that take into account the full range and cumulative effects of potential human activities and impacts, and added, "the conservation and sustainable use of the vulnerable ecosystems and biodiversity in deep waters and high seas are among the most critical ocean issues and environmental challenges today." 55 [\*12] As the oil industry moves its activities into deeper water to find oil reserve, the risk of harm increases. As UNEP noted: As human activities, such as fishing and oil, gas and mineral exploration and exploitation, move into deeper waters both within and beyond national jurisdiction, the relative lack of data on deep seabed ecosystems and biodiversity makes it difficult to predict and control their impacts. 56 The increasing demand for oil continues to push drilling activities into deeper water, and threatens to fundamentally alter the deep sea environment in the Gulf. Given the industry's attempts to expand the oil depletion window and sustain profits from a non-renewable resource, the outlook for protecting the Gulf environment under the current status quo is not promising. The industry must make fundamental changes to ensure that its actions do not impair the future sustainability of renewable resources in the Gulf.